



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO
ATTACHE
CHRON
RF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

SEPT 10, 1969

R 101600Z SEP 69

FM [REDACTED] ACTION COPY

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUECSDE/USMILGP, BRAZIL
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
BT

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

1. (C) INFORMATION IN THIS MESSAGE BASED ON NEARLY THREE HOURS OF CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH BRIG GEN CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS AND HIS WIFE. GEN. MEIRA MATTOS IS THE COMMANDANT OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY ACADEMY AND BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE ARE PERENNIALY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING. DESPITE A RECENT DECLINE IN PROMINENCE AFTER INCURRING THE DISPLEASURE OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA AND ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, MEIRA MATTOS REMAINS INFLUENTIAL AND HE SUSTAINS A POWER BASE AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF THE LATE PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO.

2. (C) SOURCE WAS BITTERLY OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CONDEMNATION OF THE JUNTA ARRANGEMENT. HE AVOWED THAT THE DECISION TO BY-PASS VICE PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEIXO SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE HIGH COMMANDS OF EACH SERVICE AND NOT MERELY BY THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS, THE THREE CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD. IN HIS VIEW, THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS MIGHT HAVE GOTTEN AWAY WITH A CERTAIN AURA OF LEGITIMACY, HAD NOT THREE OF THEM EMERGED AS THE DIRECT BENEFICIARIES OF THEIR OWN DECISION. MEIRA SAID THAT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE JUNTA DECIDED TO MEET THE RANSOM DEMANDS FOR AMBASSADOR ELBRICK WAS BOTH HUMILIATING AND ANOTHER CRASS DISDAIN FOR THE SERVICE HIGH COMMANDS. HE CONSIDERS THE JUNTA'S POSITION UNTENABLE AND ITS DEMISE IMMINENT.

3. (C) IN ASSESSING THE CONTENDING GROUPS, MEIRA IDENTIFIED GENERALS GEISEL, MURICY, MEDICI, AFFONSO DE ALGUEQUERQUE LIMA, AND SYSENO AS RUNNING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE OR AS HAVING AMBITIOUS ASSOCIATES RUNNING THEM. HE BELIEVES THAT GEN. GEISEL,

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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GEN. MURICY, AND GEN. MEDICI HAVE CHANCES ONLY IF THE JUNTA AND HIGH COMMAND ARE ABLE TO MEDITATE ON THE SUCCESSION WITHOUT PRESSURES, WHEREAS AFFONSO AND SYSENO CAN PROSPER ONLY AS THE PRODUCTS OF PRESSURE. MEIRA LEANS TOWARD GEISEL AND SYSENO IN THE RESPECTIVE CATEGORIES. HIS PREFERENCES NATURALLY REFLECT HIS ASSESSMENT OF HIS OWN FUTURE UNDER EACH CONTENDER.

4. ~~(C)~~ MEIRA ALSO MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. IF GEN. AFFONSO GAINS THE PRESIDENCY THERE WILL BE A WHOLESALE CHANGE IN THE CABINET. NO MATTER WHO THE NEW PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT IS, AT LEAST FOUR CABINET OFFICERS (ANDREAZZA, TARSO DUTRA, IVO ARZUA, AND LEONEL MIRANDA) WILL BE SACKED.

B. LYRA TAVARES IS HOPING TO BUY TIME FOR THE JUNTA BY CONDUCTING SOUNDINGS AT THE FOUR ARMIES. THIS IS FUTILE BECAUSE THE ONLY SOURCE OF POWER IS THE FIRST ARMY.

C. THE JUNTA HAS GAINED A BIT OF BREATHING ROOM AS A RESULT OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ACTS. IT WILL GAIN ADDITIONAL TIME IF IT CAN APPREHEND THE AMBASSADOR'S ABDUCTORS.

D. ANY SOLUTION THAT IS FOUND MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A DECENT WAY OF DISPOSING OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA.

E. GEN. PORTELLA REMAINS WHOLLY DEDICATED TO COSTA E SILVA AND HAS NO PERSONAL AMBITION. EVERYTHING HE DOES IS FOR COSTA E SILVA. PORTELLA IS PUSHING HARD FOR GEN. MEDICI AS A SOLUTION.

F. IF THE HIGH COMMAND CANNOT AGREE ON ONE OF ITS MEMBERS AS A SUCCESSOR TO THE JUNTA, IT MIGHT DECIDE IN FAVOR OF A RETIRED MILITARY MAN (PASSARINHO OR COSTA CAVALCANTI), OR EVEN A CIVILIAN (PIO CORREIA OR ETELVINO LINS).

G. THE ARTILLERY BATTALION OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE REFUSED TO MARCH IN THE 7 SEPTEMBER PARADE AND 11 OF ITS OFFICERS ARE UNDER ARREST. THREE OFFICERS WERE ARRESTED AT THE OFFICERS ADVANCED SCHOOL AT THE VILA MILITAR FOR ATTEMPTING TO CIRCULATE A MANIFESTO CRITICIZING THE JUNTA'S ACTION ON THE ELBRICK CASE. OFFICER REBELLIONS SUCH AS THESE ARE "STUPID".

H. THERE IS NO INTER-SERVICE PROBLEM OVER THE FACT THAT ONLY AN ARMY GENERAL CAN QUALIFY FOR THE PRESIDENCY. NEITHER THE NAVY NOR THE AIR FORCE HAVE ANYONE WITH PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES.

I. COSTA E SILVA CAN RECOVER TO BE A LOVING GRANDFATHER, BUT NEVER TO RESUME THE PRESIDENCY.

COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ THE CLEVER MEIRA MATTOS OBVIOUSLY SENSES THAT SOMETHING IS ABOUT TO POP AND HE DID NOT WANT TO BE AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY (150 KILOMETERS FROM RIO) OBLIVIOUS TO THE JOCKEYING FOR ADVANTAGE. HIS VISIT TO ME WAS A FISHING EXPEDITION WHICH HE

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4-68



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PROBABLY HOPED WOULD FILL IN ANY GAPS IN HIS OWN EXTENSIVE PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE NET. THE ONLY GAP I COULD DISCERN FROM THE DETAILS HE PARADED DEALS WITH PRECISE INFORMATION ON WHO, WHEN, AND HOW. WE PARTED WITH MUTUAL DOUBTS OVER THOSE THREE KEY ELEMENTS. GP-3

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FORM FS-412
4-68

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Charge:

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Classification

Control:

-3-

Date: September 10, 1969

3. Comment: Preceding reflect thinking at this point of most powerful (in terms troop command) most senior, and perhaps most influential military voice on the Planalto. GP-3

SP
LOW

Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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SEPT 10, 1969

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P 092000Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (K-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI DA
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1. ~~(C)~~ NUMEROUS WELL PLACED SOURCES CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT A REPLACEMENT FOR THE JUNTA ARRANGEMENT IS IMMINENT. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF A GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER MEETING NOW GOING ON AT THE AIR MINISTRY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELECTING A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD GUIDE BRAZIL FOR THE REMAINDER OF COSTA E SILVA'S TERM.
2. ~~(C)~~ THERE IS STILL MUCH UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW THE CHANGE WILL BE ENGINEERED, AND ALMOST AS MUCH OVER THE WHO THAT WILL EMERGE IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT. SINCE MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA HAS BEEN DOING MOST OF THE CAMPAIGNING, HIS NAME HAS GAINED THE WIDEST CURRENCY. TODAY, HOWEVER, THERE IS JUST THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT A CONSENSUS MAY BE FORMING AROUND THE PERSON OF GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF.
3. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE FACT THAT GEN. GEISEL TURNED SIXTY-FOUR LAST FRIDAY AND THAT HE REPORTEDLY HAS HAD BOUTS WITH EMPHYSEMA, HE HAS MUCH FAVORABLE ARITHMETIC ON HIS SIDE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. FIRST OF ALL, HE IS GENUINELY RESPECTED AS A MAN OF INTELLECT, MORALITY, AND PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENT. HIS PERSONAL LIFE IS IMPECCABLE; HIS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS ARE OF THE HIGHEST ORDER AND HE WAS DEEPLY RESPECTED BY THE LATE PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO. MOREOVER, HE IS THE SENIOR ARMY GENERAL ON ACTIVE DUTY AND HE OCCUPIES A JOINT POSITION. THESE TWO CONDITIONS WOULD QUALIFY HIM TO TAKE OVER FROM THE THREE

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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SERVICE MINISTERS WITHOUT SCRATCHING THE PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY. MOREOVER, HE COULD BE THE NEEDED RALLYING POINT FOR THREATENED MILITARY UNITY. GEN. GEISEL HAS RETURNED TO HIS HEADQUARTERS IN POLITICALLY-ABANDONED BRASILIA WHERE HE REMAINS ALOOF FROM THE NASTY IN-FIGHTING THAT TENDS TO CONTAMINATE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF OTHERWISE WELL-REGARDED ASPIRANTS.

COMMENT: ~~(e)~~ MANY THINGS REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE GEISEL SOLUTION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED. ONE OF THE DILEMMAS IS THE SAFEGUARDING OF COSTA E SILVA'S DIGNITY AND EVEN HIS CHANCES FOR RECOVERY. BRAZILIANS ARE VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT PULLING THE RUG FROM UNDER A SUFFERING MAN, AND SOME WAY MUST BE FOUND TO OBTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S ACQUIESCENCE. STILL ANOTHER PROBLEM IS WHETHER AND HOW CONGRESS IS RECALLED. FINALLY, WILL THE ARMED FORCES WANT A 64-YEAR OLD MAN FOR A FULL TERM OR MERELY AS A CARE-TAKER TO CARRY OUT THE FINAL COSTA E SILVA YEAR AND ONE-HALF. IN THE EVENT THE DECISION IS MADE FOR THE CARE-TAKER, SOME WAY MUST BE FOUND OF DISPOSING OF VICE-PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEIXO. IN THE END, THERE IS EVERY EXPECTATION THAT A NON-VIOLENT BRAZILIAN SOLUTION WILL EMERGE AND THAT MILITARY UNITY WILL BE RECOMPOSED IN THE PROCESS. GP-3.

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4-68

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control: 390

Date: September 9, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 390

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. Your assessment that Paratroop Artillery Battalion center of resistance to release 15 political prisoners apparently correct. Commandant Brasilia Marines told me today ~~that~~ group from that battalion seized radio station and ~~that~~ thirty officers now under arrest. He described their act as most serious of disturbances that occurred.

2. Reference newspaper report that several hundred "sailors" tried block departure from Galeao, source said he not have definite information but believes must have been group of marines.

3. Concerning decision to release prisoners, he stated that "most" officer opinion was against it. Then added that only those who had all the information were competent to judge.

4. Comment: This latter sentiment I have heard from wide variety sources past three days and seems to be a stabilizing aspect to an otherwise strongly emotional response.

Drafted by UKE [] md/9/9/69

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

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Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: September 9, 1969

As news of patient and successful action against the abductors spreads, it is likely that many weekend hotheads will conclude government acted with maturity and responsibility after all. Colonel who informed me of their capture yesterday was obviously swelling with pride. GP-3

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Classification

Control: 385

Date: September 8, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 385

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. Following is additional information gathered yesterday and this morning.

2. Found several officers of Presidencia and President's Aide separately talking about President reassuming partial powers somewhere near end this month. Idea is for him treat only major issues such as new constitution and opening Congress, and leave routine to others. Apparently large volume routine involving mostly signatures and legal procedures could be delegated. However, several officers asked one source how such routine things, perhaps officer promotions, would not through lack Presidential attention grow into major issue. He had no good reply. Considering all night emergency work session in Presidencia, interesting they saying same thing. Appears most anyone of opinion only President has acceptable prestige ^{to} ~~xxx~~ open Congress. It may be their desire ^{see} /President return at least long enough reinitiate legitimate form government with procedures select legal successor Costa e

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: September 8, 1969

Silva and avoid pending division military and possible civil war. Several sources said as much. In fact at moment this writing President's Aide called and reiterated his statement that President will reassume 20 Sept. and added will be for purpose open procedure select successor. Flurry over incident of Ambassador he sees as ~~now~~ beginning subside at once.

3.

EO50x1

Dona Iolanda about 1100 Sunday. Same best possible news as before. Say now quite evident it was spasm rather than worse possibilities. Said he can speak words but not articulate sentences. While movement returned to right leg and hand, he yet cannot write. Apparently first indication illness was during interview with Goias Governor Otavio Lage 27 August after which he told Aide, "He must think I have lost my mind, I couldn't get words to come out right."

4. Reference strong current military opinion against decision meet terrorist terms for releasing Ambassador,

EO50x1

He added everyone has right to believe what want but in the end we have Brazilian saying to cover situation:

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Classification

Control:

-3-

Date: September 8, 1969

"He who gives orders has power; he who obeys does because he must." This is what counts, he said, let's see what will happen. He sounded confident.

5. On same subject EO50x1 called this morning in obviously low spirits to say he depressed to hear so many officers saying that junta gave in to terrorist terms because of pressure from United States. For example, said even he couldn't understand why junta met at Itamarati to discuss subject. Reason given, he said, was communications

EO50x1

He also said there is much talk that driver not take advantage powerful bullet proof car to evade captors. I have heard similar statements from many other sources. They also are annoyed over report that Ambassador left w/o body guard.

6. Spent last evening with small military group at home Air Force General Staff Colonel. Following impressions heard:

- a. Not look like President will be well soon.
- b. Junta was formed in typical Brazilian fashion assuming all OK soon. Seemed good solution at moment with VP ~~unacceptable~~ unacceptable.

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Control:

-4-

Date: September 8, 1969

c. Important issue is open Congress and have elections. However, in reality of moment only likely solution appears military power struggle with strong man winning.

d. Would like get out of politics ASAP if only guarantee civilians not take country right back to 1963. Unfortunately, despite their talk, there are no civilians in Brazil today big enough lead country.

7. Very good source EO50x1 advised this morning that situation in Brasilia is calm.

8. Comment: Above gives some feel of situation as being received in Brasilia. GP-3.

LOW *cl*

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

SEPT 8, 1969

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1. (C)

EO50x1

SITUATION IS LOOKING UP WITH RESPECT TO SUSTAINING MILITARY UNITY AND DEVISING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE RECOGNIZED THAT PRESSURES REMAIN STRONG AND DANGEROUS, BUT SENSES JUST THE SLIGHTEST EASING ON THE BASIS OF THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE POLITICAL AMBITIONS OF SOME MILITARY LEADERS, AS WELL AS BECAUSE OF THE TRAUMATIC REALIZATION THAT MILITARY UNITY IS IN JEOPARDY.

2. (C) IN HIS VIEW, GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA "IS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE RACE" AND 1ST ARMY COMMANDER GEN. SYSENO IS ALSO NOT A FACTOR. HE WOULD NOT EXPAND ON WHAT LED HIM TO THESE CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE ASSERTED WITH THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE INSIDER. HE MERELY INSISTED ON THE ABSENCE OF REAL FOLLOWINGS IN EITHER CASE AND AVOWED THAT "THE FOUR-STAR GENERALS THAT COUNT ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT".

3. (C) THE COLONEL DEPLORED THE FACT THAT TODAY'S PRESS HAD BEEN KEPT BY GEN SYSENO FROM GIVING THE FULL STORY ON REPORTEDLY HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL POLICE DRAGNETS AGAINST AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S KIDNAPPERS AND THEIR ASSOCIATES

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4-68



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HE SAID THAT INVESTIGATIONS STILL UNDERWAY KEPT THE STORY FROM BEING ANNOUNCED, BUT THAT RAIDS LAST NIGHT IN RIO DE JANEIRO HAD NETTED FOUR SAFE-HOUSES AND OCCUPANTS AS WELL AS MOST OF THOSE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S ABDUCTION. THE SAME TYPE OF GOOD LUCK REPORTEDLY PREVAILS IN SAO PAULO AGAINST IMPORTANT TARGETS. [REDACTED], "THEY GOT BACK FIFTEEN OF THEIRS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE AMBASSADOR, BUT WE ARE MULTIPLYING THAT FIGURE IN OUR FAVOR." HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT DISCLOSURE TOMORROW OR THE NEXT DAY OF THE ARRESTS IS BOUND TO GAIN BROAD PUBLIC CONFIDENCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, HE BELIEVES THAT THE MANY EMBITTERED MILITARY OFFICERS WILL BE ASSUAGED BY THE RESULTS OF THE NEW TOUGHENED POSTURE. COMMENT: (C) [REDACTED]

EO50x1

P-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/SEDSTATE WASHDC
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RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
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SEPT 8, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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1. (C) DURING ATTENDANCE AT INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE IN BRASILIA, [REDACTED] EO50x1 DISCERNED THAT PRINCIPAL SUBJECT OF CONVERSATION AMONG BRAZILIA OFFICERS WAS THE DECISION OF THE GOB TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR AMBASSADOR ELBRICK. COMMENTS WERE HEATED AND TREND INDICATIVE OF OPPOSITION TO THE DECISION. PARATROOPER SON-IN-LAW OF GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF, SAID: "THE DECISION WAS GOOD FOR THE U.S. BUT NOT FOR BRAZIL. UNFORTUNATELY, THE BEST THING FOR BRAZIL NOW IS THAT THEY KILL THE AMBASSADOR TO PROVE TO ALL HOW FUTILE SUCH A DECISION IS." SEVERAL OFFICERS REMARKED THAT AMERICANS DO NOT REALIZE THAT BRAZIL IS IN THE MIDST OF GUERRILLA WARFARE.

2. (C)

[REDACTED] EO50x1

CONRADO

STILL TRYING TO PORTRAY OPTIMISM WITH RESPECT TO PRESIDENT'S CHANCES OF RESUMING OFFICE, BUT LACK OF REAL CONVICTION APPARENT, AS WELL AS MOOD OF DEJECTION. CONRADO AND OTHERS ON PRESIDENTIAL STAFF CLING TO SLIM HOPE PRESIDENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO RETURN BETWEEN 20-30 SEPTEMBER, BUT RECOGNIZE JUNTA ARRANGEMENT UNLIKELY TO SURVIVE THAT LONG.

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FILES WITHIN (5) DAYS.



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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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3. ~~(C)~~ IN MOMENTS WHEN EMOTIONALISM SUBSIDED AND REASON SURFACED, CONRADO FACED UP TO REQUIREMENT FOR A SUCCESSOR. HE CONTENTS THAT GEN. MEDICI, 3RD ARMY COMMANDER, IS ONLY VIABLE 4-STAR CONTENDER. CONRADO ALSO MENTIONED GEN. CASTILHO, THE COMMANDER OF THE VILA MILITARY GARRISON IN RIO DE JANEIRO, BUT QUALIFIED THIS BY ASSERTING THAT 1ST ARMY TOO DIVIDED TO SUPPORT ANY ONE CADIDATE. CONRADO WROTE OFF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES AS "BRILLIAN BUT TOO WEAK." HE THINKS THAT GEN. MURICY, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, IS JUST A "GOOD GUY". AS FOR GEN. AFFONSO DE ALGUQUERQUE LIMA, CONRADO REFERRED TO HIM AS HAVING LIMITED INTELLIGENCE AND NO TROOPS. HE DOWNGRADED GEN. SYSENO, 1ST ARMY COMMANDER, ON THE BASIS OF NOT BEING CLEVER ENOUGH TO MANEUVER HIMSELF INTO THE PRESIDENCY. IN SCANNING THE HORIZON OF POTENTIALS, CONRADO ALSO THREW IN THE NAMES OF GEN. PORTELLA, CIDF OF THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD, AND MAJ. GEN. EDNARDO D'AVILLA MELLO, RECENT MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON. DESPITE HIS AMBIVALENCE OVER NAMES, CONRADO WAS FIRM IN ASSERTING THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO BE AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY GENERAL OFFICER.

ARMA COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ CONRADO'S COMMENTS PROBABLY REPRESENT AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THINGS HE ACTUALLY HEARD COSTA E SILVA SAY AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, OR OF WHAT HE THINKS THE PRESIDENT WOULD SAY IF HE WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE POLITCO-MILITARY CRISIS NOW UNDERWAY. THERE OS ALSO A HEAVY DOSE OF SELF-PRESERATION IN HIS COMMENTS, SINCE HE LEANS TOWARD INDIVIDUALS (MEDICI, PORTELLA, EDNARDO) WHO WOULD PERPETUATE THE COSTA E SILVA TEAM. THE HONORABLE BUT NAIVE CONRADO APPEARS TO OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT CLOSE IDENTIFICATON WITH THAT TEAM PROBABLY IS EQUIVALENT TO THE "KISS OF DEATH" IN THE CURRENT SWEEPSTAKE. GP-3.

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Foreign Service of the
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Charge:

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Classification

Control: 382

Date: September 7, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasília 382

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. At Independence Day Parade this morning officers in Reviewing Stand were intensely discussing pros and cons of releasing political prisoners, with trend in favor cons. Said Gen. Geisel's paratrooper son-in-law, "the decision was good for US but not Brazil; unfortunately best thing for Brazil now is that they kill Ambassador to prove to all how futile such a decision is." Several remarked Americans not know Brazil is in guerrilla war.

2. Notable was size of turnout of troop units, indicating no need felt for appreciable troop reserve in barracks. Army, Navy and Air Force almost totally accounted for, including combat aircraft.

3.

EO50x1

He was on

emergency duty in Palácio until 0200 this morning. For first time he is showing, and admitting, crisis situation exists.

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Control:

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Date:

Comments and attitudes expressed reflect much of what you reporting. He spoke against wisdom of releasing prisoners although acknowledged that weak junta arrangement had no other choice:

a. ~~Basic~~ Basic hope is still ~~promised~~ ^{predicated} on return of President soon. Two other officers of Presidência today spoke of 30 September. Aide went so far as to suggest 20 September. He said thought President's first act be to issue constitution and throw open Congress for election new President in December in order take heat off situation. However, rest of comments indicated he not really believe this possible.

b. ~~He~~ He believed weakness of junta and its fall could lead to civil war because Armed Forces so divided, especially after incident of kidnapping Ambassador. However, saw present trauma as great ~~wave~~ wave which will subside in about ten days. Big challenge junta is survive through that period.

c. ~~If~~ If junta falls, stated next leader must be Army general.

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Control:

-3-

Date:

No question of politics, just pure military power. Therefore, he will have to be respected as man of decision. As expected, stated only viable 4-star general is Medici. In addition decisiveness he commands large army. Other most likely is Gen. Castilho of Vila Militar because of his decisiveness. ~~Believes first Army too D Believes First Army too divided to deliver~~ Believes First Army too divided to deliver the strength to one leader. ^{Feels} ~~Feels~~ Brasilia garrison too firmly commanded and remote that not likely be important factor. Lira ~~discontented as brilliant~~ discounted as brilliant but too weak, Muricy as just "good guy", Affonso as too limited in intelligence and without troops. Syseno he doubted was clever enough pull it off. The Air Force, he said, is leaning toward support Medici. Continuing his thoughts of personal survival, he also threw in name of General Portella and General Mello in Washington as lower ranking but ~~decisive~~ decisive generals with possibilities of landing on top turbulence. Civilian-military types such as Passarinho and Andreazza he

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-4-

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rejected out-of-hand because if the junta falls the future of
Brazil will be purely an Army affair, come what may to
the ~~next~~ rest of the country.

4. COMMENT: I have never seen normally optimistic
Conrado in such pessimistic state. He is coolly accepting
fact end for Costa e Silva may be in sight. He departs for
Rio about 1100 Monday.

LOW

Sen

Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

ACTION
POL
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P 071630Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI DA
RUECSDE/USMILGRP BRAZIL
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (U) TRADITIONAL INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE TOOK PLACE IN RIO DE JANEIRO BETWEEN 0900 AND 1115 TODAY WITH 3 SERVICE MINISTERS TAKING SALUTE NORMALLY GIVEN TO PRESIDENT. MEMBERS OF CABINET, DIPLOMATIC CORPS, CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS, AND VETERANS GROUP IN CROWDED STANDS TOGETHER WITH SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE THREE SERVICES. MARCH ELEMENTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY, CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS INDICATIONS THAT EMPHASIS THIS YEAR WOULD BE ON SCHOOL CHILDREN. TROOP APPEARANCE EXCELLENT AND MATERIEL EQUALLY IMPRESSIVE. PARADE WITNESSED BY SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS POPULATION AND NO INCIDENTS REPORTED. ONLY DISTRACTION WAS LARGE FIRE IN NEW BUILDING A FEW BLOCKS FROM REVIEWING STAND. EMBASSY, BRASILIA REPORTS THAT PARADE THERE LASTED THREE HOURS AND MADE UP LARGELY OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WITH A SPRINGLING OF MILITARY UNITS. VICE PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEXO ON REVIEWING STAND WITH PRESIDENTS OF SENATE AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.
2. ~~(C)~~ ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE FROM VILA MILITAR REPORTED IN RIO LINE OF MARCH, AS WELL AS OTHER UNITS. ONLY PERCEPTIBLE VOID WAS WITHIN AIRBORNE BRIGADE WHERE ALL OF ARTILLERY BATTALION AND UP TO ONE BATTALION OF INFANTRY, AS WELL AS ORDNANCE AND PERHAPS OTHER SMALLER ELEMENTS, REMAINED AT THE VILA MILITAR. THOSE AIRBORNE ELEMENTS WHO DID PARADE CONSTITUTED A SIZEABLE AND IMPRESSIVE FORCE OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS,

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FORM FS-412
4-68



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TRAINING CENTER PERSONNEL, AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.
COMMENT: (e) ABSENCE OF AIRBORNE ARTILLERY PROBABLY
INDICATIVE THAT LAST NIGHT'S DISCIPLINARY PROBLEM
OCCURRED AMONG OFFICERS IN THAT SECTOR OF THE BRIGADE.
IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, HOWEVER, THAT THE AIRBORNE
BRIGADE IS BRAZIL'S MOBILE FIRE-FIGHTING FORCE AND THAT,
IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS A MATTER OF ROUTINE
AND PRUDENCE NOT TO COMMIT SUCH A CUTTING EDGE, IN ITS
ENTIRETY, TO PARADE ACTIVITY. THE SOLID PRESENCE IN
THE PARADE OF THE FULL 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE IS SOURCE OF
REASSURANCE THAT ARMY HIGH COMMAND CONFIDENT OF ITS
SUPPORT AT VILA MILITARY. GP-3.
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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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P 061915Z SEP 69

FM [REDACTED]

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

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RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUECSDE/USMILGP, BRAZIL

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

SEPT 6, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN [REDACTED]

1. ~~(C)~~ NAVY CAPT. PAULO CASTELLO BRANCO, SON OF THE LATE PRESIDENT, TODAY SAID THAT HE EXPECTS THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT TO FALL WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS. PAULO POINTED TO THE DEEP RESENTMENT GENERATED IN OFFICER RANKS OVER THE CAPITULATION TO AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S CAPTORS, AND CITED THE ATMOSPHERE OF DOOM AT THE NAVY MINISTRY. HE SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT THAT MINISTER RADEMACHER WAS IN THE MOST SOMBER MOOD HE HAS EVER REFLECTED WHEN HE RETURNED FROM THIS MORNING'S JUNTA MEETING WHICH RE-AFFIRMED THE DECISION TO SATISFY THE PRE-CONDITIONS OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S KIDNAPPERS.

2. ~~(C)~~ ACCORDING TO PAULO, ARMY OFFICERS FROM THE VILA MILITAR GARRISON WERE IN TOUCH WITH NAVY COLLEAGUES THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT IN CONVERSATIONS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH MUTUALLY REINFORCING POSITIONS AGAINST THE PRESENT SERVICE MINISTERS. PAULO INDICATED THAT SUCH FORMER MEMBERS OF HIS FATHER'S TEAM AS PAULO EGYDIO, RAIMUNDO BRITO, GEN. GOLBERY, AND GEN. MEIRA MATTOS WERE ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRES OF THOSE WHO WISH TO BRING DOWN THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE LATE BRIGADIER FARIA LIMA WAS ENGAGED IN SIMILAR EFFORTS AT THE TIME OF HIS FATAL HEART ATTACK TWO DAYS AGO.

COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ CAPT. CASTELLO BRANCO IS NOT POLITICALLY ASTUTE AND HE HAS STRONG BIASES AGAINST GEN. PORTELLA, ADM. RADEMACHER, AND EVEN GEN. LYRA TAVARES. THE VALUE OF PAULO'S INFORMATION LIES IN HIS PROCLIVITY FOR POLITICAL GOSSIP AND HIS ACCESS TO THE SOURCES WHO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL FUEL FOR THE POTS OF POLITICAL INTRIGUE. GP-3.

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Department of State

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RF

P 061530Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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RUESUZ/EMBASSY, BRASILIA
RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL, SAO PAULO
ZEN/CONSULATE GENERAL, PORTO ALEGRE
RUESEI/AMCONSULATE, RECIFE
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1 ~~(S)~~ GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPLY WITH TERMS SET BY TERRORISTS FOR RELEASE OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK HAS PRODUCED STRONG REACTION IN ARMY CIRCLES.

EO50x1

WITHIN RIO GARRISONS ON 5 SEPTEMBER AND THE NINE GENERAL OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND SESSION, WHICH LASTED FIVE HOURS, DEBATED THE DECISION WITH HEAT AND REALISM.

2 ~~(S)~~ AS RESULT OF PERSISTENG AND RELIABLE REPORTS OF UNEASINESS, GENERAL OFFICERS WITH COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WENT TO ALL OF THEIR UNITS TO EXPLAIN SITUATION TO OFFICERS. ESSENCE OF RATIONALE GIVEN WAS THE ABSENCE OF ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES AND THE ABSOLUTE NEED TO INSURE AMBASSADOR ELRICK'S SAFE RETURN. GEN MURICY TOLD ME AT HIS RESIDENCE AT 7:30 THIS MORNING THAT, BY 2100 LAST NIGHT, THE HIGH COMMAND WAS REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THE LID ON. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE ENORMOUS RISK TAKEN BY BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS IN THE CURRENT CONTINGENCY. HE ALSO SAID THAT ALL THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WANTS IS UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACT THAT A VERY DANGEROUS FORM OF WARFARE IS IN FULL SWING IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CHIEF OF STAFF CITED GUERRILLA TRAINING AREAS WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN UNCOVERED IN MARANHAO AND WESTERN PARANA STATES, AS WELL AS THE DECLARATION BY THE AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPPERS THAT RURAL WARFARE WOULD BE UNDERWAY BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

3 ~~(S)~~ SAID THAT OFFICER UNHAPPINESS IS NOT CONFINED TO JUNIOR OFFICERS AND THAT IT EXTENDS TO EVERY MAJOR MILITARY COMMAND. SOME OFFICERS WERE MOST UNHAPPY WITH THE INITIAL PUBLICATION OF THE KIDNAPPER'S

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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MANIFESTO, BUT MANY OTHERS BECAME BITTER OVER THE AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE "ON THE BASIS OF THE PRE-CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY VULGAR COMMUNISTS". EO50x1 SAID THAT OFFICER UNHAPPINESS FLOWED FROM OTHER REASON AS WELL: (1) THE FEELING AMONG A SMALL NUMBER THAT RUMOR MILL STORIES OF AN AMERICAN DEMAND FOR THE GOB TO ACT AS IT DID ARE TRUE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION REPRESENTS SHAMEFUL CAPITULATION TO FOREIGN PRESSURES; (2) THE FACT THAT SOME OFFICERS PARTICIPATED IN THE HUNT FOR OR THE TEDIOUS TRIALS OF SOME OF THE PRISONERS AND THAT THEIR WORK AND DEDICATION HAS SUDDENLY BEEN CAST DOWN THE DRAIN; (3) CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL WHEN MOST OF THOSE RELEASED RETURN TO THE COUNTRY TO RESUME THEIR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES; AND (4) FEAR THAT THE PRECEDENT BEING ESTABLISHED WILL NURTURE CURRENTLY PASSIVE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND ERODE THE SECURITY POSTURE OF BRAZIL. COMMENT: (⊕) DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S APPARENT VICTORY IN THIS INSTANCE, SEVERAL DISTURBING ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN GENERATED AND THESE WILL LEND THEIR WEIGHT TO THE AIR OF UNCERTAINTY THAT EMERGED FOLLOWING PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S STROKE. PERHAPS FOREMOST AMONG THEM IS THE EROSION - EVEN IF SLIGHT - OF MILITARY UNITY. FLOWING FROM THAT, ONE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS ARE WEAKER, BOTH IN THEIR CABINET CAPACITIES AS WELL AS IN THE SENSE OF A JUNTA. FINALLY, IT APPEARS REASONABLE TO EXPECT RATHER HARSH SECURITY MEASURES AS SOON AS THE ELBRICK CASE IS RESOLVED. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

SEPT 5, 1969

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1. ~~(C)~~ ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES HAS CALLED A MEETING OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND FOR THIS AFTERNOON. GEN LYRA HAD CONSIDERED HOLDING A MEETING LATER IN THE MONTH TO EVALUATE PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS AND SUBSEQUENT AD HOC EXECUTIVE ARRANGEMENT; HOWEVER, FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS REPORTEDLY LED HIM TO CALL MEETING ON URGENT BASIS.
A. PRESIDENT'S REPORTED IMPROVEMENT AND NEED FOR IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HIS TRUE CAPABILITY TO RESUME OFFICE ON EFFECTIVE BASIS.

B. CONTINUING INTENSE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY POLITICIANS AND SOME SENIOR MILITARY MEN.

C. THE REQUIREMENT TO GIVE HIGH COMMAND SOME SORT OF PRIDE-SOOTHING SATISFACTION FOLLOWING ARBITRARY MANNER IN WHICH 3 SERVICE MINISTERS DECIDED TO ACT FOR PRESIDENT. D. THE KIDNAPPING OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK.

2. ~~(C)~~ RUMOR MILL CONTINUES TO CHURN FURIOUSLY OVER LIKELIHOOD THAT A DEFINITIVE POLITICO-MILITARY CHANGE OF STATUS IS IMMINENT. KEY MILITARY FIGURE IN SUCH SPECULATION REMAINS MAJOR GENERAL AFFONSO AUGUSTO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, DIRECTOR OF ARMY ORDINANCE AND FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER, WHO RELIABLY REPORTED ON VERGE OF ISSUING SOME SORT OF MANIFESTO EXPOUNDING HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. AFFONSO IS NOT THE ONLY REPORTED ACTIVIST, HOWEVER, AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLEGEDLY PENDING "SOLUTION" TO THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM INVOLVES GENERAL ORLANDO GEISEL, CHIEF OF

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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THE ARMED FORCES STAFF, OR GENERAL MURICY, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

3. ~~(C)~~ TODAY'S MEETING COULD PRODUCE MORE ACCURATE BASIS FOR ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT IS TRULY A FLUID SITUATION. ONE KEY ELEMENT WHICH MEETING PROBABLY WILL DEFINE IS THE EXACT STATUS OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES AMONG HIS TOP COLLEAGUES. THE PROUD LYRA, WHO IS TIRED BUT NOT OTHERWISE HAMPERED BY ANY HEALTH PROBLEM, COULD THROW IN THE TOWEL IF HE SENSES THAT HE HAS LOST AUTHORITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE COULD EMERGE WITH A FULL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM THE HIGH COMMAND WHICH WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD INSURING MILITARY UNITY IN THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD. PRESENT BETTING WOULD HAVE TO LEAN TOWARD THE HIGH COMMAND DISDAINING SUCH AMBITIOUS INDIVIDUALS AS GENERAL AFFONSO AND THE CASHIRED COL BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI, WHILE PLACING ITS CHIPS ON SAFEGUARDING THE RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY WHICH IS THE BEST INSURANCE FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL.

4. ~~(C)~~ OFFICERS ON THE ARMY MINISTER'S STAFF GENERALLY SHARE BELIEF THAT AFFONSO AND HIS ENTOURAGE ARE MISREADING THEIR REAL STRENGTH; THAT GEN ARAGAO IS NO LONGER A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION; THAT KEY TROOP COMMANDERS ARE FULLY RESPONSIVE TO THE MINISTER'S AUTHORITY; AND THAT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN MURICY REMAINS FIRMLY LOYAL TO HIS OLD FRIEND LYRA TAVARES. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT LYRA TAVARES HAS SEEN HIS LONG-TERM PRESIDENTIAL CHANCES BADLY DAMAGED BY NEED TO ASSUME TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL ROLE OF CO-PRESIDENT. WHILE HE IS LIKELY TO MUSTER A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FOR THE SAKE OF SUSTAINING THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNITED DURING CURRENT PERIOD OF CRISIS, THAT SUPPORT COULD VANISH QUICKLY UNLESS PRESENT DILEMMA IS RESOLVED SOON. GP-3.
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FORM FS-412
4-68

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

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Classification

Control: 376

Date: September 5, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 376

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. During week have had numerous opportunities talk to wide group officers of all services in EMFA, Presidencia, NSC, SNI, Military Ministries and local commands. From top to bottom there is certain unity in what they are saying:

a. Almost all regard optimistically likelihood president will return to office within some time frame less than six months. This they see as primary way out of present dilemmas.

b. If President not able return, they see situation then turning serious sharply. They see President himself making decision. Estimates range from one to six months. In one version or another, all have talked of need select new president at that point. None have mentioned continuation of junta.

50X1 HUMINT

must either find new President or Vice President.

When I expressed shock at idea new Vice President, he said, "keep this low but Brazilian solution is possible."

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA 9

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Control:

-2-

Date: September 5, 1969

c. They speak of selection of presidential candidate or candidates by junta followed by election in newly opened Congress. Big thing for potential candidates is not show feelings. A man who points to himself will jeopardize his military support. Most likely will be man expected to make least changes in present government membership. Albuquerque Lima is rejected out of hand as ^{lacking} ~~lacking~~ significant military support. Lira overall is considered most likely. Others most talked about are Muricy, Passarinho, and Andreazza. They see selection as potentially dangerous power struggle "under the table." Generally they express sincere confidence in good intentions of junta but recognize its weaknesses for anything more than provisional solution.

d. Few expect Congress will be opened by junta. Most feel this be one of first acts of Costa e Silva or first order of business in post-junta period. None have exhibited concern that action on reopening political process critical at this stage. From across spectrum, not just hardliners, one sees their conviction that people not really interested in a Congress. In fact, there is deep confidence that

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

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Control:

-3-

Date: September 5, 1969

Brazilian people as whole approve of junta solution. They seem to have closed their minds to possibility some elements responsible citizenry believe a less politically disciplined approach is called for.

e. Major concern this point seems be that Armed Forces not lose undisputed control of Revolution and direction national security effort. Tendency of feeling exhibited is toward less rather than more democratic methods despite fundamental long range commitment to democracy. Strong feelings expressed frequently prior to kidnapping of Ambassador to effect that major issue facing country at this point is terrorism, have been fortified by that act. GP-3

LOW *sc*

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

SEPT 17, 1969

R 171745Z SEP 69

FM FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (C) MAJOR ANTONIO GABRIEL CONRADO DIAS, ARMY AIDE-DE-CAMP TO PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA, CAME BY OFFICE THIS MORNING FOR A RELAZED CHAT. HIS COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PHYSICAL CONDITION WERE ENTHUSIASTIC AND HE STATED FIRMLY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED NEXT WEEK AS HE STANDS AT A LARANJEIRAS PALACE WINDOW AND WAVES TO NEWSMEN. MOREOVER, CONRADO ASSERTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE READY TO RESUME OFFICE IN EARLY OCTOBER. I SUGGESTED THE PRESIDENT'S 3 OCTOBER BIRTHDAY AND HE REACTED WITH AGREEMENT.

2. (C) 50X1 HUMINT INVITATIONS TO VISIT WITH MARSHAL COSTA E SILVA HAVE GONE OUT TO A SELECT GROUP OF REASONABLY CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL CRONIES. THE VISITATION PROGRAM WAS URGED BY THE FRENCH SPECIALIST WHO EXAMINED THE PRESIDENT SEVERAL DAYS AGO. THE PRINICPAL CRITERION IS THAT THE INITIAL SELECTION BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS UNILKELY TO PRODUCE A STRONG EMOTIONAL REACTION. ON THAT BASIS, THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT SEE HIS GRANDCHILDREN FOR THE TIME BEING. CONRADO SAID TAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET BEEN TOLD OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S KIDNAPPING EPISODE, BUT THAT COSTA E SILVA HAS FREE ACCESS TO RADIO AND TELEVISION. THE PRESIDENT'S MAJOR RADIO INTEREST IS LISTENING TO THE BROADCASTS OF THE HORSE RACES ON

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FORM FS-412
4-68



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THURSDAY NIGHTS AND SATURDAY AND SUNDAY AFTERNOONS. BY THE END OF THE MONTH CONRADO ESTIMATES THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL AGAIN BE STUDYING THE RACING PROGRAMS AVIDLY AND ASKING CLOSE FRIENDS TO PLACE A SMALL BET OR TWO ON HIS SELECTIONS.

COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ CONRADO IS A FIERCELY LOYAL YOUNG MAN WHO IS LIKELY TO BE THE LAST ONE TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT PROBABLY WILL NEVER RETURN TO OFFICE. THERE CAN BE NO DENYING THE PRESIDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT, HOWEVER, AND THIS TURN OF EVENTS WILL PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CONSULTATIONS AND DEBATES OVER THE SUCCESSION ISSUE. WHILE THE LIKELIHOOD OF COSTA E SILVA RETURNING MUST STILL BE TERMED REMOTE, HIS SIGNS OF RECOVERY MAKE HIS OFFICE MORE RESISTANT TO ARBITRARY CHANGE. GP-3.
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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R 221930Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
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SEPT 23, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN SC

1. (C) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO WEIGHS HIS STATEMENTS CAREFULLY. MOREOVER, HE ENJOYS A STERLING REPUTATION OF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE U.S. AND WITH FREE ENTERPRISE IN THE AMERICAN MANNER.

2. (C) [REDACTED], THE POSSIBILITY OF GEN. AFFONSO BECOMING PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL IS NOT ALTOGETHER COMFORTING. HE FEELS THAT AFFONSO HIMSELF IS A MAN OF PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATIC MOTIVATION, BUT THAT HE HAS FOOLISHLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO UNTRUSTWORTHY INDIVIDUALS. FIRST OF ALL, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, AFFONSO HAS SIDED WITH REACTIONAIRES SUCH AS ADMIRAL BERUTTI, CHIEF OF PORTS AND COASTS, AND ADM. HEITOR, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS. MOREOVER, AFFONSO REPORTEDLY HAS EMBRACED THE SUPPORT OF SUCH POTENTIAL NASSERISTS AS HARD-LINERS COLS. BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI AND HELIO LEMOS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AFFONSO WILL NAME GEN.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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MONIZ DE ARAGAO, THE RECENTLY-FIRED INTRANSIGENT PURIST, AS HIS MINISTER OF THE ARMY. THIS CHOICE, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WILL PLACE THE ARMY IN A STATE OF TURMOIL AND ALSO REPRESENT A LATENT CHALLENGE TO WHOMEVER THE PRESIDENT HAPPENS TO BE.

3. (C) [REDACTED], GEN. AFFONSO [REDACTED] WAS NOT ACTIVELY SEEKING THE PRESIDENCY BUT THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT HIS NAME WAS THE POPULAR CHOICE AMONG OFFICERS FROM COLONEL ON DOWN. AFFONSO IS SAID TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT "THE GENERALS GROUP" WILL NEVER SELECT HIM, BUT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE A STRONG VOICE IN THE SELECTION OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT. IN ADDITION, AFFONSO BELIEVES THAT ANY PRESIDENT CHOSEN NOW WILL LAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS ONLY AND THAT HE WILL EMERGE AT THAT TIME. AFFONSO REPORTEDLY STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW HIS FOLLOWERS TO GO INTO A STATE OF OPEN REBELLION AGAINST CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY, BUT THAT THE HIGH COMMAND WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN ITS ACTIONS DURING THE COMING WEEKS.

4. (C) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES HAS A GOOD CHANCE IF HE INDICATES THAT HIS HAT IS IN THE RING. AT LEAST GEN. MURICY WILL BACK HIM, AS WILL MEDICI, CANAVARRO, AND NAHON. IF LYRA DOES NOT INDICATE INTEREST, HOWEVER, MURICY IS THE MAN TO BEAT,

[REDACTED]
CANDIDATES TO BURN THEMSELVES OUT THROUGH A PREMATURE DISPLAY OF AMBITION.

5. (C) ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WILL BE IN BAD SHAPE CAREER-WISE, UNDER EITHER MURICY OR AFFONSO, IS BRIG. GEN CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS, COMMANDANT OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY, [REDACTED]. MEIRA MATTOS APPARENTLY REALIZES

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

THIS AND IS FRANTICIALLY PROMOTING THE CANDIDACIES OF
EITHER GEN. ERNESTO GEISEL OR OF HIS BROTHER, GEN. ORLANDO
GEISEL. [REDACTED] DOES NOT THINK THE GEISELS HAVE ANY CHANCE
AT ALL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AMONG OTHERS WHO
DO NOT RAITE WITH EITHER AFFONSO OR MURICY, ACCORDING TO
SOURCE, ARE: FINANCE MINISTER DELFIM NETTO, TRANSPORTATION
MINISTER ANDREAZZA, INTERIOR MINISTER COSTA CAVALCANTI,
HEALTH MINISTER MIRANDA, PLANNING MINISTER BELTRAO, AND
FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO.

EO50x1

COMMENT: ~~(e)~~ IT IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GEN. AFFONSO AS A
PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECT. [REDACTED] CONVINCED
THAT HIS MODERATE VIEWS WOULD NOT PREVAIL OVER THE
"INTEGRALISTA" (FASCIST) OUTLOOK WHICH AFFONSO IS SAID TO
HAVE. [REDACTED]

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

POL

INFO

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CHRON

RF

FI

R 221800Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUEAOWD/OACSI DA

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. ~~(C)~~ A WEEKEND OF EXTENSIVE SOUNDINGS IN BRAZILIAN ARMY SECTORS

[REDACTED] SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF THE MOST VIGOROUS CAMPAIGNER -- MAJ GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA -- MIGHT BE GAINING NEW MOMENTUM. THOSE WHO ARE FOR AFFONSO ARE LOUD AND FORTHCOMING IN THEIR ATTEMPTS AT PERSUASION, WHILE NO OTHER REAL OR SUGGESTED CANDIDATE HAS THAT TYPE OF ARITHMETIC WORKING IN HIS BEHALF.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE VICE ADMIRAL SOURCE REFERRED TO ABOVE WAS OBSERVED PROMOTING THE GEN. AFFONSO CAUSE AT A DIPLOMATIC SOCIAL AFFAIR ON 19 SEPTEMBER. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL HIS ACTIVITY AS HE CORNERED ARMY GENERALS SEPARATELY.

[REDACTED] OVER 75 PERCENT OF THE ADMIRALS ARE FOR GEN. AFFONSO. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE 4-STAR GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH HIM HE REPLIED: "THEY DON'T COUNT NOW THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED TO CONDUCT SOUNDINGS AMONG ALL THE GENERALS". THE CONSENSUS OF CONTACTS WITH ARMY OFFICERS AT THE SAME RECEPTION REVEALED STRONG PRO-AFFONSO SENTIMENT.

3. ~~(C)~~ ON SATURDAY A COLONEL WHO IS IN RIO ON TEMPORARY DUTY FROM BRASILIA TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM A MEETING OF MARINE CORPS OFFICERS WHO ARE PROMOTING THE AFFONSO CANDIDACY.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Classification

[REDACTED] IN FAVOR OF GEN. AFFONSO. THE INTERESTING ASPECT OF SOURCE'S COMMENT IS THAT HE PERSONALLY IS ANTI-AFFONSO, YET HE SEEMED TO SENSE THAT THE AFFONSO BANDWAGON MIGHT BE THE ONE TO JUMP ON. [REDACTED] DID SAY THAT HE ISN'T QUITE READY TO ACCEPT AFFONSO WITHOUT A BATTLE. SOURCE REMINDS THOSE WHO FAVOR AFFONSO IF THEY ARE FAMILIAR WITH WHAT IS GOING ON IN PERU AND ASKS IF THAT IS WHAT THEY WANT FOR BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT THIS TACTIC HAD PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE IMPACT.

4. ~~(C)~~ A [REDACTED] AT RIO'S COLEGIO MILITAR SAID ON SUNDAY THAT SOME OFFICERS AT THE COLEGIO (INCLUDING HIMSELF) FAVOR GEN. MURICY, BUT THAT THE MAJORITY APPEARS TO BE SWINGING TOWARD AFFONSO.

[REDACTED] AND AN INSATIABLE APPETITE FOR POLITICAL GOSSIP, AVOWED THAT AFFONSO IS A SURE THING. THE GENERAL HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THREE DAYS IN CURITIBA AND SAO PAULO AND HE SAID THAT THE PRO-AFFONSO MOVEMENT IS VERY STRONG. HE ALSO SAID THAT SUCH HARD-LINERS AS CASHIERED COL. BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI, COL. HELIO LEMOS, AND COL. RUY DE CASTRO WERE CONCENTRATED IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL IN FEVERISH ACTIVITY IN BEHALF OF AFFONSO. THE GENERAL POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT THAT MOST OF RIO'S SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS MENTIONED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT COULD COME FROM THE FOUR-STAR OR THE THREE-STAR AREA.

EO50x1

5. ~~(C)~~ DURING A WEEKEND CONVERSATION [REDACTED], HE LAMENTED THE HEAD OF STEAM THAT AFFONSO APPEARS TO HAVE GENERATED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE GOING TO UNLEASH A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BEGIN BY REPRINTING GEN. AFFONSO'S SWAN-SONG SPEECH WHEN HE RESIGNED AS INTERIOR MINISTER SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THIS SPEECH IS BLINDLY NATIONALISTIC AND ITS DISSEMINATION WILL SEEK TO IDENTIFY IT AS THE PLATFORM FOR A REGIME HEADED BY AFFONSO. COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ THE PRESIDENTIAL SWEEPSTAKES MIGHT BE REACHING THE STAGE WHERE THE TRADITIONAL "WHITE BOTTOMS"

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Classification

SYNDROME COULD ASSERT A DECISIVE INFLUENCE. THE ESSENCE OF THIS SYNDROME IS THAT MOST BRAZILIAN OFFICERS STRADDLE WHITE-WASHED FENCES UNTIL A WINNER APPEARS TO BE EMERGING; AT THAT STAGE, A SEA OF WHITE BRITICHES CAN BE OBSERVED CHARGING OFF TOWARD THE SEEMINGLY TRIUMPHANT BANDWAGON. IF THE PRO-AFFONSO FORCES CAN CONTINUE TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR MAN IS THE VICTOR, AND IF THE HIGH COMMAND DID IN FACT ABDICATE ITS AUTHORITY IN AGREEING TO SOUNDINGS AMONG ALL GENERAL OFFICERS, THEN GEN. AFFONSO MUST BE CONSIDERED AS THE FRONT-RUNNER AT THIS MOMENT. AT THE MINIMUM, HE HAS ALREADY EARNED A STRONG VOICE IN THE COMPOSITION AND DIRECTION OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION.

GP-3.

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

POL

INFO

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RF

FI

R 251610Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RUESEI/CONSULATE GENERAL, RECIFE

RUESUZ/EMBASSY, BRASILIA

RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL, SAO PAULO

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

ZEN/AMCONSULATE, PORTO ALEGRE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (C) EO50x1 SPENT EVENING 22 SEPTEMBER AT BRASILIA APARTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL AIDE-DE-CAMP, MAJOR CONRADO, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FOR VISIT WITH FAMILY AFTER FOUR CONSECUTIVE DAYS ON DUTY AT MARSHAL COSTA E SILVA'S BEDSIDE. CONRADO WAS IN HIGH SPIRITS AND SPOKE WITH CONVICTION OF HIS EXPECTATION THAT PRESIDENT WOULD RESUME DUTIES BY DATE OF HIS 67TH BIRTHDAY ON 3 OCTOBER. MOREOVER, CONRADO BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT WILL RECALL CONGRESS ABOUT 15 OCTOBER, AFTER WHICH PRESIDENT WILL INITIATE WORKING CONVALESCENCE AT PETROPOLIS SUMMER PALACE.

2 (C) IN REPORTING ON COSTA E SILVA'S PROGRESS, CONRADO CITED FOLLOWING:

A. PRESIDENT MAKING DETERMINED EFFORT TO REGAIN SPEECH AND CONRADO OFTEN HEARS HIM UTTERING SOUNDS AT NIGHT.

B. PRESIDENT HAS BEEN VISITED BY HIS GRANDCHILDREN WITH NO UNUSUAL EMOTIONAL REACTION.

C. PRESIDENT HAS FULL FREEDOM TO LISTEN TO RADIO RO WATCH TELEVISION.

D. PRSIDENT CAN PUSH HIMSELF UP IN BED WITH BOTH ARMS; HE CAN GET OUT OF BED AND WALK UNAIDED ACROSS ROOM AND SIT IN CHAIR.

E. PRESIDENT DRAGS HIS RIGHT FOOT WHEN WALKING AND HAS NOT REGAINED USE OF RIGHT HAND FOR WRITING. HE DOES USE LEFT HAND TO MARK HORSE RACING PROGRAM SELECTIONS DURING FREQUENT PLEASANT SESSIONS WITH FOUR OF HIS RACE TRACK CRONIES.

F. PRESIDENT HAS BEEN TOLD OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S KIDNAPPING. COMMENT: (C) CONRADO'S OPTIMISM MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST HIS WIFE'S APPARENT GREATER REALISM SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER, WHEN SHE WAS OVERHEARD SPECULATING ON HER HUSBAND'S LIKELY NEW ASSIGNMENT. GP-3

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO
ATTACHE
CHRON
RF
FI

P 261530Z SEP 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESEI/CONSULATE GENERAL, RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/EMBASSY, BRASILIA
RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL, SAO PAULO
ZEN/AMCONSULATE, PORTO ALEGRE
BT

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SEPT 26, 1969

ACTION COPY

ACTION TAKEN *SL*

1. ~~(C)~~ CONVERSATIONS LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING WITH

LEAD

EO50x1

ME TO CONCLUDE THAT GEN. MEDICI, 3RD ARMY COMMANDER, IS THE ALMOST CERTAIN SUCCESSOR TO COSTA E SILVA. SOURCES SAY THAT MEDICI WON EASILY IN THE SOUNDINGS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE GENERAL OFFICER CORPS OF THE ARMY. WHILE THE INDIVIDUAL SELECTED WILL HAVE THE OPTION OF PICKING HIS OWN VICE-PRESIDENT, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT LABOR MINISTER JARBAS PASSARINHO, A FEDERAL SENATOR AND RETIRED ARMY COLONEL, WILL RECEIVE THE NOD. GEN. MEDICI WILL BE SIXTY-FOUR ON 4 DECEMBER AND PASSARINHO WILL TURN FIFTY ON 11 JANUARY.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE APPARENT UNANIMITY WITHIN THE LYRA TAVARES STAFF NOTWITHSTANDING, HIS CLOSEST AIDES STILL HARBOR A FAINT HOPE THAT HE WILL ACCEPT A DRAFT MOVEMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER. GEN. LYRA HAS RESISTED ALL SUGGESTIONS THAT HE THROW HIS HAT IN THE RING ON THE BASIS OF THREE BASIC ARGUMENTS: (1) HE DEPLORES THE FACT THAT A GENERAL OFFICER WILL SUCCEED TO THE PRESIDENCY FOR THE THIRD CONSECUTIVE TIME. DESPITE RECOGNIZING THE MEDIOCRITY OF CURRENT CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND ADMITTING THAT A MILITARY MAN IS THE ONLY SOLUTION AT THIS TIME, LYRA DOES NOT WANT TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS THAT MAN; (2) HE FEELS A STRONG BOND OF LOYALTY FOR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA, AND (3) HE CONSIDERS IT UNETHICAL FOR A MEMBER OF THE JUNTA TO USE THAM

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FOES WITHIN (5) DAYS.

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Classification

POSITION FOR WHAT WOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A POWER GRAB. SOURCES SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY LYRA'S STAFF WITH ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MURICY FOR HIM TO ADVANCE LYRA'S CANDIDACY AT MONDAY'S PERHAPS DECISIVE MEETING. THE ARMY MINISTER WILL LEAD OFF THE MEETING BY ANNOUNCING THE RESULTS OF THE SOUNDINGS AND INDICATING THAT MEDICI IS THE WINNER. AT THAT POINT, MEDICI IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE AND GEN. MURICY WILL ASK FOR THE FLOOR AND URGE LYRA TAVARES TO RECONSIDER. THE CHANCES OF A FAVORABLE REPLY APPEAR TO BE 20-80.

3. (C) BOTH SOURCES BELIEVE THAT THE CONGRESS WILL BE OPENED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS (4 OCTOBER IS A POPULAR DATE) AND THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL UNDERTAKE WHOLESALE REDEMOCRATIZATION AS A TRIBUTE TO COSTA E SILVA AND AS AN ESCAPE VALVE FOR PRESSURES NOW FOCUSED ON THE ARMED FORCES EXCLUSIVELY. A SUGGESTION THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE SURVIVING THE ANTICIPATED CONTINUED CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES OF GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA BROUGHT A LAUGH OF DISDAIN. MOREOVER, IT WAS STATED WITH APPARENT CONVICTION THAT AFFONSO'S SO-CALLED SUPPORT IS LARGELY A PRODUCT OF THE IMAGINATION, AND THAT HE AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE PERMANENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY PENETRATED IN THEIR SUB-ROSA MACHINATIONS. IT WAS EVEN SAID BY ONE OF THE COLONELS THAT GEN. AFFONSO IS LIKELY TO BE PASSED OVER FOR PROMOTION WHEN HIS NAME COMES UP IN A FEW MONTHS. SOURCES ALSO IDENTIFIED GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO, 1ST ARMY COMMANDER, AS A NEGATIVE AND AMBITIOUS ELEMENT WHO NOW HAS BEEN NEUTRALIZED.

EO 50X1

COMMENT: (C) IF MEDICI WANTS THE PRESIDENCY, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT IS HIS. THE REMAINING QUESTION IS WHETHER HE CAN RECONCILE TAKING THAT IMPORTANT STEP WITH THE IMMENSELY PROFOUND BOND OF FRIENDSHIP AND LOYALTY HE FEELS FOR COSTA E SILVA. THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND CAN BE COUNTED ON TO POINT OUT TO GEN. MEDICI THAT HE MUST ACCEPT FOR THE SAKE OF THE FATHERLAND AND MILITARY UNITY. IF THE COSTA E SILVA FAMILY SEES THE LIGHT AND RECOGNIZES THAT MEDICI REPRESENTS THE VERY BEST SOLUTION FOR ITS OWN RETENTION OF EVEN MARGINAL INFLUENCE, THAN MEDICI IS LIKELY TO ACQUIESCE TO THE CUMULATIVE PERSUASIONS WORKING ON HIM.GP-3.

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

ACTION

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUECSDE/USMILGP BRAZIL

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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OCT 2, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN *Sw*

1. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEN. MEDICI HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENCY WITH EXTREME RELUCATANCE. ONE OF GEN. MEDICI'S CONDITIONS HAS BEEN MET: THAT HE BE THE UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND. THE OTHER CONDITION REMAINS TO BE WORKED OUT: A GRACIOUS WAY OF OBTAINING THE BLESSING OF THE COSTA E SILVA FAMILY. SOURCE SAID THAT GEN. MEDICI SPENT FOUR HOURS AT LARANJEIRAS PALACE ON 30 SEPTEMBER WITH THE TREE MILITARY MINISTERS. AT THAT TIME, PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S BROTHER AND PRIVATE SECRETARY, GEN. (RET) RIOGRANDINO COSTA E SILVA, WAS CALLED IN AND ASKED TO PREVAIL UPON DONA YOLANDA TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF MEDICI FINISHING OUT HER HUSBAND'S TERM AS WELL AS A FULL FOUR-YEAR TERM.

2. (S/NF) [REDACTED] MRS. COSTA E SILVA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE INTRINSIC ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S CHANCES FOR CONTINUATION IN OFFICE OUT OF GENUINE CONVICTION. INSTEAD, HE WENT ON, SHE APPEARS TO BE REACTING EMOTIONALLY THE CONSTANT BADGERING OF PRESIDENTIAL AIDES WHO ARE SEEKING TO SAFEGUARD THEIR JOBS. THE COLONEL SAID THAT GEN. PORTELLA, CHIEF OF THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD, WAS IN THE FOREFRONT IN THIS EFFORT, AS WELL AS THE OFFICERS CONNECTED WITH HIM IN THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD. THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER REPORTEDLY AGREED TO SEEK TO PERSUADE D. YOLANDA THAT IT IS FUTILE AS WELL AS INCONSIDERATE OF THE PRESIDENT'S CHANCES FOR SURVIVAL TO PERSIST IN REFUSING TO

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Classification

FACE UP TO REALITIES AND TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. AS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF UTTERING A PERSUASIVE OPINION, SOURCE SAID THAT WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT IS NOT AT ALL CURRENT ON WHAT IS GOING ON ABOUT HIM AND THAT THOSE WHO VISIT WITH HIM CONFINE THEMSELVES TO QUICK STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT EVERYTHING IS GOING ALONG FINE IN THEIR AREAS. ON THESE OCCASIONS, [REDACTED] EO50x1 THE PRESIDENT CLINGS PATHETICALLY TO HIS VISITORS AND WEEPS PROFUSELY. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEFINITIVE MEDICAL JUDGMENT, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT THE DOCTORS ARE OVERLY CAUTIOUS AND UNWILLING TO PRONOUNCE THEMSELVES IN TRULY UNEQUIVOCAL FASHION. IN THE END, HE CONTINUED, IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE MILITARY MINISTERS SIMPLY TO DECLARE THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE-PRESIDENCY VACANT. HE HOPED THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY BECUASE GEN. MEDICI WOULD DEPLORE SUCH A NEED. ON THE OTHER HAND, GEN. MEDICI APPARENTLY NOW HAS BEEN WON OVER TO THE CONCEPT THAT HE IS THE LAST HOPE FOR A REAL CONSENSUS AND WILL GO ALONG WITH SUCH A PAINFUL MOVE IF IT IS DECIDED UPON.

3. (S/NE) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ONLY GENERAL PROBES WERE MADE INTO WHAT THE MEDICI TEAM WOULD LOOK LIKE. WITH RESPECT TO THE CABINET, [REDACTED] GEN. MEDICI WOULD CLEAN HOUSE ("ONE OR TWO EXCEPTIONS AT MOST") IN ORDER TO PUT AN EARLY END TO THE ALREADY-HEAD CRIES THAT HE REPRESENTS "TONINUISMO". IN SOURCE'S JUDGMENT, THERE WILL BE "CONTINUISMO" WITH RESPECT TO THE BASIC ECONOMIC POLICIES WHICH THE MEDICI ADMINISTRATION WILL FOLLOW, AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF SOLID RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN CONNECTION WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENCY, [REDACTED] MEDICI HAD NOT YET DECIDED, BUT THAT IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT MEDICI WOULD MAKE THE CHOICE AND SUBMIT IT TO THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND. SOURCE DID NOT REACT WITH MUCH ENTHUSIASM TO MENTION OF THE NAMES OF LABOR MINISTER PASSARINHO OR INTERIOR MINISTER COSTA CAVALCANTI [REDACTED] EO50x1

[REDACTED] MOREOVER, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] THAT ALL THE GOSSIP ABOUT THE NAVY DEMANDING THE VICE-PRESIDENCY WAS NONSENSE. SPECULATION ON A NEW ARMY MINISTER BROUGHT FORTH AN ASERTION THAT GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF, IS GEN. MEDICI'S FAVORITE 4-STAR COLLEAGUE, AND THAT HE MIGHT GET THE ARMY MINISTRY. THE FACT THAT GEISAL COMES UP FOR STATUTORY RETIREMENT IN LATE NOVEMBER WOULD NOT BE A DETERRENT BECAUSE ALL THREE OF THE PRESENT SERVICE MINISTERS ARE RETIRED, AS WAS GEN. LYRA TAVARES' PREDECESSOR, MARSHAL (RET) ADHEMAR DE QUEIROZ. SOURCE FEELS THAT ANOTHER POSSIBILITY FOR THE ARMY MINISTRY IS MAJOR GENERAL RODRIGO OCTAVIO JORDAO RAMOS, PRESENT COMMANDER OF THE AMAZON MILITARY COMMAND AND DUE FOR HIS FOURTH STAR PERHAPS AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Classification

RECENT TALK IDENTIFYING 2ND ARMY COMMANDER GEN. CANAVARRO AS A LIKELY ARMY MINISTER WAS GIVEN [REDACTED] WHO GAVE SOLID ENDORSEMENT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT BG JOAO FIGUEIREDO, GEN. MEDICI'S CURRENT CHIEF OF STAFF, WOULD BECOME THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD.

4. (C/NF) [REDACTED] WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF ON THE LIKELY SEQUENCE OF THE UPCOMING SCENARIO. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE NAME OF A SUCCESSOR WOULD BE ANNOUNCED ON THE PRESIDENT'S BIRTHDAY (3 OCTOBER), BUT HE FULLY EXPECTS AN ANNOUNCEMENT SHORTLY THEREAFTER BECAUSE "THE COUNTRY CANNOT WAIT MUCH LONGER". IN HIS VIEW, THE EXPECTED EARLY MEETING OF THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND MUST PRODUCE A FOLLOW-UP PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEDICI'S NAME. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE INAUGURATION MUST BE HELD WELL BEFORE THE RUMORED 15 NOVEMBER DATE SO THAT BRAZIL CAN GET BACK TO WORK. THERE MIGHT BE SOME STATEMENT CONCERNING THE NEW CONSTITUTION ON 3 OCTOBER AS A BIRTHDAY PRESENT FOR COSTA E SILVA, BUT HE WASN'T CERTAIN. HE ALSO DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR NOTION OF HOW THE CONGRESS WOULD FIT INTO THE PICTURE, BUT HE DID SAY THAT MEDICI ENJOYS DIALOGUE WITH POLITICIANS AND THAT HE IS AN EXCELLENT LISTENER.

EO50x1

5. (C/NF) THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SNI) AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, HE SAID, AND CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT GEN. AFFONSO HAS THROWN IN THE TOWEL AS FAR AS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS ARE CONCERNED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. SOURCE SAID THAT A LARGE MEETING WAS HELD AT GEN. AFFONSO'S APARTMENT ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND THAT THOSE PRESENT (INCLUDING RECENTLY ARRESTED PARATROOPER DICKSON GRAEL) DECIDED THAT AFFONSO'S CHANCES WERE DEAD AND THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO CLOSE RANKS AROUND MEDICI. IN FURTHER ILLUSTRATION OF GEN. AFFONSO'S SITUATION, [REDACTED] THAT GEN. FROTA, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST MILITARY REGION, HAD STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY TO GEN. CASTILHO, CG OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, DURING A 30 SEPTEMBER MEETING, THAT HE WOULD TAKE TO THE STREETS WITH WHATEVER TROOPS HE COULD MUSTER RATHER THAN ACCEPT AFFONSO AS PRESIDENT. AT THE SAME MEETING, CASTILHO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE IS FULLY IN FAVOR OF MEDICI, BUT THAT HE COULD NEVER ACCEPT EITHER GENERALS GEISEL OR MURICY FOR THE PRESIDENCY. [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT AFFONSO'S FUTURE POTENTIAL FOR MISCHIEF WOULD BE FURTHER INHIBITED BY THE THREAT OF PROMOTION PASSOVER. MOREOVER, ONE OF AFFONSO'S BEST BOOSTERS, GEN. RODRIGO OCTAVIO, IS LIKELY TO BE ON THE MEDICI TEAM, THUS DEPRIVING AFFONSO OF A FELLOW-CONSPIRATOR.

EO50x1

6. (C) [REDACTED] THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE WILL NOT

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. HE SAID THAT NAVY MINISTER AD. (RET) RADEMAKER RETAINS A FIRM GRIP ON THE ADMIRALTY, DESPITE HAVING MANAGED A SLIM 31 TO 28 VOTE IN FAVOR OF STANDING AUTHORITY TO ACT AS THE SOLE SPOKESMAN FOR THE NAVY'S INTERESTS AT FORTHCOMING ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND MEETINGS. [REDACTED] EO50x1 THAT ALLEGED STRONG NAVY SUPPORT FOR THE CANDIDACY OF GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA WAS LARGELY MORE NOISE THAN SUBSTANCE. HE SAID THAT "ABOUT EIGHT" ADMIRALS HAD SAID THEY WERE FOR AFFONSO. [REDACTED] EO50x1 EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THEM BARELY KNEW HIM. ONE OF THE EIGHT, [REDACTED] IS VICE ADM. HEITOR, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINES, WHO HAD ALREADY BEEN TO SEE SOURCE IN ORDER TO MEND HIS FENCES. ANOTHER, HE REPORTED, IS VICE ADM. BERUTTI, WHO WAS SEDUCED BY A PROMISE FROM AFFONSO THAT HE WOULD MAKE HIS NAVY MINISTER. ON THE AIR FORCE SIDE, SOURCE PRAISED THE BRIGADIERS FOR THEIR UTTER DISCRETION IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE SAID THAT THE AIR FORCE POSITION HAD TWO ESSENTIAL PLANKS: (1) THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTEE BE AN ARMY 4-STAR GENERAL WHO COULD COMMAND THE UNANIMOUS ENDORSEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND, AND (2) THAT THE NAVY NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR EITHER THE PRESIDENCY OR VICE PRESIDENCY.

COMMENT: (S/NF) THE MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE OF SOURCE'S COMMENTS WOULD APPEAR TO BE MEDICI'S DECISION TO ACCEPT THE MANDATE OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH OR WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE CURRENT FIRST FAMILY. THE CANDID COMMENTS ON COSTA E SILVA'S APPARENT TRUE CONDITION ALSO CONSTITUTE A NEW INGREDIENT IN THAT SECTOR. LESS SURPRISING, BUT NONETHELESS COMFORTING, ARE THE OBSERVATIONS ABOUT EXPECTED POLICY THRUSTS IN THE ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS FIELDS. GP-3.
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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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OCT 7, 1969
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUECSDE/USMILGP BRAZIL
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESEI/CONSULATE GENERAL RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL, SAO PAULO
ZEN/AMCONSULATE, PORTO ALEGRE
BT

EO50x1

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1. (C/NF)

[REDACTED], NOW THAT GEN. MEDICI FIRM SUCCESSOR FOR A 4-YEAR TERM OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA, SUBSEQUENT EVENTS WILL MOVE AT VERY FAST PACE. IN THAT CONNECTION, [REDACTED] CONGRESS TO BE REOPENED THIS WEEK BY INSTITUTIONAL ACT; NEW CONSTITUTION TO BE PROMULGATED, ALSO THIS WEEK, AND MEDICI TO BE SWORN INTO OFFICE PRIOR TO END OF NEXT WEEK.

EO50x1

2. (C/NF) MAJOR PROBLEM STILL TO BE RESOLVED IS SELECTION OF A VICE-PRESIDENT. THE NAMES OF GENRRALS ORLANDO GEISEL AND MURICY WERE SUGGESTED TO GEN. MEDICI AT LAST NIGHT'S ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND MEETING, BUT HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD OTHER SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS IN MIND FOR THEM. THE DISCUSSION REPORTEDLY MOVED AWAY FROM AN ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL OR FLAG OFFICER FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY, AND APPEARED TO SETTLE ON ONE OF THE SO-CALLED "AMPHIBIANS" (A FORMER MILITARY MAN WHO HAS BEEN IN CIVILIAN LIFE AND POLITICS FOR SOME TIME). THE NAME OF LABOR MINISTER JARBAS PASSARINHO WAS MENTIONED PROMINENTLY [REDACTED]

EO50x1

[REDACTED] BUT APPARENTLY RAN INTO SOME HEAVY FIRE FROM UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS. WHEN I SUGGESTED TO SOURCE ANOTHER "AMPHIBIAN", INTERIOR MINISTER COSTA CAVALCANTI, HE SOUGHT TO DISCOUNT HIM SOLELY ON THE BASIS THAT HE IS THE BROTHER OF CASHIERED COL. BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI. THE MATTER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY AND OTHER MINOR DETAILS WILL BE WORKED

EO50x1

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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OUT AT ANOTHER MEETING [REDACTED]

3. (C/NF) AS FAR AS THE ATTITUDES OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA AND HIS FAMILY, [REDACTED] THE EXCELLENT GROUND WORK DOWN BY GEN. MURICY ON SUNDAY REMOVED THAT PROBLEM.

EO50x1

[REDACTED] THIS WILL BE GEN. MEDICI'S FIRST VISIT WITH HIS DEAR FRIEND COSTA E SILVA SINCE THE PRESIDENT FELL ILL. GEN. MEDICI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FACE THE EMOTIONAL STRAIN OF SUCH A MEETING UP TO NOW, AND IT SEEMS FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THIS MORNING'S MEETING BETWEEN TWO EXCEPTIONALLY SENTIMENTAL "GAUCHOS" WILL PRODUCE STREAMS OF EMOTION.

COMMENT: (C/NF) JUDGING BY THIS MORNING'S FAVORABLE MEDIA COVERAGE AND THE APPARENT COLLECTIVE SIGH OF RELIEF AMONG ARMY OFFICERS, AN ENVIRONMENT APPEARS TO EXIST FOR CLOSING RANKS AND GETTING ON WITH THE JOB OF BRAZIL'S SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. GP-3.

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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P 031600Z OCT 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUECSDE/USMILGP, BRAZIL

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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1. (C/NF) AFTER ATTENDING BIRTHDAY MASS FOR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA TODAY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO SUGGESTED THAT I KEEP ON THE ALERT FOR A POSSIBLE MILITARY MOVE TO CHALLENGE THE REGIME. HE SAID THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT FRAUD HAD BEEN PERPETRATED IN THE MATTER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE VOTE, AND THAT MAJ GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA AND HIS FOLLOWERS [REDACTED] WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE VERDICT.

EO50x1

2 (C/NF) [REDACTED] HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES PLANNED TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT BY SAYING THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY. HE IDENTIFIED THAT STEP AS A LETTER WHICH ADM MELO BAPTISTA PRESUMABLY HAS WRITTEN TO THE NAVY MINISTER CHALLENGING HIM TO PUBLISH THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, AND ANOTHER LETTER FROM GEN AFFONSO HIMSELF WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED AT THE VILA MILITAR AND OTHER GARRISONS. THE ADMIRAL EXPECTS OTHER LETTERS TO BE WRITTEN AND SAID THAT THE EXPECTED SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS OF SENIOR OFFICERS WILL BRING A WAVE OF SOLIDARITY FOR GEN AFFONSO.

COMMENT: (C/NF) [REDACTED] WAS IN A STATE OF GREAT

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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Classification

EXCITEMENT AND APPARENTLY IS INVOLVED IN SOME ATTEMPT TO DEFY THE GOVERNMENT. HIS STATEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANY OTHER SOURCE, BUT THE ABSENCE OF TOP ARMY COMMANDERS AT THE MASS WAS SIGNIFICANT. WHILE THE NAVY AND AIR MINISTERS AND DOZENS OF TOP BRIGADIERS AND FLAG OFFICERS WERE PRESENT, ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, CHIEF OF STAFF MURICY, 1ST ARMY COMMANDER GEN SYSENO, VILA MILITAR COMMANDER GEN CASTILHO, AND 1ST REGION COMMANDER GEN FROTA WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE CHURCH. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT COULD LEND SUBSTANCE [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] GP-3
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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESEI/CONSULATE GENERAL RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RULPNA/COMUSNAVSO
RUESUZ/EMBASSY, BRASILIA
RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL SAO PAULO
ZEN/AMCONSULATE, PORTO ALEGRE (POUCH)
BT

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1. (C) [REDACTED] AT OFFICE OF VICE ADM HILTON BERUTTI, DIRECTOR OF PORTS AND COASTS OF THE [REDACTED] WAS A FEW MINUTES LATE IN ARRIVING AND SAID THAT HE AD BEEN TO NAVY MINISTRY TO LEARN COMPOSITION OF NAVY SUBMISSION TO MILITARY HIGH COMMAND ON MATTER OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES [REDACTED] WAS DISTRESSED BECAUSE THE 3-NAME LIST WAS SENT ON THE BASIS OF RANK RATHER THAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF VOTES RECEIVED. HE CLAIMS THAT 75PERCENT OF ADMIRALS VOTED FOR MAJ GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA; 10PERCENT VOTED FOR NAVY MINISTER RADEMAKER, AND THE REMAINING 15PERCENT VOTED FOR GEN EMILIO GARRASTAZU MEDICI AND SEVERAL OTHER ARMY GENERALS. DESPITE THAT, HE SAID THAT THE LIST WAS HEADED BY RADEMAKER'S NAME WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY THAT OF MEDICI AND AFFONSO AT THE END. HE ALSO SAID THAT RADEMAKER INITIALLY DID NOT WISH A FORMAL VOTE BUT THAT EACH ADMIRAL HAD INSISTED ON ASTING A BALLOT. LATER, HE AID, RADEMAKER DID NOT DESIRE TO REVEAL THE RESULTS BUT, ONCE AGAIN, HIS HAND HAD BEEN FORCED.

2. (C) [REDACTED] ATTRIBUTES RADEMAKER'S MANIPULATION OF THE VOTE TO THE FACT THAT THE INISTER IS DOING EVERYTHING TO STAY IN OFFICE. MOREOVER, [REDACTED] SENSES THAT RADEMAKER'S CLOSE ASSISTANTS ARE EXTREMELY HAPPY--A SIGN THAT THEY ARE CONFIDENT OF JOB TENURE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR PRESIDENT MEDICI TO

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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RETAIN ADM RADEMAKER AS NAVY MINISTER. HE CONTENDS THAT RADEMAKER HAS LOST HIS AUTHORITY AND THAT THMOST RECENT ADMIRALTY MEETING RESULTED IN WHAT AMOUNTED TO A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE BY 29 OF THE ADMIRALS PRESENT (AN ADDITIONAL FOUR REPORTEDLY HAVE NO-CONFIDENCE VOTES IN WRITING AFTER THE MEETING). IN EVALUATING LIKELY SUCCESSORS TO RADEMAKER, [REDACTED] FEELS THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MYST BY-PASS ALL OF THE 4-STAR ADMIRALS AND PICK A VICE ADMIRAL. HE WROTE OFF ALL OF THE 4-STARS IN RATHER CASUAL FASHION ("MURILLO HAS NEVER BEEN AT HOME IN THE NAVY AND HAS HAD MOST OF HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN NON-NAVY BILLETS; CNO ADALBERTO IS WORN DOWN BY THE PRESENT SITUATION; LOBO LACKS SUBSTANCE; THE OTHER THREE ARE DOOMED BECAUSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SO-CALLED DIONNE GROUP").

3. (C) IT IS OBVIOUS THAT [REDACTED] DOES NOT HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR GEN MEDICI. HE REFERRED TO HIM AS "AN UNKNOWN WHO HAS SEPENT MOST OF HIS CAREER IN RIO GRANDE SO SUL". HE ALSO SAID THAT MEDICI IS NOT TOO BRIGHT, HE IS OLD, AND HE CANNOT RESIST THE PRESSURES OF THE TASK HE FACES. ADM BERUTTI SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK MEDICI WOULD LAST VERY LONG. ON THAT BASIS [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIS FAVORITE, GEN. AFFONSO, SELECTED AS THE VICE-PRESIDENT. IF HE WERE MEDICI, HE SAID, HE WOULD MARCH OVER TO AFFONSO'S APARTMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY A LARGE PRESS ENTOURAGE, AND ANNOUNCE THAT AFFONSO WAS HIS CHOICE FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. IT DID NOT SOUND AS IF [REDACTED] EXPECTS THAT TO HAPPEN, EVEN THOUGH HE SAID HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN A MEETING AT AFFONSO'S APARTMENT ON 1 OCTOBER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING THAT POSSIBILITY. THE ADMIRAL SAID THAT MEDICI LIAISON AGENTS ARE IN TOUCH WITH GEN AFFONSO IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WORKING RELATIONSHIP. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE SIMPLE BECAUSE "MEDICI DOES NOT REALIZE THE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE HIERARCHIAL PROCESS AND THE DEPTH OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE YOUNGER OFFICERS". HE WAS PARTICULARLY SKEPTICAL OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF MEDICI ESTABLISHING NAVY CONTACTS T OTHER THAN THE 4-STAR LEVEL. IN DISCUSSING THE 1 OCTOBER MEETING, HE SAID THAT THE NAMES OF SOME AFFONSO FOLLOWERS WERE SUGGESTED FOR THE MEDICI TEAM. THAT OF MAJ GEN EULER BENTES MONTEIRO, RECENT SUPERINTENDENT OF SUDENE AND NOW THE ARMY'S CHIEF FISCAL OFFICER, WAS ADVANCED AS A GOOD REPLACEMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION MINISTER ANDREAZZA, AND MAJ GEN RODRIGO

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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OCTAVIO JORDAO RAMOS, COMMANDER OF THE AMAZON MILITARY COMMAND, WAS DISCUSSED AS A LIKELY ARMY MINISTER.

4. (C) THE IRREPRESIBLE [REDACTED] TOOK SOME HEALTHY SWIPES AT A GOOD MANY OTHER AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS DURING THE CONVERSATION. HE REFERRED TO MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT ADM HEITOR AS A FENCE-STRADDLER WHOSE HOPES FOR SURVIVAL WERE FADING RAPIDLY. HE ALSO MADE UNFLATTERING REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S MENTAL POWERS EVEN BEFORE HIS ILLNESS, AND HE DEPLORED WHAT HE CALLED THE AIR FORCE'S NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF INTEREST IN BRAZIL'S PRESENT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

EO50x1

COMMENT: (C) [REDACTED] IS AN INTELLIGENT AND FORCEFUL OFFICER WHO MAKES NO EFFORT TO CONCEAL HIS EXTRAORDINARY ADMIRATION FOR THE UNITED STATES. #923;34, HE IS SO INTENSELY INVOLVED IN PROMOTING HIS VIEWS AND HIS AMBITIONS THAT HE TENDS TO EXAGGERATE BOTH HIS HOPES AND HIS FRUSTRATIONS. HE OBVIOUSLY HAD HIS SIGHTS SET ON BECOMING NAVY MINISTER UNDER AFFONSO ALBUQUERQUE LIMA AND CANNOT RECONCILE HIMSELF TO ANY OTHER SOLUTION. THUS, HIS FRANTIC EFFORTS TO PROPAGANDIZE AFFONSO INTO THE VICE-PRESIDENCY, AND HIS CAVALIER ELIMINATION FROM CONTENTION FOR THE NAVY MINISTRY OF ALMOST ANY OTHER ADMIRAL SENIOR TO HIM. GP-3

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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P 071630Z OCT 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RUESEI/CONSULATE GENERAL RECIFE

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/EMBASSY, BRASILIA

RUESUP/CONSULATE GENERAL, SAO PAULO

ZEN, AMCONSULATE, PORTO ALEGRE

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1. (C) A BATTLE OF LETTERS BETWEEN MAJ. GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, CLIFE OF ARMY ORDNANCE, AND GEN. LYRA TAVARES, ARMY MINISTER, OCCURRED ON 2 AND 3 OCTOBER. THE FIRST SALVO WAS FIRED BY GEN. AFFONSO IN A THREE-PAGE DOCUMENT WHICH HIGHLIGHTS THE FOLLOWING:

A. SINCE AFFONSO'S NAME WAS AMONG THOSE SUBMITTED TO ARMY HIGH COMMAND AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, AFFONSO FELT ENTITLED TO COMMENT ON MATTER.

B. AFFONSO OBJECTED TO METHODS USED IN SELECTION AND REPUDIATED IRREGULARITIES. HE AVOWS THAT "CONSIDERABLE PARCEL OF ARMY" SHARES THAT VIEW.

C. HIS PURPOSE IN WRITING LETTER IS TO FORECLOSE ON NEW AND GRAVE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ARMY AS RESULT OF DECISIONS AT THE SUMMIT WHICH REFLECT IGNORANCE OF TRUE FEELINGS OF SUBORDINATES.

D. HE PRAISES CG OF 1ST ARMY FOR CARRYING OUT PRESIDENTIAL STRAW VOTE WITH "DIGNITY AND SERIOUSNESS", THEREFORE COMING UP WITH A TRUE CONSENSUS OF HIS ORGANIZATION. ON OTHER HAND, "OTHERS DID NOT EVEN LISTEN TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AND FORWARDED PURELY PERSONAL OPINIONS, FREQUENTLY AT ODDS WITH THE OPINIONS OF THEIR OFFICERS; EVEN MORE SERIOUS, OTHERS HEARD THEIR SUBORDINATES AND THEN TOTALLY IGNORED THEIR VIEWS INFORWARDING THE RESULTS".

E. AFFONSO CRITICIZES THE SYSTEM DEVISED FOR THE SELECTION PROCESS BY SAYING THAT IT WAS VAGUE WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATIONS ON GENERAL OFFICER GRADES THAT COULD BE

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Classification

CONSIDERED. HE SAID THAT THIS CAUSED CONFUSION AND LED TO UNFAIR AND DELIBERATE MISINTERPRETATIONS. F. HE SAYS THAT HE PLANS TO GO ON LISTENING TO SUBORDINATES OF ALL RANKS AND OF ALL AGES AND TO POINT OUT TO THEM MAJOR NATIONAL PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, HE AVOWS THAT HE WILL PRESENT TO THEM NEW IDEAS, NEW PROGRAMS, AND A NEW MESSAGE FOR THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE. HE CLAIMS THAT HE IS CRATING A NEW MENTALITY WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING TO ASSERT ITSELF, AND WHICH MOTIVATES HIM TO FOLLOW THE PATH HE OUTLINED UPON LEAVING THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. HE DERIVES GREAT COMFORT, HE SAYS, FROM THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HE ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF SUBORDINATES WHO BELIEVE IN THE IDEALS AND PRINCIPLES THAT HE DEFENDS.

G. AFFONSO CLAIMS THAT HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF AS HAVING REACHED THE TOP OF HIS MILITARY CAREER NOW THAT HE HAS RECEIVED THE HONORED SUPPORT OF SO MANY GENERALS AND OTHEKR OFFICERS SPREAD OUT ALL OVER BRAZIL. MOREOVER, HE IS ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL FOR THE MASSIVE SUPPORT RECEIVED FROM ADMIRALS WHO SUBMITTED THEIR VOTES FOR HIM IN WRITING TO THEIR MINISTER. HE DISCLAIMS ANY HAND IN PROMOTING THOSE MANIFESTATIONS WITHIN GARRISONS, AND ATTRIBUTES THEM TO THE PURE IDEALISM OF THE OFFICER CORPS--BOTH YOUNG AND OLDER--WHICH SEEKS ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROGRAMS FROM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CORRUPTION AND AGAINST CORRUPTION, AND WITHOUT SUBVERSION AND AGAINST ANY FORM OF SUBVERSION.

H. HE SAYS THAT HE DOES NOT WISH THOSE BELOW TO BY-PASS THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, BUT THAT ALL MUST BE A PART OF ANY TRULY REVOLUTIONARY AND NATIONALISTIC PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT. WHILE REAFFIRMING HIS DEVOTION TO THE REVOLUTION, HE STATES THAT IT HAS NOT YET OCCURRED BECAUSE NOT ENOUGH HAS BEEN DONE FOR THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE WITHIN THE PRINCIPLES OF A PURE AND INTELLIGENT NATIONALISM THAT SEEKS DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL BRAZILIANS.

SECTION 2 OF 2 [] OCT 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

I. AFFONSO ENDS BY URGING LYRA TAVARES TO MEDITATE ON THE GRAVE CRISIS NOW FACING THE NATION. "IN THE EVENT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINAL DECISION ELECT TO IGNORE THE WISHES OF THE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES, WE CANNOT EVALUATE THE RISKS THAT THE NATION WILL BE RUNNING WHEN OTHER LEADERS WHO

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

ARE PERHAPS BOLDER AND LESS RESISTANT TO THE TEMPTATIONS OF POWER DARE TO BYPASS THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP."

2. (C) THE 3 OCTOBER REPLY FROM THE ARMY MINISTER IS A TYPICAL LYRA TAVARES LITERARY GEM IN THAT IT TAKES WORDS AND PHRASES USED BY GEN. AFFONSO AND DRIVES HOME REACTIONS OF STUPEFACTION, OFFENSE, DISAPPROVAL, REGRET, CENSURE, AND ADMONITION. LYRA BEGINS HIS LETTER BY REMINDING AFFONSO THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND ARE PERFECTLY AWARE OF ALL OF THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE REVOLUTION--INCLUDING THOSE CITED IN AFFONSO'S LETTER. IN A DIRECT QUOTE OF AFFONSO'S PASSAGE ON A "GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CORRUPTION AND AGAINST CORRUPTION, ETC." LYRA AVOWS THAT THE IDEALISM AFFONSO MENTIONS IS COMMON TO ALL OFFICERS. AS FOR THE NEED FOR PURSUING PROGRAMS AIMED AT DEVELOPMENT, LYRA STATES THAT SUCH PROGRAMS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE AFFONSO SUBSCRIBED TO DURING THE NEARLY TWO YEARS HE SERVED AS ONE OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S CABINET OFFICERS. MOREOVER, LYRA GOES ON TO SAY THAT THERE IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ARMY CONCERNING THE ABSOLUTE NEED FOR MILITARY COHESIVENESS, WITHIN THE PRINCIPLES OR HIERARCHY AND DISCIPLINE, AS THE SINE QUA NON FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION'S OBJECTIVES. HEATING UP TO THE CHALLENGE, LYRA AVOWS HIS RESPECT FOR THE OPINIONS OF LEADERS WHO ARE CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND WHO RENOUNCE ANY PERSONAL AMBITION. AT THIS POINT THE MINISTER CITES HIS OWN EXAMPLE IN THE FACE OF NUMEROUS PLEAS THAT HE BECOME A CANDIDATE.

3. (C) GEN. LYRA TAVARES AVOWS THAT HE IS SATISFIED THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS USED "SERIOUSNESS AND DIGNITY" IN SOUNDING OUT THE FEELINGS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES TOWARD THE SUCCESSION ISSUE. HE ALSO SAYS THAT AN ELECTION WAS NOT HELD WITHIN THE ARMY BECAUSE SUCH AN ACTION WOULD HAVE COMPROMISED THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS OF THE ARMY AND TRANSFORMED THE INSTITUTION INTO A POLITICAL PARTY. WITH MOUNTING CYNICISM, LYRA TELLS AFFONSO THAT "I KNOW, JUST AS YOUR EXCELLENCY DOES, THAT NO GENERAL WISHES TO BE A CANDIDATE, BUT THAT WHICHEVER ONE IS CALLED FORTH BY HIS PEERS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER ARMED FORCES" SHALL ACCEPT THE CALL TO SERVE THE NATION IN SUCH A GRAVE MOMENT HE GOES ON TO SAY THAT IMPOSITIONS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED, NOR AUTHORITY BYPASSED FROM BELOW, OTHERWISE NO ONE CAN SUSTAIN A STABLE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 4

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

4. (C) IN THE MOST TELLING BLOW STRUCK BY THE SKILLFUL LYRA TAVARES HE TAKES AFFONSO'S STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 1 (D), ABOVE, AND WRITES: "I FRONTALLY DISAGREE, THEREFORE, WITH THE RAVE IMPUTATION BY YOUR EXCELLENCY TO GENERAL OFFICERS' LACK OF SERIOUSNESS AND DIGNITY IN FORWARDING TO THE HIGH COMMAND THE GENERAL VIEWS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES." THE RUINOUS ASPECT OF THIS QUOTATION BY LYRA TAVARES WAS NOT LOST ON AFFONSO. HE WHIPPED UP A SECOND LETTER TO LYRA TAVARE, DATED 3 OCTOBER. IN THAT SHORT COMMUNICATION, WHICH LYRA TAVARES REFUSED TO ACCEPT, HE PROTESTS VEHEMENTLY AGAINST THE TENDENTIOUS INTERPRETATION WHICH LYRA GAVE TO A PORTION OF HIS LETTER, IN A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO PLACE AFFONSO IN A BAD LIGHT WITH HIS MILITARY SUPERIORS AND OTHERS.

COMMENT: (C) GEN. AFFONSO APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED BADLY BRUISED FROM THE BATTLE OF THE LETTERS. ANOTHER RECENT VICTIM OF A SIMILAR ENGAGEMENT WITH LYRA TAVARES, UNASSIGNED GEN. MONIZ DE ARAGAO, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE DISAGREED ENTIRELY WITH AFFONSO. IN GEN. ARAGAO'S JUDGMENT, GEN. AFFONSO WAS WRONG IN WRITING THE FIRST LETTER BECAUSE HE WAS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THE RESULT OF THE CONSULTATION ON PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES. MOREOVER, "HE EMPLOYED THE FIRST PERSON SINGULAR TOO MUCH," SAID GEN. ARAGAO, AND "HE MADE THE HORRIBLE MISTAKE OF ATTACKING THE INTEGRITY OF FELLOW-GENERAL OFFICERS." WHILE GEN. ARAGAO DOES NOT BELIEVE GEN. AFFONSO WILL SUFFER STIFF SANCTIONS, THE OFFICERS ON THE ARMY MINISTER'S STAFF PREDICT SEVERE PENALTIES. EVEN SOME OF AFFONSO'S CLOSE ALLIES CONCEDE THAT HIS POLITICAL STOCK HAS TAKEN AN ABRUPT, AND CONCEIVABLY IRREVERSIBLE, NOSEDIVE. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

POL

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ATTACHE

CHRON

RF

P 081450Z OCT 69

FM [REDACTED]

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI DA

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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OCT 8, 1969

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1. (S) SOURCES CONSIDERED REPRESENTATIVE OF MOST ARMY CURRENTS OF OPINION EXPRESS SEEMINGLY GENUINE APPROVAL OF BOTH THE SELECTION OF GEN. MEDICI FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SUCCESSION HAS BEEN HANDLED. GEN. MEDICI'S NATIONWIDE TALK ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER EARNED HIGH MARKS FOR ITS CANDOR, CONCILIATORY TONE, AND APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ATTACH A DISTINCT MEDICI IMPRINT, RATHER THAN A MERE COSTA E SILVA CONTINUATION, TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

2. (S) [REDACTED] SAY THAT MEDICI IS NOT LIKELY TO DIVORCE HIMSELF COMPLETELY FROM THE POLICIES, PROGRAMS, PERSONALITIES, AND EVEN STYLE OF THE COSTA E SILVA GOVERNMENT. IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FIELD, FOR EXAMPLE, SOURCES BELIEVE THAT CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL REMAIN A CONSTANT, BUT THAT DEEP CHANGES WILL OCCUR IN PERSONALITIES (A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER) AND IN STYLE (LESS POLITICAL DEMAGOGUERY FOR THE PURELY PERSONAL DOMESTIC BENEFIT OF THE MINISTER). OFFICERS ON THE ARMY MINISTER'S STAFF BELIEVE THAT GEN. MEDICI WILL RETAIN FINANCE MINISTER DELFIM NETTO BECAUSE HE HAS CONFIDENCE IN HIM AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO ALTER THE THRUST OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM. ONE OF SOURCES EVEN SAID THAT IF GEN. MEDICI KEEPS DELFIM IT WILL BE BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THE USG WILL BE PLEASED WITH SUCH A GESTURE.

3. (S) THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INAUGURATION IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN WITH AN INSTITUTIONAL ACT, EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW, DECLARING THE PRESIDENCY VACANT. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SUCH ACT, PERHAPS THIS WEEK, RECALLING THE CONGRESS. DETAILS STILL ARE NOT CLEAR CONCERNING THE NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THE MILITARY MINISTERS WILL MEET TODAY TO WORK

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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ON THE EXISTING DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT. AMONG MATTERS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER GEN. MEDICI'S NAME WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS BY THE LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTY OR BY THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS. A SPECIFIC INAUGURATION DATE HAS NOT BEEN SET BY GEN. MEDICI WHO INDICATED YESTERDAY THAT HE CANNOT BE READY BY NEXT WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AN ACTIVE CANDIDATE, THUS HE DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED 15 TO 20 DAYS IN WHICH TO PREPARE HIS PROGRAM AND SELECT HIS TEAM.

4. (C) THE SELECTION OF A VICE-PRESIDENT APPARENTLY REMAINS UP IN THE AIR.

EO50x1

5. (C) GREAT CARE IS BEING TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD THE DIGNITY OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA IN THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS. INFORMED AND RELIABLE SOURCES SAY THAT SPECIAL PROVISIONS ARE BEING WORKED OUT TO PROVIDE THE FORMER PRESIDENT WITH AIDES, VEHICLES, SECRETARIES, PAY, AND OTHER ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH HIS POSITION AND REQUIRED BY HIS PHYSICAL CONDITION. DETAILS OF THE PRIVILEGES PROBABLY WILL BE EMBODIED IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ACT DECLARING THE PRESIDENCY VACANT.

6. (C) DISAPPOINTED PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA SPENT NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES ON 7 OCTOBER AND REPORTEDLY AGREED TO CEASE HIS OVERT POLITICKING, WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO REINFORCE HIS POSTURE AS "THE OPPOSITION". GEN. LYRA IS SAID TO HAVE WARNED AFFONSO THAT HE FACES DISMISSAL FROM THE ARMY UNLESS HE CORRECTS HIS WAYS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT AFFONSO'S MAJOR

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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IMMEDIATE PENALTY IS THE DECISION BY THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND THAT HE WILL NOT BE PROMOTED TO FULL GENERAL AT THE TIME HE BECOMES ELIGIBLE.

COMMENT: (⊕) THERE IS A GENERAL AIR OF EUPHORIA IN THE ARMY AREA OVER THE WAY IN WHICH THE CRISIS IS WORKING ITSELF OUT. THE ONLY NEGATIVE ASPECT IS THE EXTREME CONCERN FELT OVER THE LIKELIHOOD THAT TERRORISTS WILL TRIGGER SOME MAJOR ACT OR ACTS CONNECTED WITH THE 8 OCTOBER SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF CHE GUEVARA'S DEMISE. STRINGENT SECURITY PRECAUTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN THROUGHOUT BRAZIL, BUT PARTICULARLY IN RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAO PAULO, WHERE SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE ALERT TO POSSIBLE ATTACKS UPON THEIR PERSONS. GP-3.
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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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OCT 15, 1969

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TO RUECRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI DA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

UESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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EO50x1

MEDICI LISTED THE MINISTERS WHO WOULD NOT BE RETAINED:
FOREIGN RELATIONS, #HEALTH, EDUCATION, PLANNING,
AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND
ARMED FORCES. THE FINANCE MINISTER WAS TOLD DIRECTLY
THAT HE WOULD BE RETAINED AND THAT HIS POSITION WOULD BE
STRENGTHENED THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF THE PLANNING
MINISTRY AND THE CREATION OF AN INTER-MINISTERIAL
PLANNING COMMITTEE INVOLVING THE MINISTRIES WITH THE
GREATEST ECONOMIC IMPACT.

EO50x1

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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EO50x1

3. (C) THE INTERIOR MINISTER IS VERY DISAPPOINTED OVER THE APPARENT SELECTION OF NAVY MINISTER RADEMAKER FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. HE SAID THAT RADEMAKER IS A MAN OF DECISION, BUT THAT HE WILL NOT HAVE MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE THAT VIRTUE IN HIS NEW POSITION. COSTA CAVALCANTI BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE MEDICI "IS BUYING TROUBLE" THROUGH THE SELECTION OF RADEMAKER, AND SAID THAT BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE FRIENDS HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR UNHAPPINESS. COSTA CAVALCANTI IS OF THE VIEW THAT THE COMBINATION OF RADEMAKER IN THE VICE-PRESIDENCY AND THE RETENTION OF TRANSPORTATION MINISTER ANDREAZZA WILL PLACE THE MEDICI ADMINISTRATION IN EARLY DIFFICULTIES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. THE INTERIOR MINISTER ADDED THAT BEEFED UP AUTHORITY FOR THE ABLE FINANCE MINISTER ALSO WILL GENERATE NEGATIVE PRESSURES.

COMMENT: (C)

EO50x1

GP-3.

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FORM 4-68 FS-412



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUECRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAWD/OACSI, DA

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESEL/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

OCT 16, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN *SL*

1. (G)

EO50x1

HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL TO BECOME HIS SUCCESSOR AS CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF. ADM. MURILLO EXPECTS TO BE CALLED BEFORE PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE MEDICI TODAY IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE OFFICIAL TENDER. HE PLANS TO ACCEPT WITHOUT HESITATION AND HAS ALREADY DECIDED UPON MAJ GEN REYNALDO MELLO DE ALMEIDA, CURRENT ARMY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, TO BECOME HIS VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. (G)

EO50x1

WITH ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THE FACT THAT GEN. GEISEL WILL BECOME THE NEW ARMY MINISTER AND THAT MAJ GEN NEWTON FONTOURA DE OLIVERIA REIS, CURRENTLY GEN. GEISEL'S VICE CHIEF ON THE ARMED FORCES STAFF, WILL BECOME THE CHIEF OF THE MINISTER'S CABINET. *EO50x1* THAT 1ST ARMY COMMANDER GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO WILL BE RELIEVED BY GEISEL AND GIVEN ONE OF THE DIRECTORATES. THE NEW 1ST ARMY COMMANDER REPORTEDLY WOULD BE THE CONTROVERSIAL AND UNASSIGNED GEN. MONIZ DE ARAGAO, WHOM GEN. GEISEL GREATLY ADMIRES AS A TOUGH, NO-NONSENSE COMMANDER.

EO50x1

, THE PRESENT 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND VILA MILITAR COMMANDER, MAJ. GEN. JOAO DUTRA DE CASTILHO, WILL ALSO BE REPLACED.

3. (G)

EO50x1

WITH CERTAINTY THAT CNO ADALBERTO BARROS NUNES WILL BECOME THE NEW NAVY MINISTER, BUT RE E VED FILE THIS DOCUMENT, HAS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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THAT THE STATUS OF THE AIR FORCE MINISTRY IS NOT YET CLEAR. HE INDICATED THAT THE PRESENT MINISTER MIGHT REMAIN OR THAT CHIEF OF STAFF SAMPAIO MIGHT GET THE NOD. IN A CONVERSATION ON 15 OCT WITH FORMER AIR MINISTER EDUARDO GOMES, [EO50x1] WAS TOLD, WITH OBVIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT, THAT IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT AIR MARSHAL MARCIO WILL REMAIN AS AIR MINISTER. [EO50x1] [EO50x1] THAT ADM. LOBO MIGHT SUCCEED ADM. ADALBERTO AS CNO.

4. (C) IN FURTHER SPECULATION OVER PENDING CHANGES, [EO50x1] THAT GEN. ERNESTO GEISEL, CURRENTLY A MINISTER ON THE SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL'S BROTHER, WILL BECOM THE NEW PRESIDENT OF PETROBRAS, THE GOVERNMENT OIL MONOPOLY. IN THIS MANNER, [EO50x1] CONTENDS, A VACANCY WILL BE OPENED UP ON THE TRIBUNAL FOR GEN. AUGUSTO FRAGOSO, COMMANDANT OF THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL, AND A THORN IN THE SIDE OF THE ARMY NFAKCOMMAND V FRAGOSO PRESUMAXZPY WILL BE REPLACED BY AN ARMY GENERAL [EO50x1] THAT HE WILL BE SUCCEEDED AT THE JOINT COMMISSION BY A BRIGADIER.

COMMENT: (C) [EO50x1] TO GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL AND APPEARS TO BE ON THE VERGE OF REAPING THE REWARD MANY HAD THOUGH UNLIKELY. WHILE MOST OF THE SUGGESTED ARMY MOVES UNDOUBTEDLY REPRESENT GEN. GEISEL'S THINKING, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER GEN. MEDICI WILL GO ALONG WITH THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL REASSIGNMENTS. GP-3.
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Classification

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
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P 102035Z JUL 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RULPAL/USCINCSO (JA2)
RUEADWD/OACSI
RUESCDE/COMUSMKLGP BRAZIL
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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GENERAL ARAGAO CASE.

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Recd: JULY 11, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN *Sc*

SUBJECT: (U) THE

1. (C) GEN. ARAGAO SURRENDERED DIRECTORATE OF SUPPLY FROM WHICH DISMISSED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AT 1530, 9 JULY. HE TURNED OVER DIRECTORSHIP TO LEGAL SUCCESSOR SURGEON GENERAL OLIVIO IN CEREMONY AT ARMY MINISTRY. A FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF GENERAL OFFICERS AND A FEW CAPTAINS AND OTHERS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT MOST OF THOSE PRESENT HAD FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO ATTEND CHANGE-OVER. GEN. ARAGAO HIMSELF HAD BARRED PRESS AND HE REPORTEDLY CONFINED HIS SHORT TALK TO PERFUNCTORY STATEMENTS. THE CEREMONY HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CUSTOMARY HALF-DAY WORKING SCHEDULE IN ARMY AND THUS ATTRACT LARGER TURNOUT. ACCOUNTS OF NUMBER PRESENT WOULD INDICATE THAT ORGANIZERS HAD REASON TO BE DISAPPOINTED.

2. (C) FOLLOWING CEREMONY, ANOTHER ARAGAO LETTER TO THE ARMY MINISTER BEGAN TO CIRCULATE WITHIN ARMY MINISTRY AND ELSEWHERE IN RIO. I READ THE LETTER AT ARMY MINISTRY THIS MORNING AND IT IS EXTREMELY PROVOCATIVE IN THAT IT ACCUSES LYRA TAVARES OF BEING DECEITFUL, WEAK, A DREAMER, AND A MAN OF DUBIOUS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. THE LONG LETTER MUST NOW BE IN HANDS OF THE MINISTER WHO DUE IN FROM BRASILIA TODAY. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE HAS THREE OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW CHALLENGE: (1) ISSUE A REPRIMAND AND CIRCULATE IT WIDELY; (2) GIVE ARAGAO HOUSE ARREST, OR (3) URGE

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8 - 65

* GPO : 1987 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

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Foreign Service of the
United States of America

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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Control:

Recd:

THE PRESIDENT TO RETIRE ARAGAO UNDER THE TERMS OF IA-5.

THE FIRST OPTION WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUITABLE ACTION WITH THE ADVANTAGE OF NOT INVITING EXPRESSIONS OF SOLIDARITY FOR ARAGAO AND LEAVING THE OTHER MORE EXTREME ALTERNATIVES OPEN. EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO WILL TEND TO GIVE ARAGAO AN AURA OF MARTYRDOM WHILE ENCOURAGING TIME-HONORED BRAZILIAN TRADITION OF TRUE FRIENDS AND MEN OF CHARACTER STEPPING UP TO PAT THE PENALIZED ONE ON THE BACK.

3. (C) GEN. ARAGAO IS NOW AT HOME WITHOUT ASSIGNMENT AND HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS ARE EITHER UNDEREMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, OR UNDER SURVEILLANCE. MOST OF HIS SUPPORT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE MINISTER'S OFFICE AS HAVING COME FROM GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA AND HIS ASSOCIATES. AS WELL AS A FEW ISOLATED LETTER PEDDLERS SUCH AS COL. SEBASTIAO CHAVES, A STUDENT AT THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL, AND A STUDENT CAPTAIN AT THE OFFICER'S ADVANCED SCHOOL WHO IS NOW BEING INVESTIGATED. THE ARMY MINISTER'S STAFF IS FULLY CONFIDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT OF SUCH KEY ELEMENTS AS 1ST ARMY CG SYSENIO, GEN. CASTILHO, CG OF THE VILA MILITAR GARRISON, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ARAGAO'S PEOPLE ARE SPREADING RUMORS OF ALLEGED SUPPORT IN AN EFFORT TO DRUM SOME UP AND TO PROMOTE CONFUSION.

4. (C) YESTERDAY'S FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL IN O GLOBO HAS REPORTED DONE MORE THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE ACTION TO DEFLATE THE ARAGAO BALLOON. THE EDITORIAL URGED THE ARMED FORCES TO REMAIN UNITED AND TO FINISH THE JOB THE REVOLUTION SET OUT TO DO. IT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESS AND THE CONGRESS WERE THE PROPER ROUTES FOR DISSENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE EDITORIAL WAS SUGGESTED TO GLOBO'S PUBLISHERS BY THE ARMY MINISTER'S OFFICE. MOREOVER, LATTER ALSO ENLISTED COOPERATION OF INFLUENTIAL JORNAL DO BRAZIL PUBLISHER NASCIMENTO BRITO TO GAIN AGREEMENT FROM SOMETIMES-DEFIANT O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO PUBLISHER JULIO MESQUITA NOT TO PUBLISH ANY-

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FORM FS-412
8 - 65

* GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

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Foreign Service of the
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Control:

Recd:

THING INFLAMMATORY CONCERNING THE ARAGAO CASE.
COMMENT: (⊕) APPARENT WILLING COOPERATION F NEWS MEDIA
APPEARS TO BE VITAL INGREDIENT ON SIDE OF STABILITY.
WHILE ARAGAO AND HIS ASSOCIATES WILL CONTINUE TO FIRE
BROAD SIDES, THE IMPACT APPEARS TO BE EASING. AT THIS
STAGE, LYRA TAVARES' POSITION SEEMS SHAKEN BY THE
ARAGAO CHALLENGE WHICH AIMED AT PRESIDENT BUT
WILLINGLY ABSORBED BY THE LOYAL ARMY MINISTER. IF
LYRA DECIDES TO GO THE FULL ROUTE, HE MIGHT RESIGN
TO PROVIDE ESCAPE VALVE FOR PRESSURES AND DISCONTENT.

GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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P 031940Z JUL 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUEFJA/DIA

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFL RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

READWD/ACSI

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

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Recd:

JULY 5, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. (G) UPON RETURNING TO RIO FROM BRASILIA ON 2 JULY, ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES CALLED IN KEY GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDERS IN RIO AREA AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO TAKE FORCEFUL ACTION WITH THEIR SUBORDINATES IN ORDER TO PREEMPT POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION BY OPPORTUNISTS. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO DEPLORE GEN. ARAGAO'S WELL KNOWN INCLINATION TOWARD IMPULSIVE ACTIONS; TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT ALLEGATIONS WOULD BE REFUTED, AND TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ARAGAO'S GESTURE IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH POSSIBLE SOLIDARITY FOR RECENTLY CASHIERED HARD-LINE COLONEL BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI. LATTER CASE STILL SENSITIVE IN ARMY CIRCLES AND STRONG FEELING EXISTS FOR AMNESTY, THUS, LAST THING HIGH COMMAND WANTS IS TO HAVE ANY OTHER ISSUE GAIN STRENGTH ON BASIS OF EMOTION ATTACHED TO BOAVENTURA CASE.

2. (G) [REDACTED] AND I SPENT MORNING AT VILA MILITAR TODAY AND WE CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE SOUNDINGS AMONG OFFICERS OF 1ST BRIGADE, AIRBORNE BRIGADE, AND VISITING ARMY STAFF SCHOOL INSTRUCTORS. CONSENSUS OF THESE PROBES COINCIDES WITH SIMILAR FINDINGS FROM CONVERSATIONS YESTERDAY WITH OFFICERS ON ARMY MINISTER'S STAFF AND OTHERS: THE ARAGAO CASE WILL FADE GRADUALLY FROM PROMINENCE AND HAS ALREADY REACHED PEAK OF ITS POTENTIAL FOR A REAL CRISIS. DESPITE ARAGAO'S REPUTATION FOR INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, AND DESPITE FACT MOST OFFICERS SUSPECT THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8-65

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TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Control:

Recd:

TRUTH TO HIS ALLEGATIONS, FEW ARE WILLING TO GO THE MAT OVER THIS ISSUE. THIS FEELING FLOWS FROM CONTINUING ADHERENCE TO MYSTIQUE THAT UNITY MUST BE MAINTAINED AT ALL COSTS, AND FROM RECOGNITION THAT OVERTHROW OF COSTA E SILVA IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE.

3. (⊕) THERE ARE ABUNDANT INDICATIONS THAT FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER ALGUQUERQUE LIMA AND COL. BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI - AMONG OTHERS - WILL JOIN ARAGAO IN FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT AND EVEN TO OVERTHROW HI. THOSE INDICATORS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO TIGHTEN FURTHER THE ALREADY EFFECTIVE CLAMPS PLACED ON ALGUQUERQUE LIMA AND BOAVENTURA, AND SOON TO BE PLACED ON ARAGAO HIMSELF. THESE INHIBITIONS INCLUDE THE DENIAL OF NOTORIETY THROUGH PRESS CENSORSHIP AND SUCH OTHER TECHNIQUES AS PHONE TAPS AND PENETRATIONS AT MEETINGS.

COMMENT: (⊕) WE HAVE NOT HEARD THE LAST OF GEN. ARAGAO, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE CURRENT POTENTIAL CRISIS HAS BEEN PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND TM GP--/J
BT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FORM FS-412
8 - 65

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★ GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

POL
INFO
ATTACHE
CHRON
RF

R 011435Z JUL 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA
INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RUEADWD/OACSI, DA
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFOR FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Control- FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Recd: JULY 1, 1969

ACTION

ACTION TAKEN *[Signature]*

1. (G/NF)

EO50x1

2. (S/NF) GEN. AUGUSTO CEZAR DE CASTRO MONIZ DE ARAGAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ARMY SUPPLY, HAS APPARENTLY CONFRONTED THE PRESIDENT AND ARMY MINISTER WITH A CHALLENGING DISCIPLINARY SITUATION. EO50x1
GEN. ARAGAO MET LAST WEEK WITH GENERAL OFFICERS UNDER HIS DIRECTION AND INDULGED IN VITRIOLIC DIATRIBE AIMED AT ALLEGED SHADY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE PRESIDENT, HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND CLOSE GOVERNMENT ADVISERS. ARAGAO IS SAID TO HAVE BLASTED THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION IN ALLOWING HIS RETIRED VETERINARIAN COLONEL FATHER-IN-LAW TO BE RECALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY "ON PAPER" FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING RE-RETIRED AT THE PAY OF A MAJOR GENERAL; IN ALLOWING THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL STATE TO APPOINT THE PRESIDENT'S UNQUALIFIED BROTHER TO A JUDGESHIP; IN TOLERATING INFLUENCE PEDDLING BY HIS SON, COL. (RET.) ALCIO DE CASTA E SILVA; IN PERMITTING A NEW HIGHWAY IN RIO GRNDE DO SUL STATE TO BE GIVEN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT'S LATE FATHER, AND IN CLOSING HIS EYS TO NUMEROUS OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH GEN. ARAGAO BELIEVES TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE HIGH PURPOSES OF

~~SECRET~~ DOCUMENT HAS RE E V E D FILE

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FORM FS-412
8-65

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* GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control:

Recd:

THE REVOLUTION. FOLLOWING HIS OUTBURST, ARAGAO WAS ASKED BY ONE OF THE GENERAL OFFICERS PRESENT WHETHER HE WAS FREE TO DISCUSS ARAGAO'S COMMENTS OUTSIDE THE ROOM WHERE THE MEETING WAS BEING HELD. ARAGAO READILY GAVE HIS CONSENT AND THE UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL OFFICER IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE ARMY MINISTER TO INFORM HIM OF ARAGAO'S COMMENTS. MINISTER LYRA TAVARES REPORTEDLY ADMONISHED ARAGAO WHO THEN EXACERBATED THE ISSUE BY HANDING THE ARMY MINISTER A FORMAL LETTER IN WHICH HE REPEATED HIS DENUNCIATION OF THE ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES OF THE FIRST FAMILY AND ITS RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES.

3. (~~S/NF~~) THE ARMY MINISTER IS SAID TO HAVE SOUNDED OUT THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THEY DID NOT SHARE GEN. ARAGAO'S VIEWS. ARMED WITH THAT COHESIVE POSTURE, GEN. LYRA TAVARES MADE AN UNSCHEDULED TRIP TO BRASILIA ON 27 JUNE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSULTING WITH THE PRESIDENT. WHILE THE FORMULA AGREED UPON IS NOT KNOWN, THE ARMY MINISTER SPENT THE WEEKEND OF 28-29 JUNE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE HIGH COMMAND. SOURCE INDICATED THAT GEN. ARAGAO WAS GIVEN "CONCILIATORY OPTION" ON 30 JUNE AND THAT THE DECISION WAS NOW UP TO HIM.

4. (~~S/NF~~) COL. ALCIO, THE PRESIDENT'S SON, SPENT ABOUT A HOUR IN MY OFFICE ON 30 JUNE AND DISCUSSED ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM WITH CONSIDERABLE SELF-CONFIDENCE. HE DEPLORED GE, ARAGAO'S PERSISTENCE IN VENTING HIS PERSONAL FRUSTRATIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO ARE WORKING ON BRAZIL'S BEHALF. ALCIO ALSO SAID THAT WILL POUNCE ON ARAGAO WITH LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EVENT ARAGAO AIRES HIS ALLEGATIONS IN PUBLIC. IN ALCIO'S WORDS, "ABOUT 10 OR 12 GENERALS THINK THAT THE REVOLUTION MUST ENGAGE IN CONSTANT ARBITRARY ACTS TO PROVE ITS WORTH." HE LISTED ARAGAO AMONG THEM AND SAID THAT ARAGAO SHOULD BE APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S TOLERANCE IN PROMOTING HIM TO FOUR STARS IN MARCH AFTER ARAGAO HAD CAMPAIGNED TO DEPOSE THE PRESIDENT DURING THE 12-13 DECEMBER 1968 CRISIS. ALCIO ALSO SAID THAT INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS ARAGAO STILL ANNOY THE PRESIDENT, BUT THEY "NO LONGER MAKE HIM ILL."

~~SECRET~~

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8 - 65

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☆ GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Control:

Recd:

COMMENT: (S/NF) GEN. ARAGAO IS NOTED FOR HIS IMPETUOUS AND OFTEN CRUDE ACTIONS. IN DECEMBER, FOR INSTANCE, IN MY PRESENCE, HE REFUSED TO SHAKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OUTSTRETCHED HAND. MOREOVER, HE FREQUENTLY WRITES SIGNED, HARD-LINING ARTICLES WHICH APPEAR IN THE LOCAL PRESS. DESPITE HIS EXEMPLARY PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND, HE HAS LOST PRESTIGE IN RECENT YEARS BECAUSE OF HIS INTEMPERATE OUTBURSTS. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY WILL TRIGGER A MAJOR CRISIS, BUT ARAGAO IS DANGEROUS BECAUSE HE PRESUMES TO SPEAK FOR THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHOM HE CONSTANTLY COUS AND IS IDENTIFIED WITH SUCH ANTI-ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS AS FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER AFFONSO DE ALGUEQUERQUE LIMA AND RECENTLY-CASHIERED HARD LINE COLONEL BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI. MOREOVER, THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME SUBSTANCE TO THE STORIES ABOUT THE FIRST FAMILY'S ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE FOLLOWING THREE COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN TO THE GOVERNMENT: (1) REPRIMAND ARAGAO AND KEEP HIM ON THE JOB BUT UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY; (2) RELIEVE HIM OF HIS DUTIES AND PLACE HIM IN LIMBO WITHOUT ASSIGNMENT, OR (3) RETIRE HIM FOR CAUSE UNDER INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO.5

GP-3.

BT

~~SECRET~~

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8 - 65

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☆ GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

ACTION

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P 231535Z MAY 69

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA

INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUEOJEA/OASD/ISA

RUEOJFA/JCS

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. (C)

EO50x1

FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE FIRST STEP APPARENTLY OCCURRED 10 DAYS AGO WHEN PRESIDENT MET WITH SERVICE MINISTERS AND ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO WORK TOWARD REOPENING OF CONGRESS (PROBABLY IN AUGUST). MINISTERS REPORTEDLY AGREED WITH PLAN PROVIDED NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS TAKEN TO INSURE CONTINUITY OF REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS WITHOUT IMPEDIMENTS PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH SPOKESMEN FOR VESTED INTERESTS AND STATUS QUO. SERVICE MINISTERS REPORTEDLY ALSO URGED NON-ABDICATION OF PUNITIVE PREROGATIVES OF IA-5, AND NECESSARY PRIOR CONDITIONING OF OFFICER CORPS.

2. (C) ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES IS SAID TO HAVE SENT CLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM TO ALL GENERAL OFFICERS LATE LAST WEEK, ADVISING THEM PRESIDENTIAL DECISION AND OF HIS OWN FULL ENDORSEMENT. HE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE DISSEMINATION OF THE DECISION TO KEY STAFF OFFICERS AND SENIOR TROOP COMMANDERS AND SUGGESTED APPROPRIATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. FIRST POSITIVE INDICATION OF COMPLIANCE CAME ON 19 MAY WHEN MG RAMIRO TAVARES GONCALVES, RECENT COMMANDER OF THE ARMORED DIVISION, USED OCCASION OF TAKING COMMAND OF BOONDOCKS 9TH MILITARY REGION IN MATO GROSSO, TO EXTOL VIRTUES OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMY'S

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Recd: MAY 23, 1969

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TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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Classification

Control:

Recd:

PREFERENCE FOR PURELY PROFESSIONAL PURSUITS. GEN RAMIRO'S STATEMENT ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT SINCE HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO APPLIED STRONGEST PRESSURES FOR MILITARY SANCTIONS ON PRESIDENT DURING DECEMBER CRISIS.

3. (C) MAJOR "CONDITIONING" EXERCISE WILL TAKE PLACE ON SATURDAY ON THE OCCASION OF INFANTRY DAY CELEBRATIONS AT RIO'S VILA MILITAR ARMY GARRISON. EVERY GENERAL OFFICER IN THIS AREA AND ALL TROOP COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO ATTEND. PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER ADDRESS AT END OF LUNCH AT SAMPAIO INFANTRY REGIMENT AND IS EXPECTED TO CONVEY HIS POLITICAL STRATEGY TO HUNDREDS OF OFFICERS PRESENT.

COMMENT: (C) DESPITE MOOD OF SUPREME SELF-ASSURANCE WHICH PRESIDENT SAID TO BE ENJOYING, HE IS REALISTIC ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT OFFICERS AT THE TROOP LEVEL ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC OVER RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL GAME. CONSENSUS AMONG THOSE OFFICERS APPEARS TO BE: "THINGS ARE GOING SO WELL AS THEY ARE, WHY REVERT TO THE PRE-13 DECEMBER SITUATION?" PRESIDENT MOVING FIRMLY, BUT CAREFULLY, AND CONSIDERABLE LIP-SERVICE BEING GIVEN TO IRREVERSIBLE NATURE OF 13 DECEMBER REAFFIRMATION OF THE 1964 REVOLUTION, AS WELL AS TO PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION TO DEAL APPROPRIATELY WITH THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION. CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL PROCESS WILL BE TOLERATED ON A TIGHTLY REGULATED BASIS, WITH POLITICIANS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY. GP-3.

BT

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Classification

FORM FS-412
8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Control: 207

Date: May 6, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasilia 207

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. Reference three military names on recent cassation list, heard following from officers of Gen. Sec. NSC who stated they did not have direct access to info but repeated what they believed was case:

a. Lt.Col. Av. Lamego de Camargo. As pilot of private planes, was acting as courier to exiles and others "who are against us" in Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina.

b. Lt.Col. Army Orlando da Rocha Santos. Retired Veterinary officer living in Mato Grosso involved in mal practice of medicine, i.e. practicing on humans. When asked why take political rights for this, they replied he was running for some political office.

~~EX~~ Comment: It likely they wanted him for political reasons and used moral corruption to justify.

c. Air Force Captain. No information.

2. They understood all officers had been retired for

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA⁹

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: May 6, 1969

some time but not forcibly by Revolution.

3. Rate credibility B-3. GP-3

LOW *Sc*

Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FORM FS-413
8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control: I99

Date: April 30, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasilia I99

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. As now known, Adm. Henning was selected for Vice Admiral in unexpected promotions. He told me today he was jumped over two admirals senior to him both of whom will leave service under four years in post restriction. Also said Minister Navy told him he will command Naval District in Bahia. Expects to depart Brasilia in about a month. Minister's desire, he said, is to put a junior admiral in Brasilia.

2. Of interest, Henning also said he expects Brasilia Naval Command will move to new headquarters on edge of lake about this time next year, thus indicating Navy Ministry will move to Brasilia some time thereafter. He also stated that "perhaps overly ambitious plans" call for increasing Marine complement Brasilia to about 1000 men thus setting back plans for construction of Marine Barracks. (Have heard talk in NSC of Navy plans put Marine company in Anapolis.)

3. In farewell call today, Col. Carlos Evaristo M.

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA 69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: April 30, 1969

Costa, departing 11th MR Chief of Staff, stated he will become Chief of 4th Section (Logistica) of Army General Staff. He expects Gen. Muricy is type who will increase emphasis in that area. Evaristo is friendly, competent, loyal and of average intelligence. Speaks excellent English, translates books. Wife is quiet, some find her strange, but basically a very decent person. Both are anxious to return to Rio where they spent most their lives. He is thinking of private visit to US with family.

4. Gen. Vale is scheduled assume command Planalto Military Command 0900 hours, 9 May. GP-3.

SL
LOW

Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Charge:

Classification

Control: I8I

Date: April 24, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia I8I

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. Gen. Meira Mattos departs Brasilia this evening for his new assignment as Commandant Military Academy. There is frequent comment on rapidity of his departure but have yet to hear a reason given.

EO50x1

In meanwhile Chief of Cabinet Col. Helio da Cunha Telles de Mendonça (Mendonça) will be interim IGPM.

2. Among others ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ farewell dinner for him last night was attended by Lira Tavares and, of note, virtually entire Military Household. While the senior military of Brasilia were there, lower ranking representation was noticeably less than recent similar affairs for Generals Brasil and Medici. These adhesions are voluntary and cost individual dearly, hence was surprised to see this in light of frequent comment that MM is somewhat idol of junior officers. ~~Conrados~~ were

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Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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Classification

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Charge:

Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: April 24, 1969

invited but elected not to attend. EMFA, SNI, and CNS rank and file turn out was almost nil, again in contrast to Medici and Brasil. Reference your recent speculation, noted Lira went out of way to talk to young captain formerly Costa e Silva aide and still close to family.

3. MM's dinner remarks reference new job dealt solely with opportunities now presented him for implanting ideas in minds young cadets. I gave him best wishes in your name and all US military attaches who have had pleasure of knowing him. Have noticed his always friendly attitude has been especially so in last few weeks strongly suggesting future contacts with Americans are actively sought. This includes normally coolish Dona Serrana. Aide Captain Geraldo Rodrigues dos Santos will accompany him. Geraldo is young, aggressive and very sensitive of slights. He is useful low key contact with MM. Speaks some English.

4. ~~ATTEMPT TO SECURE MM~~ MM addressed War College group 22 April. Despite press of schedule he made extensive preparations and subjected himself to a difficult half hour reading in English of his prepared discourse which Embassy

by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control:

-3-

Date: April 24, 1969

had
~~xxx~~ translated for him. Through use of interpreter subsequent
questions were forthrightly answered. Group was favorably
impressed. GP-3.

SL
LOW

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Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FORM FS-413
8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEC 6

ACTION
ATTACHE
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POL
CHRON
RF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Recd: APR 15, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN *Use*

P 151840Z APR 69

FM [FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA]

TO RUEOJFA/DIA

INFO RUDONBA/USDAO AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON

RUESVB/USCINCSO

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA]

BRASILIA FOR [FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA]

FOLLOWING MESSAGE

EO50x1

QTE

1.

EO50x1

A. ENROUTE LONDON WILL VISIT WASHINGTON 18-28 APRIL FOR COORDINATION WITH BAF PURCHASING COMMISSION WASHINGTON. AT PRESENT LONDON COMMISSION IS SUBORDINATE TO ONE IN WASHINGTON.

B. THERE HE WILL COORDINATE PLANS TO SEPARATE THE TWO COMMISSIONS. BAF DESIRES LONDON REPORT DIRECTLY TO RIO AND BE BUILT UP IN SIZE EQUIVALENT TO WASHINGTON BECAUSE OF INCREASING NUMBER OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN INVENTORY.

C. PRESIDENT IS HESITATING APPROVING THE CHANGE BECAUSE HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE TOO COSTLY, PREFERING INSTEAD THAT OFFICERS FROM WASHINGTON TRAVEL TO ENGLAND WHEN NECESSARY.

COMMENT:

EO50x1

IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THIS IS SUBTLE YET DELIBERATE REMINDER OF BRAZILIAN IMPATIENCE WITH US SALES POLICY. IR FOLLOWS. UQTE

BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM FS-412
8-65

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control: 165

Date: April 15, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Request following message be sent

EO50x1

USCINCSO and any USAF addressees deemed appropriate:

1.

EO50x1

a. Enroute London will visit Washington 18-28 April for coordination with BAF Purchasing Commission Washington. At present London commission is subordinate to one in Washington.

b. There he will coordinate plans to separate the two commissions. BAF desires London report directly to Rio and be built up in size equivalent to Washington because of increasing number of British aircraft in inventory.

c. President is hesitating approving the change because he believes it will be too costly, preferring instead that officers from Washington travel to England when necessary.

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA '69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: April 15, 1969

2. When asked why BAF not save the trouble and buy US aircraft, [REDACTED] BAF wants US aircraft but US won't sell them. He specifically mentioned F-5.

3. Comment: [REDACTED]

EO50x1

[REDACTED] it entirely possible this is subtle yet deliberate reminder of Brazilian impatience with US sales policy. IR follows. GP-3.

LOW *Sc*

Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO
ATTACHE
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RF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Recd: APR 12, 1969

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R 111215Z APR 69

FM FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI DA
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSULATE SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSULATE RECIFE
ZEN/ AMCONSULATE PORTO ALEGE
BT

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

(U) SUBJECT: ARMY GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS.

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED:

GEN ALVARO ALVES DA SILVA BRAGA - FM DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL TO SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL.
MG REYNALDO MELLO DE ALMEIDA - FM COMDT COMMAND AND GEN STAFF SCHOOL TO DEPUTY CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF.
MG LAURO ALVES PINTO - FM UNASSIGNED TO ATTACHED TO ARMY SECRETARIAT FOR SPECIAL DUTY.
BG ADOLPHO JOAO DE PAULA COUTO - FM COMDT MIL ACADEMY TO COMDT COMD AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL.
BG CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS - FM INSPECTOR GENERAL STATE MILITIAS TO COMDT MIL ACADEMY
BG AUGUSTO DE OLIVEIRA PEREIRA - FM 2ND DEP CHIEF ARMY GEN STAFF TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STATE MILITIAS.
BG EDMUNDO DA COSTA NEVES - RELIEVED OF COMMAND FRONTIER ELEMENTS (NEW ASSIGNMENT NOT ANNOUNCED).
BG VENITIUS NAZARE NOTARE - FM COMD 1ST ENGR GROUP TO COMD OF FRONTIER ELEMENTS.
BG SAMUEL AUGUSTO ALVES CORREA - FM CHIEF OF STAFF, FOURTH ARMY TO COMD ENGR. GROUP.
BG JOSE PINTO RABELO - FM COMMAND DIV ARTY, 4TH DIV TO CHIEF OF STAFF, FOURTH ARMY.
BG AUGUSTO CID DE CAMARGO OSORIO - NEWLY PROMOTED AND ASSGD TO DIV ARTY, 4TH DIV.
BG ALCY JARDIM DE MATOS - FM COMMAND OF DIV ARTY, 2ND DIV TO SUB DIRECTOR OF RECRUITING.
BG ANTONIO CARLOS DE ANDRADA SERPA - NEWLY PROMOTED AND ASSGD TO DIV ARTY, 2ND CIV.
BG EULER BENTES MONTEIRO - FM DIRECTOR OF SUDENE TO CHIEF SUPERIOR

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Foreign Service of the
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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Control:

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FINANCE & ECON COUNCIL OF ARMY.

BG CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBEIRO - FM CG OF 2ND BRIGADE TO CHIEF OF STAFF, FIRST ARMY.

BG ALBERTO CARLOS DE MANDONCA LIMA - FM CG 2ND MIXED BRIGADE TO CG 2ND INF BRIGADE.

BG HUGO DE ANDRADA ABREU - NEWLY PROMOTED AND NOW ASST. ARMA, WASHINGTON TO CG OF 2ND MIXED BRIGADE IN CORUMBA.

BG MANUEL JOSE CORREA DE LACERDA - NEWLY PROMOTED AND ASSGD AS CG OF INFANTRY OF 3RD DIV.

BG CARLOS MARIO TABERT - NEWLY PROMOTED AND ASGD AS DIRECTOR OF ESTRELA FACTORY.

2. ASSIGNMENT OF GEN. BRAGA TO SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL EXPECTED AS HE WANTED A LESS DEMANDING ASSIGNMENT AND A TEMPORARY VACANCY WAS CREATED WHEN GEN. MOURAO WAS "PERSUADED" (IN LIEU OF FORCED RETIREMENT) TO REQUEST A LEAVE OF ABSENCE UNTIL HIS NORMAL RETIREMENT COMES UP IN 1970. GEN BRAGA'S MOVE TO THE SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL OPENS UP ANOTHER 4-STAR BILLET AND MINISTER LYRA TAVARES CAN BE EXPECTED TO PUSH HARD IN FAVOR OF HIS CLOSE FRIEND, MG ISAAC NAHON, WHO IS THE NEXT ELIGIBLE MAJOR GENERAL, BUT GENERALLY HELD IN LOW REGARD WITHIN THE ARMY.

3. (⊕) THE ASSIGNMENT OF GEN PAULA COUTO TO THE IMPORTANT GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL BILLET COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME, PAULA COUTO HAS JUST BEEN SACKED FROM COMMAND OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY BECAUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE AND THIS FACT IS GENERALLY KNOWN AMONG THE PROUD STAFF AND FACULTY AND STUDENT BODY AT THE STAFF SCHOOL. GRUMBLING ALREADY EXISTS THERE OVER BEING HANDED A "DISCARD." THE ASSIGNMENT OF MEIRA MATTOS TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY CONSTITUTES ANOTHER IN THE LONG STRING OF CHALLENGES HE HAS FACED. IT IS THE PRIME JOB FOR A BRIGADIER GENERAL AND HE CAN ADD TO THE AURA OF SUCCESS THAT SURROUNDS HIS CAREER BY CLEANING UP THE MESS LEFT THERE BY PAULA COUTO.

4. (⊕) GEN. BENITIUS NOTARE CERTAINLY IS NOT PROGRESSING IN GOING FROM THE CHOICE ENGINEER GROUP COMMAND TO THE LESS-THAN-ATTRACTIVE FRONTIER ELEMENTS COMMAND. VENITIUS IS A CLOSE SUPPORTER OF FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER AFFONSO ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, AND SENT THE MINISTER A STRONG TELEGRAM OF SOLIDARITY AT THE TIME OF AFFONSO'S RESIGNATION, THUS, THE NEW JOB PROBABLY REFLECTS THE ADMINISTRATION'S UNHAPPINESS WITH THE OUTSTANDING VENITIUS. IN THE BARGAIN, HOWEVER, THE FRONTIER ELEMENTS GAIN A TOP-NOTCH COMMANDER AND THE ENGINEER GROUP WILL HAVE CONTINUITY OF EXCELLENCE IN THE PERSON OF THE COMPETENT BG SAMUEL CORREA.

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5. (G) POOR GEN. JOSE PINTO RABELO CONTINUES TO DO PENANCE FOR HAVING LOST CONTROL OF THE STUDENT BODY AT THE LATE OFFICERS ADVANCED SCHOOL AT THE VILA MILITAR WHERE, IN OCTOBER OF LAST YEAR, YOUNG CAPTAINS DREW UP A MEMORANDUM OF GRIEVANCES WITH JOSE PINTO'S BLESSING. NOT ONLY WAS HIS SCHOOL DISSOLVED, BUT THE GENERAL IS NOW GOING TO HIS THIRD POST SINCE LATE 1968. INITIALLY, HE WAS ATTACHED TO THE GENERAL STAFF: MOST RECENTLY, HE HAS BEEN WITH DIV ARTY OF THE 4TH DIVISION, AND NOW HE IS GOING TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF THE 4TH ARMY. GEN. JOSE PINTO IS A VERY CAPABLE OFFICER, BUT HE WANTS TO BE POPULAR AT ALL COSTS AND HE ALSO SUFFERS FROM A TOUCH OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN HIS REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR. HE APPARENTLY ENJOYS A POSITION OF FAVORITISM WITH D. YOLANDA COSTA E SILVA, THUS, HE IS NOT ENTIRELY OUT OF THE PICTURE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW WELL HE KEEPS HIS HARD-LINING TENDENCIES UNDER CONTROL IN PROVOCATIVE RECIFE.

6. (G) GEN. CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBEIRO IS AN OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL BUT HE HAS BECOME OVERLY INVOLVED WITH THE MESSY STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO POLITICS AND ASSUMED AN EXTREMELY RADICAL POSTURE ON 12-13 DECEMBER. AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY HE WILL BROADEN HIS HORIZONS AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN HIS TEMPTATIONS TO SPEAK OUT ON POLITICAL ISSUES. HIS SUCCESSOR, GEN. MENDONCA LIMA, IS NOT A POLITICAL CREATURE AND PROBABLY WILL GIVE THE 2ND INF. BRIGADE A LOWER KEY APPROACH TO LIFE IN GENERAL.

COMMENT: (G) THE ESSENCE OF THESE ASSIGNMENTS IS A CLEAR REINFORCEMENT OF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S OVERALL CONTROL OF HIS ARMY APPARATUS. NOT ONLY AREN'T ANY GENERAL OFFICER'S SENSITIVITIES TOO OBVIOUSLY CHALLENGED BY ANY OF THESE MOVES, BUT ALL OF THE GENERALS INVOLVED OWE AT LEAST ONE GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTION TO EITHER WAR MINISTER COSTA E SILVA OR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA. GP-3.

BT

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Charge:

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Classification

Control: 164

Date: April 11, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

INFO: AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE PRIORITY

Brasilia 164

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. Departing SNI chief General Garrastazu Medici was honored with a farewell dinner last night studded with the current elite of Brasilia which included Ministers, Justices, Generals, and a sprinkling of politicians. Group was essentially military. Civilians were those generally close to the President, including ubiquitous Minister of Justice Gama e Silva. In his eulogy, Transport Minister Col. Mario Andreazza described Medici as the Army's most prepared General and next to the President himself the man most knowledgeable of Brazil's intimate problems--words which undoubtedly hurt Gen. Orlando Geisel, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and one of most senior, respected Army Generals, and perhaps BGen. Jaime Portella, Chief Military Household, both present.

2. Medici is first departure from "Holy Trinity", Presidencia vernacular for President's three most intimate advisors--Medici, Portella, and Rondon Pacheco, Chief Civil

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA 69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence: WRC

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Foreign Service of the
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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Charge:

Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: April 11, 1969

Household--who have been with him since start of administration. Time will tell if BGen Carlos Alberto Fontoura, new SNI Chief, will be able occupy as exalted position. Number two man, Chief of Staff Col. Pereira Manso Neto EO50x1 he will stay with Fontoura for a yet unspecified period, despite his desires for command assignment at this time. Hence, Fontoura steps in as head of fully operational group but one which includes many middle grade officers long personally associated with Gen. Medici, a man known for his ability to elicit intense personal loyalty. Last night at a large head table not particularly arranged by rank or protocol, Fontoura sat well at the foot and during the evening he was not especially sought after by those present.

3. For Porto Alegre.

EO50x1

After expressing best wishes in their names last night he was obviously touched. His response in English showed it is

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Classification

Control:

-3-

Date: April 11, 1969

still functional. After we made similar gesture toward his wife, she began talking in a burst of enthusiasm about "our dear, dear friends, the Americans". This is all to say that Medici, a man marked at present for an important future, is sympathetic toward US.

4. Please pass to EO50x1 as considered appropriate. GP-3

LOW

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Foreign Service of the
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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Charge:

Classification

Control: 163

Date: April 10, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 163

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (C) [EO50x1] last night that yesterday Lyra told him he will receive command of the Military Academy. He said no firm date was given but that it should be soon. [EO50x1] When I asked how he felt about assignment he vaguely replied it was Brazil's West Point and appeared less than enthusiastic.

2. (U) MGen Clovis Bandeira Brasil passed command of 11th Military Region yesterday to interim commander BGEN Antonio Bandeira. New Commander, MGEN Vale, will remain in Third Army as interim commander until relieved by Gen. Medici.

3. (C) Gen Brasil, now retired, states he is moving to his apartment in Rio. There is general confidence he will receive a new government assignment. For the American community's information in possible future dealings with him, he is a most warm and understanding man and should be approached with honesty and candor. He should not be pushed

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA 69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence: *MP*

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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~~SECRET~~

Charge:

Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: April 10, 1969

to discuss a subject after meeting initial resistance. His wife is much like her husband. Neither speak English. Among senior people at farewell dinner for him last night were Minister Gama e Silva, Gen. Portella, and Gen. Medici, reflecting his close identification with Costa e Silva and present regime. His farewell address at change of command ceremony was a masterpiece of defense of the revolution and elicited widespread favorable comment quite in contrast to the normal emptiness of such pronouncements.

4. (U) Lt.Col. Manoel de Jesus e Silva (Jesus) assumed command Presidential Guards Battalion on 8 April.

5. (U) On 11 April Gen. Figueiredo passes command of 1st Cavalry Regiment of Guards to Lt.Col. Helio da Cunha Costa. Minister Lyra told Cunha Costa yesterday he will remain as permanent commander. Gen. Figueiredo then leaves for Porto Alegre as Chief Staff, 3d Army.

6. (S) On 12 April Col. Rubens Mario Brum Negreiros passes command of 2d Engineer Railway Battalion in Araguaia to his ExO Maj ARISTOBULO who will be interim commander.

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
Control:

-3-

Date: April 10, 1969

There is talk both here and in Araguaia that Col. Miguel Pereira Manso Neto, presently Chief Staff SNI, will be nominated. Manso served there as ExO prior to present assignment and maintains many contacts. Upper classes in that area are still uneasy following the Communist Terrorist Threat quashed in 1967. SNI maintains an officer secretly assigned to the battalion to whom they feed information. Hence, Manso's presence in the rich Triangulo Mineiro would be comforting to locals. Negreiros goes to Minister of Army's cabinet in Rio to a position unknown to him as of yesterday. GP-3

LOW



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Charge:

Classification

Control: I39

Date: March 25, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia I39

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~LIMDIS~~

1.

EO50x1

concerning alleged terrorists now
being investigated under IPM Col. Ademar.

2. Angelo said number of prisoners is now thirty.
On 16 March I was told by another source that the number
at that time was around 20. No source here has any
information on these additional police arrests.

EO50x1

3. Prisoners have stated they refused "instructions
from above" to commit terrorist and other acts here in
Brasilia because of fear configuration of city and its
isolation would make hiding or fleeing too difficult
afterwards.

4. I asked Angelo if he felt they have cleaned up
enough of these people to reduce their effectiveness. He

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Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Charge:

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Control:

-2-

Date: March 25, 1969

replied no, that because of their strict cellular
organization there is no way of telling their total
extent.

5

EO50x1

LOW *SC*

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INCOMING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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Recd: MAR 22, 1969

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CHRON
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R 211845Z MAR 69

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TO RUEOJFA/DIA
INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE UNN
DA GRNC
BT

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1. (C) PRELIMINARY MOVES ALREADY UNDERWAY IN WHAT PROMISES TO BE AVALANCHE OF EXPECTED PROMOTIONS AND ROUTINE AND NOT-SO-ROUTINE ASSIGNMENT. UNLEASHING OF STREAT EXPECTED FOLLOWING 25 MARCH GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS IN ARMY. EARLY RETURNS OF POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GAME OF MUSCIAL CHAIRS SHOW FIVE COMPLETED ACTIONS INVOLVING CATALYTIC FOUR-STAR AREA. TWO OF THESE INVOLVE SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL WHERE ONE ACTUAL AND ONE POTENTIAL VACANCY CREATED THROUGH FORCED RETIREMENT OF GEN. PERI BEVILAQUA UNDER INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5 AND REQUEST FOR SIX MONTHS' LEAVE ON PART OF GEN. OLYMPIO MOURAO. LETTER'S ACTION NOT QUITE VOLUNTARY SINCE ALTERNATIVE WAS FORCED RETIRMENT. MOURAO EXPECTED TO REQUEST ANOTHER SIX MONTHS' LEAVE UPON TERMINATION OF CURRENT ABSENCE, THUS TAKING HIM UP TO 1970 STATUTORY RETIREMENT DATE. MEANWHILE, LAW ALLOWS PRESIDENT TO NAME ANOTHER 4-STAR GENERAL TO THE TEMPORARILY VACANT BILLET, WHICH COULD MEAN EASING ANOTHER GENERAL OUT OF ACTIVE ARMY WITH CONCOMMITANT CREATION OF ANOTHER 4-STAR VACANCY. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. ADALBERTO PEREIRA DOS SANTOS HAS BEEN NAMED TO TAKE GEN. BEVILAQUA'S TRIBUNAL VACANCY. THE FOURTH HIGH-LEVEL ACTION TAKEN WAS THE STATUTORY (AGE) RETIREMENT OF 2ND ARMY COMMANDER GEN. LISBOA. IN A FIFTH MOVE, GEN. RAPHAEL DE SOUZA AGIUAR, DIRECTOR OF ARMY SUPPLY, HAS BEEN ASSIGNED

A

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AS MILITARY ADVIER TO THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION
AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, THUS CREATING
A PROMOTION VACANCY THROUGH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN
ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL OFFICE TO A NON-ARMY BILLET.

2. (C) THE OUTLOOK FOR NEXT TUESDAY'S PROMOTIONS

A. TO FOUR-STARS: GENERALS AUGUSTO CESAR ARAGAO,
JOSE CANAVARRO PEREIRA, AND EMILIO GARRASTUZU MDICI.

B. TO MAJOR GENERAL: GENERALS SYLVIO COUTO DA
FROTA, RAMIRO TAVARES GONCALVES, REYNALDO MELLO DE
ALMEIDA, EDNARDO D'AVILA MELLO, HENRIQUE CARLOS DE
ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO, AND LAURO ALVES PINTO.

C. TO BRIGADIER GENERAL: COLONELS HUGO DE
ANDRADE ABREU, WALTER PIRES DE CARVALHO E ALGUQUERQUE,
ERNANI AYROSA DA SILVA, ANTONIO CARLOS DE ANDRADA
SERPA, JOAO BPATISTA DE OLIVERIA FIGUEIREDO, AND
POSSIBLY THREE OTHERS.

3. (C) SPECULATION ON NEW ASSIGNMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. GEN. FRAGOSO - FROM SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL TO
PRESIDENCY OF JOINT BRAZIL-US MILITARY COMMISSION.

B. GEN BRAGA - FROM 3RD ARMY TO ARMY SUPPLY
DEPT. OR SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

C. GEN MURICY - FROM CHIEF OF ARMY PERSONNEL
TO CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY.

D. GEN. ARAGAO - FROM DIRECTOR OF REMOUNT TO
COMMANDER OF 3RD ARMY.

E. GEN. CANAVARRO - FROM DIRECTOR OF ORDINANCE
TO COMMANDER OF 2ND ARMY.

F. GEN. AFFLONSO ALGUQUERQUE LIMA - FROM UNASSIGNED
TO DIRECTOR OF ORDINANCE.

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G. GEN. NEWTON REIS -FROM SUB-CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF
TO SUB-CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF (NEW BILLET)

H. GEN. JOSE CAMPOS ARAGAO - FROM COMMANDER
5TH REGION TO COMMANDANT ARMY STAFF SCHOOL.

I. GEN. RAMIRO GONCALVES - FROM ARMORED
DIVISION TO 4TH MILITARY REGION.

J. GEN. REYNALDO DE ALMEIDA - FROM
ARMY STAFF SCHOOL TO COMMAND
OF 5TH REGION.

K. GEN. D' AVILA MELLO - FROM MILITARY ATTACHE,
WASHINGTON TO BRASILIA MILITARY COMMAND.

L. GEN. ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO - FROM CHIEF OF STAFF,
1ST ARMY, TO DIRECTOR OF REMOUNT.

M. GEN. NEWTON FERREIRA - FROM ARMY MATERIAL
TO COMMAND OF ENGINEER GROUP IN NORTHEAST.

N. GEN. OBINO ALVARES - FROM EXECUTIVE TO ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO ARMY TRAINING DIRECTORATE.

O. GEN. ARGUS LIMA - FROM THIRD ARMY TO
COMMAND OF 1ST INF. BRIGADE AT VILA MILITAR.

P. GEN. CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBERIRO - FROM
COMMAND OF 2ND BRIGADE AT NITEROR TO COMMAND OF
2ND DIV. INFANTRY AT CACAPAVA, SAO PAULO.

4. (6) SOME THE UPCOMING SIFTS ARE OF LITTLE
CONSEQUENCE. MOST, HWEVER, HAVE DEEP POLITICAL
MEANING. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND ARMY MINISTER LYRA
TAVARES WILL BE REMOVING MUCH OF THE POTENTIAL FOR
POLITICO-MILITARY MISCHIEF WITH THE NEW ASSIGNMENTS
FOR GENRALS MONIZ DE ARAGAO, AFFONSO, RAMIRO
GONCALVES, ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO, AND CARLOS ALBRTO.

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8 - 65


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PAGE-4



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COMMENT: (6) THE CHANGES MENTIONED HERE ARE BUT A FRACTION OF THOSE THAT WILL OCCUR IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. IN THE PROCESS, COSTA E SILVA WILL STRENGTHEN HIS HAND WITHOUT OFFENDING THE SENSITIVITIES OF THOSE TRANSFERRED, SINCE HE IS MAKING THE CHANGES ON THE BASIS OF SENIORITY, PROMOTION, OR TIME IN A PARTICULAR ASSIGNMENT. EVERY INDICATION POINTS TO THE CLOSEST COORDINATION AND MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ARMY MINISTER.

GROUP-3.

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Recd: MARCH 1, 1969

ACTION

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CHRON

RF

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FM

TO RUEOJFA/DIA

INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHDC

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RUEAOWD/ACSI, DA

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL REICFE

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210 FEB 69 / SECTION 1 OF 2

1. (C/NFD)

EO50x1

2. (C/NFD)

EO50x1

I WAS GOING TO CONUS ON

SATURDAY AND WANTED TO HAVE LATEST INFORMATION TO PASS ON TO

WASHINGTON, I ASKED FOR VIEWS ON DEGREE OF

CONTROL COSTA E SILVA HAS OF SITUATION.

EO50x1

THAT PRESIDENT IS IN FIRM CONTROL BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT INSULT MY

INTELLIGENCE BY PRETENDING THAT MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE PRES-

IDENT DID NOT EXIST. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE

PRESSURES EMANATED LARGELY FROM GENERALS MURICY, DUTRA DE CASTILHO,

ARAGAO, CALDERARI, FROTA, RAMIRO GONCALVES, AND HENRIQUE CARDOSO.

THESE GENERALS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS WERE NOT MAKING PUBLIC PRON-

OUNCEMENTS BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD BANNED THEM AFTER GENERAL

HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S "STUPID DECLARATION" IN VITORIA SEVERAL WEEKS

AGO. HOWEVER, THEY WERE USING ANOTHER CLEVER DEVICE AND THAT WAS

SPEECHES ON THE OCCASION OF CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONIES. TODAY,

FOR INSTANCE, EXPECTED THAT GEN FROTA WOULD GO

INTO PROFOUND CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING THE IMAGINED THREATS TO

THE REVOLUTION IN HIS SPEECH OF ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF THE

EO50x1

1ST MILITARY REGION.

ALL OF THE OTHER 4-STAR GENERALS, INCLUDING SYSENO SARMENTO,

THIS DOCUMENT HAS RECEIVED FILE

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AND

ESPECIALLY ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, ARE SOLIDLY ON THE SIDE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MODERATION.

3. (C/NFD) UPCOMING SHIFTS IN COMMAND WILL TAKE CARE OF MANY OF THE RASH GENERALS IN COSTA CAVALCANTI'S VIEW. HE SAID THAT LYRA TAVARES WANTS HIS PET MURICY AS CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF TO REPLACE GEN ADALBERTO WHO IS GOING TO THE SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME RESERVATIONS TOWARD MURICY WHO EXERTED PRESSURE ON 12 DECEMBER AND IS POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS. COSTA E SILVA LIKES HIM PERSONALLY AND BELIEVES HIM TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY LOYAL, BUT HE HAS INDICATED THAT WERE MURICY TO GO TO THE GENERAL STAFF, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE ALONG MANY OF THE HARDLINE COLONELS (HELIO MENDES, HELIO LEMOS ETC.) NOW IN HIS ENTOURAGE. [EO50x1] THAT GEN SOUZA AGUIAR, WHO WAS CONSPICUOUS IN HIS SUPPORT OF COSTA E SILVA ON THE PRESSURE-LADEN NIGHT OF 12 DECEMBER, AND WHO OUTRANKS MURICY, MIGHT GET THE CHIEF OF STAFF BILLET WITH MURICY REMAINING DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PERSONNEL. [EO50x1] PREVIOUS INFORMATION THAT GENERALS ARAGO, CANAVARRO, AND MEDICI WOULD GET THEIR FOURTH STARS ON 25 MARCH, WITH ARAGAO GOING TO 3RD ARMY, CANAVARRO TO 2ND ARMY, AND MEDICI REMAINING IN SNI FOR A WHILE. LATER, HE SAID, MEDICI WOULD TAKE OVER THE 3RD ARMY IN PREPARATION FOR BECOMING ARMY MINISTER. THE NEW HEAD OF SNI WILL BE GB FONTOURA, NOW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 3RD ARMY, [EO50x1] HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT MARSHAL LEVY CARDOSO WILL BE NAMED PRESIDENT OF PETROBRAS AND THAT HIS SLOT ON THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL WILL BE TAKEN BY THE CURRENT CHIEF OF CABINET, ARAKEN. [EO50x1] [EO50x1] THAT GEN (RET) DIEGUEZ WILL REMAIN AS A PETROBRAS DIRECTOR BECAUSE HE ENJOYS THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF COSTA E SILVA WHO EXPECTS TO MAKE HIM PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. [EO50x1] THAT PROMOTIONS AND REASSIGNMENTS WILL TAKE CARE OF SUCH PROBLEM GENERALS AS HENRIQUE CARDOSO AND RAMIRO GONCALVES, BUT THAT GEN CASTILHO DURTA WILL NOT BE TOUCHED FOR THE TIME BEING.

4. (C/NFD) WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER AFFONSO ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, [EO50x1] [EO50x1] CONTROVERSIAL COL BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI, ENJOYED FAR MORE PRESTIGE IN THE ARMY THAN DID AFFONSO. [EO50x1] [EO50x1] THAT AFFONSO HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF BEING FROM THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THAT CORPS OF ENGINEERS OFFICERS HAD VERY LIMITED FOLLOWINGS IN THE ARMY. MOREOVER, [EO50x1] SAID THAT

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA
PAGE 5

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AFFONSO HAD LEFT HIS CABINET POST WITH A SMOKE SCREEN OF PIOUS SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS, BUT THAT HE, [EO50x1] WAS NOW STUCK WITH PICKING UP THE TAB FOR SOME OF AFFONSO'S SELF-PROMOTION ACTIVITIES. AMONG THESE WAS A BILL FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES FOR 15,700 DOLLARS FOR A PRO-AFFONSO SUPPLEMENT PUBLISHED ON 19 JAN 69.

[EO50x1] IS MAKING SURE THAT THIS AND OTHER STORIES GET AROUND THE ARMY. AS FAR AS A NEW ASSIGNMENT FOR AFFONSO IS CONCERNED, [EO50x1] BELIEVES HE WILL REPLACE THE TO-BE-PROMOTED GEN CANAVARRO AS DIRECTOR OF ORDNANCE. ONE OF AFFONSO'S MOST ARDENT FOLLOWERS, GEN VINITIUS NOTARE WHO COMMANDS THE ENGINEER GROUP IN NORTHERN BRAZIL, WILL BE SENT TO MANAUS TO THE FRONTIER UNITS COMMAND AND HIS JOB WITH THE ENGINEER GROUP WILL BE TAKEN BY BG NEWTON FARIA FERREIA. ANOTHER AFFONSO SUPPORTER, CURRENT PETROBRAS HEAD MAJ GEN CANDAL, IS MENDING FROM SURGERY BUT WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY CHOICE CONSIDERATION FROM COSTA E SILVA WHO HOLDS HIM IN DISDAIN.

5. (C/NFD) WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT LIKELY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, [EO50x1] THAT COSTA E SILVA IS ANXIOUS FOR A RECOMPOSITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC APPARATUS, BUT THAT HE MUST GO CAREFULLY. [EO50x1], IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REOPEN CONGRESS UNTIL ABOUT JULY. HE SAID THAT MANY CIVILIANS--HEADED BY JUSTICE MINISTER GAMA E SILVA--AND A LIKE FORCE OF OF MILITARY MEN ARE ALL FOR MAINTAINING THE CURRENT STATUS ON AN INDEFINITE BASIS. WHEN I ASKED IF GAMA E SILVA HAD ANY REAL MILITARY ALLIES OR CONTACTS, [EO50x1] IDENTIFIED GEN RAMIRO, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMORED DIVISION, AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, COL HUGO DE SA CAMPELLO. (COMMENT: NEITHER OFFICER IS CONSIDERED TO BE BRIGHT IN THE ARMY AND THEIR FOLLOWINGS ARE INSIGNIFICANT).

6. (C/NFD) [EO50x1] THAT HE AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT SENSED THAT THE US WAS HOLDING BACK ON SOME OF ITS PROGRAM COMMITMENTS WITH BRAZIL. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW MUCH LONGER WE WOULD DO SO AND WHAT THE CONDITIONS WERE FOR A RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE NOT IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON OUR OLD FRIEND AND MATURE ALLY, BUT THAT HE MUST UNDERSTAND THE RESTRAINTS PLACED ON THE US EXECUTIVE BY PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISMS OF EXCESSES IN BRAZIL. I ALSO SAID THAT WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID BRAZILIAN EXPLOITATION OF ROUTINE AID ACTIONS, AND THAT WE FACED VERY MUCH THE SAME PREDICAMENT OF BRAZILIAN POLITICIANS WHO "SWEAT OUT" EVERY MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS ATTENDANT "CASSATION" LISTS.

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THE LAST THING WE WANT, I TOLD HIM IS FOR A CASSATION LIST TO COME OUT THE DAY BEFORE OR AFTER WE SCHEDULE A ROUTINE AID ACTION. HE SAID THAT COSTA E SILVA HAD SAID AT THE LAST NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THAT THE LIST THEN AGREED UPON WAS TO BE THE LAST AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL. [EO50x1] THAT GAMA E SILVA IS PRESSING FOR THE PURGE OF SOME OF THOSE ON THE HUGE LIST HE HAD SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT (INCLUDING SENATOR KRIEGER). BUT THAT COSTA E SILVA SOUNDED QUITE FINAL IN HIS STATEMENT [EO50x1] BELIEVES THERE WILL BE ABOUT 200 OR SO AT THE STATE AND TERRITORY LEVEL, "BUT WE CAN ARRANGE TO GUARANTEE THAT NO CASSATIONS WILL OCCUR WITHIN A THREE WEEK SPAN OF AID GIVING US THE WORD ON SOME MAJOR ASSISTANCE ACTION." HE ALSO ASSURED ME THAT THE GOB WOULD USE THE SAME DISCRETION IT RECENTLY DISPLAYED IN CONNECTION WITH A VALE DO RIO DOCE LOAN TRANSACTION.

7. (C/NFD) HOW, I ASKED, DID THE GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TIDY UP THE POLITICAL MESS FLOWING FROM INSTITUTIONAL AND COMPLEMENTARY ACTS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN, BUT THAT IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE HIM TO HAVE THE PRESIDENT ISSUE A FINAL INSTITUTIONAL ACT IN THE FORM OF A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A NATIONAL PLEBISCITE FOR RATIFICATION. [EO50x1] THAT IA-5JS PROVISIONS WILL REMAIN ALIVE AS A SOP TO THE RADICALS, BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING MORE SEVERE THAN A FORCED RETIREMENT AFTER CASSATIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL ARE CARRIED OUT. ON THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, [EO50x1] CONSIDERS THE WHOLE ISSUE TO BE FOOLISH AND ONE THAT WILL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. HE IS OF THE OPINION THAT INITIAL MANIFESTATIONS IN THE ARMED FORCES OF AN ANTI-PROFIT SYNDROME HAVE NOW SUBSIDED AND THAT THE MAJORS AND LT COLONELS WHO MOUTH SUCH THINGS ARE RATHER SHALLOW INDIVIDUALS WHO, WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SOLID ARGUMENT ON WHERE THEY STAND, REALLY HAVE NO MEANINGFUL POSITION TO DEFEND.

8. (C/NFD) WITH RESPECT TO THE PERU-US CONTROVERSY OVER IPC, [EO50x1] THAT IT HAD NOT MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT OR THE ARMED FORCES. HE DID WARN THAT THE US WOULD BE IN SERIOUS AND PROBABLY IRREVERSIBLE TROUBLE IN BRAZIL IF ANY SUCH THING AS CONTE-LONG, HICKENLOOPER, OR THE LIKE WERE EVER PUBLICLY INVOKED AGAINST BRAZIL. [EO50x1] THAT ANY REAL OR BRAZILIAN-IMAGINED THREAT OF REPRISAL FROM THE US WOULD PRODUCE VIOLENT REACTIONS (REACOES VIOLENTAS).

9. (C/NFD) [EO50x1] THAT COSTA E SILVA IS IN A STATE OF
MX []

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Recd:

HIGH MORALE BECAUSE HE IS ON THE OFFENSIVE FROM WHICH HE OPERATES BETTER. THE ONLY LIMITATION ON COSTA E SILVA'S ABILITY TO GET THINGS DONE. [EO50x1], IS THE PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK. [EO50x1] ALSO SAID THAT COSTA E SILVA IS BOTHERED BY A SLIPPED DISK PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES PERIODIC TRACTION. IN SPEAKING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF LYRA TAVARES LEAVING THE ARMY MINISTRY, [EO50x1] THAT LYRA HAD ALREADY AGREED TO TAKE AN AMBASADORSHIP AS SOON AS THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO MAKE A CHANGE. ON THE MATTER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, [EO50x1] [EO50x1] THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THE CURRENT BATCH OF 4-STAR GENERALS TO BE QUALIFIED, EVEN THOUGH COSTA E SILVA IS CONVINCED THAT A MAN WITH A MILITARY BACKGROUND MUST SUCCEED HIM. [EO50x1] DID NOT REACT WITH TOO MUCH SURPRISE WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT HE MUST BE HIGH ON THE LIST. I ALSO MENTIONED LABOR MINISTER JARABAS PASSARINHO ("HE MUST OVERCOME RESERVATIONS HELD BY THE ARMY") AND TRANSPORTATION MINISTER ANDREAZZA ("HE JUST WANTS A GOOD PAYING SINECURE TO MAINTAIN THE STANDARD TO WHICH HE HAS BECOME ACCUSTOMED".) ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, [EO50x1] THAT THE ORDER OF THE DAY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ALL ECHELONS WAS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH. [EO50x1] AND THE GOVERNMENT DO NOT EXPECT STUDENTS TO ENGAGE IN MUCH MISCHIEF WHEN CLASSES ARE RESUMED IN EARLY MARCH. OVERALL, HE THOUGHT THE NATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED.

COMMENT: (G/NFD)

[EO50x1]

[EO50x1] OTHER SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS USING [EO50x1] AND PASSARINHO (THE FORMER A CONGRESSMAN AND THE LATTER A SENATOR) IN LIAISON WITH POLITICAL LEADERS. BOTH CABINET MEMBERS--WHO ARE RETIRED CARRER ARMY OFFICERS-- ARE REPORTEDLY DETERMINED TO NORMALIZE THE POLITICAL PROCESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

[EO50x1]

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

BRASILIA, D.F.

DEF-6

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FEB 27 4 49 PM '69

Control:

98

Date: Feb.27, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 98

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

SUBJ: Miscellaneous Info Brasilia Military

1. Reference ~~NY~~ Brasilia 82, Col. Everaldo Breves was transferred from the President's Military Household as result of long standing friction with Air Minister.

Apparently culminating incident was argument whether to retire C54s or C47s, with Breves defending former.

2. Lt.Col. Av. Maximiano de Aquino Ramalho (Ramalho), Military Household, departs for England 24 March with four FAB captains of GTE. After one month training there they will fly second BAC 111 to Brazil. A total of eight pilots will be trained to provide two crews for each BAC 111. Col. Waldir, new chief Presidencia Air Force Section, will not check out in this aircraft.

3. Major significance of creation Comando Militar do Planalto slash 11^a Regiao Militar is that commander now instead of 1st Army reports direct to Minister Army. As one staff officer put

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Control:

-2-

Date: Feb.27,1969

it, we are back to the Brasilia Military Command. No change in organization is involved. This is further evidence of strengthening grip of President and Minister Army on troops occupying federal capital. Of interest was genuine surprise of several region staff officers over announcement. Plans were either closely held by a few officers here or they evolved rather precipitously in the Army High Command. Usually there is considerable advance talk on such changes.

4. New commander 8th Artillery Group (Grupo de Artilharia Anti-Aereo) is Col. Joaquim Abreu Fonseca (Abreu Fonseca). Maj. Roberto goes to Army General Staff Brasilia.

5. Following Army officers have been designated State Military Police commanders and will depart for new duties in about two weeks. (Public Safety Brasilia notified):

- a. Lt.Col. Fabio de Moura e Silva Lins (Fabio)--
Santa Catarina. Oldish, worn out looking
officer who does not appear have much drive or

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-3-

Date: Feb. 27, 1969

imagination. Presently Chief 3d Section, 11th
Region. Friendly and appears pro-American.

b. Lt.Col. Helio Jesus Fonseca (Fonseca)--Para.
Senior, yet young looking and energetic. His
idealism does not always go well with more
pessimistic colleagues. Presently Chief
Geography Subsection, EME, Brasilia. Very
pro-American.

6. Capt. Jose Gerado Theophilo Albano de Aratanha
(Aratanha), Chief of Staff, Brasilia Naval
Command, has just been selected as commander
First Destroyer Squadron. He departs for Rio
7 March. His replacement in Brasilia is Capt.
J.F. Albuquerque Lins (Lins). Both officers
and their wives are warmly personable, pro-
American, and speak English. Lins will continue
also in his present capacity as Chief Navy
Secretariat Brasilia. For latter position no
one has been designated although Aratanha believes
Capt. PAULO GOUVEA, recently returned from

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Date: Feb. 27, 1969

Purchasing Commission in Washington, will
be selected.

7. EMFA begins move to Brasilia 3 March. Report on
that subject will be submitted as soon as time permits.

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A MEMBASSY BRASILIA

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FM [FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA]

TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RUEADWD/DA (ACSI)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESLM/USDAO LIMA PERU
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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1. (U) [REDACTED]

EO50x1

2. (G) [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA HAS FULL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AND THAT HE HAS ACHIEVED THAT CONDITION WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT HELP FROM ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES. [EO50x1]

[EO50x1] LYRA IS WEAK AND VACILATING AND DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE COMMAND OVER THE ARMY. [EO50x1] FEELS THAT LYRA WILL BE REPLACED EVENTUALLY BY CURRENT SNI CHIEF, GEN. MEDICI, SINCE THE LATTER IS CAPABLE OF SAFE-GUARDING THROUGH FIRM LEADERSHIP AGAINST THE MILITARY CRISIS WHICH MEIRA BELIEVES TO BE INEVITABLE IN 1970 AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.

3. (G) WITH RESPECT TO FORTHCOMING PROMOTIONS AND REASSIGNMENTS, MEIRA PREDICTS THAT MAJOR GENERALS ARAGAO, CANAVARRO, AND MEDICI WILL MAKE FOUR-STARS, WITH ARAGAO GOING TO PORTO ALEGRE TO COMMAND THE THIRD ARMY; CANAVARRO GETTING THE SECOND ARMY IN SAO PAULO, AND MEDICI REMAINING AS HEAD OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FOR THE TIME BEING. RECENT INTERIOR MINISTER MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO ALBUQUERQUE LIMA WILL REPLACE CANAVARRO AS CHIEF OF ORDNANCE; GEN. ADALBERTO WILL GO TO THE SUPR MILITARY TRIBUNAL; GEN. MURICY WILL REPLACE ADALBERTO AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF; GEN. BRAGA OF THIRD ARMY WILL BECOME MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE BRAZILIAN UN DELEGATION; AND GEN. FRAGOSO WILL LEAVE THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL EITHER TO HEAD JBUSMC OR AN ARMY DEPARTMENT.

4. (G) [EO50x1] ON THE PERU-US CONTROVERSY OVER IPC AND I DEVELOPED APPROVED APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE. HE SAID THAT HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES HAD PULLED OFF A CRUDE COUP WITHOUT ANY REAL JUSTIFICATION, AND

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THAT THEY WERE DESPERATELY GROPING FOR SOME SPARK TO CHARGE UP THE POPULAR IMAGINATION. HE CONTENDED THAT THEY ARE TREADING ON TREACHEROUS GROUND AND THAT MANY BRAZILIAN OFFICERS ARE MORE WORRIED OVER THE APPARENT DEMOGOGIC LEFTWARD DRIFT OF THE JUNTA THAN OVER THE IPC MATTER ITSELF.

5. (C) IN DISCUSSING THE FORTHCOMING RETURN TO CLASSES BY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS THROUGHOUT BRAZIL, [EO50x1] HOPE THAT THE JUSTICE MINISTER WILL APPROVE A DRAFT DECREE MEIRA HAD PREPARED AND WHICH THE PRESIDENT PRESUMABLY HAD ENDORSED. [EO50x1]

[EO50x1] --WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED PRIOR TO THE RESUMPTION OF CLASSES-- STUDENT POLITICAL MISCHIEF OF A VIOLENT AND DESTRUCTIVE NATURE WOULD BE PUNISHED WITH SUSPENSIONS FROM CLASS AND, IF NECESSARY, THE UNIVERSITY ITSELF. [EO50x1] THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS WHO RECEIVE A GOVERNMENT-PAID EDUCATION HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IMMUNE FROM ANY NON-JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCE FOR THEIR DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES. HE BELIEVES IT IS TIME THEY SUFFER APPROPRIATE ACADEMIC PENALTIES THAT WILL AFFECT THEIR FUTURE BREAD AND BUTTER CAPABILITIES.

6. (C) ON THE MATTER OF BIRTH CONTROL, [EO50x1] THAT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE URGENT ATTENTION TO A LOW-KEY BUT EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE. HE SAID THAT NO ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD BE MADE DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF THE CONTROVERSY, BUT THAT GOVERNMENT DOCTORS AND CLINICS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT TO EDUCATE AND ADVISE THE POPULATION ON FAMILY PLANNING.

7. (C) [EO50x1] PARTICIPATED TWO DAYS EARLIER IN THE CLOSING SESSION OF A SEMINAR PROMOTED BY THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS AT A RETREAT HOUSE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS A 3-WAY DISCUSSION GROUP WITH APPROXIMATELY 15 REPRESENTATIVES EACH FROM THE CLERGY, THE ARMED FORCES, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THE TALKS WERE INTERESTING AND STIMULATING AND CERTAINLY EDUCATIONAL FOR THE CLERGY. [EO50x1] THAT BRAZIL'S PRIESTS ARE QUITE NAIVE AND TOTALLY UNPREPARED TO DEAL WITH SOPHISTICATED ECONOMICS, FISCAL MATTERS, AND THE GENERAL DYNAMICS OF GOVERNING. SUCH SESSIONS WILL EDUCATE THEM AND PERHAPS MAKE THEM MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BRAZILIAN REALITIES AND THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNING, HE SAID.

8. (C) THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF BRIG. GEN. TACITO AS HEAD OF SUDENE DID NOT PLEASE [EO50x1] HE SAID THAT TACITO IS A MAN OF UTTER INTEGRITY, BUT THAT HE IS NOT DECISIVE AND DOES NOT HAVE THE MENTAL FLEXIBILITY TO GRASP THE BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPLEX JOB HE HAD BEEN HANDED [EO50x1] THAT INTERIOR MINISTER COSTA CAVALCANTI HAD TOLD HIM THAT TACITO WAS HIS FOURTH CHOICE FOR THE JOB, SINCE ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES HAD VETOED THE OTHER THREE ON THE BASIS THAT THEY WERE TOO VALUABLE AS LEADERS

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Recd:

OF MEN. [REDACTED] EO50x1 THAT GEN. REYNALDO, COMMANDANT OF THE ARMY STAFF SCHOOL, WAS ONE OF THOSE PICKED BY CAVALCANTI, AND THAT ANOTHER WAS THE CURRENT COMMANDER OF THE 2ND BRIGADE IN NITEROI, BG CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBEIRO. THE THIRD CHOICE WAS NOT MENTIONED AND IT COULD [REDACTED] EO50x1, THUS ACCOUNTING IN PART FOR HIS CURRENT BITTERNESS WITH LYRA TAVARES, IF THE MINISTER IN FACT BLOCKED HIM FROM THE IMPORTANT SUDENE BILLET.

9. (C) IN DISCUSSING THE OUTLOOK FOR PETROBRAS, THE GOVERNMENT OIL MONOPOLY, [REDACTED] EO50x1 THAT HE BELIEVES MARSHAL LEVY CARDOSO, PRESENT HEAD OF THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, WILL BE THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION. GEN LISBOA, RECENTLY-RETIRED AS SECOND ARMY COMMANDER, APPARENTLY WILL REPLACE LEVY CARDOSO AND IT ALSO APPEARS THAT MAJ. GEN. CLOVIS BRASIL, SOON-TO-RETIRE HEAD OF THE 11TH REGION IN BRASILIA, WILL BE APPOINTED TO THE PETROBRAS BOARD OF DIRECTORS [REDACTED] EO50x1 THAT MARSHAL LEVY CARDOSO IS GETTING ALONG IN YEARS BUT THAT HE HAS SHOWN TREMENDOUS ENERGY AND DETERMINATION ON THE COUNCIL, AS WELL AS ENLIGHTENED ATTITUDES WITH RESPECT TO MAKING PETROBRAS ECONOMICALLY SOUND.

COMMENT: (C)

EO50x1

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Control:

82

Date: Feb. 22, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasília 82

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. As of Friday all indications in Presidência were for National Security Council meeting in Rio on 28 February. President is due return Brasília on 3 March.

2. Following are changes in key personnel of Presidência.

3. Military Household: A.) Sources in Presidência consider it certain that Col. Tancredo Ramos Jubé, Secretary to Gen. Jaime Portella, will become new Chief of Brazilian Purchasing Commission in Washington shortly after return of Government from Petrópolis. Replacement has not been decided but name of Army Col. José Maria Covas Pereira was mentioned. Covas is currently Chief, 1st Section, General Secretariat, National Security Council. ~~COMMENTXXX~~
(COMMENT: This move appears to have political overtones.

Tancredo is an astute, politically ambitious, strongly national-

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UNP

fws/2/24/69

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Date:

istic, hard hardliner. Embassy here has heard that he has active ambitions to be next Governor of Goiás. Projected move returns him to direct Armed Forces control and removes him from national scene for possibly two years. His own sense of defeat was expressed in letter to me from Petrópolis dated 13 February in which he ~~described~~ described himself as "now at the end of my career" and "lacking in the sincere support of my professional companions." His English is poor and, while he has always been friendly, his feelings toward ^{US} ~~us~~ are only lukewarm.) B.) Col. ~~Everaldo~~ ^{Everaldo} Breves, Chief Air Force Section, has been transferred to Panama as Air Attaché. Replacement is ^{Col.} ~~Colonel~~ Waldir de Vasconcelos (Waldir). Breves served only seven months in Presidência. No political motivations are known. He does not speak English but likes Americans. C.) Comdr. Walbert Figueiredo has joined Navy Section.

4. Civil Household: Lt. Col. Sergio Mario Pasquali (Pasquali), Assistant to Special Advisor on Public Relations,

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Date:

will depart March/April to attend Leavenworth course.

His replacement, a Lt. Col. Brochado, is presently working

in his new job in Rio. Pasquali has sought and expected this

assignment for some time. His English is good. Both he

and wife are **VERY** ~~working~~ personable and pro-American.

LOW



Drafted by:

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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Classification

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

DEF-6

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Charge:

Classification

Control: 76

Date: 19 February 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

PRIORITY

BRASILIA 76

FOR

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. GENERAL PORTELLA HAS ORDERED RETURN TO BRASILIA OF FIRST SECTION (DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLITICS) OF GENERAL SECRETARIAT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. OFFICERS ARE IN PROCESS CLOSING BRASILIA DURING AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CARNAVAL. SECTION WILL CONTINUE WORK THEY WERE DOING IN RIO ON IA5 PROCESSES.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE: (A) B.GEN. BANDEIRA TELLS ME HIS 3d INF.BDE. WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL 1 APRIL. (B) LT.COL. PAULO DE FIGUEIREDO ANDRADE DE OLIVEIRA (PAULO) DEPARTS BRASILIA TODAY FOR MANAUS TO ASSUME COMMAND 27TH INF. BN. HE IS BROTHER OF LT.COL. YVANILDO DE FIGUEIREDO ANDRADE DE OLIVEIRA (YVANILDO), FIRST SECTION, GS, NSC. BOTH ARE NORTHEASTERNS AND OUT-SPOKEN SUPPORTERS OF IDEALS OF 1964 REVOLUTION AND IA5. YVANILDO IS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO

Drafted by: *WJP*

Approving Officer:

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Concurrence:

jrk

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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Control:

Page 2

Date:

GEN. BANDEIRA. (C) PAULO TELLS ME ONE COMPANY
27TH INFANTRY PRESENTLY DETACHED TO BOA VISTA,
RORAIMA WHERE IT WILL REMAIN UNTIL BORDER SITUATION
EASES. (D) LT.COL. TARCISIO MONTEIRO SAMPAIO
(TARCISIO) DEPARTED BRASILIA THIS WEEKEND TO ASSUME
COMMAND 1ST BN/5TH INF. REGT. LORENA, SAO PAULO.

LOW

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Approving Officer:

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Charge:

Classification

Control: 072

Date: Feb. 15, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasília

072

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. Extreme hard liner Lt. Col. Washington Bermudez, Public Relations Officer, Minister of Army's Cabinet, Brasília, has been abruptly transferred to Curitiba where he will be assigned to a yet undesignated position on the General Staff of the 5th Military Region (he is a Gaucho). His equally hard line Assistant, Captain ^{Marcus} ~~Marcus~~ Aurelius Minervino, Brother-in-law of Presidential Aide Major Conrado Dias, and who is presently on a brief visit to Europe, will not return to his post. Marcus' new assignment has not been announced. Lt. Col. Lario Serrano, ~~Minister's~~ Minister's Legislative Liaison Officer, has assumed additional function of Public Relations. I saw Bermudez yesterday and he was uncharacteristically subdued and quiet.

2. MGen. Clovis Bandeira Brasil, Commander 11th

☒ Drafted by:

¹⁴⁴² [] fws/2/19/69

Approving Officer:

☒ Concurrence:

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Charge:

Classification

Control:

-2-

Date:

Military Region will be retired statutorily for age late February or early March. According to Col. Celso Meyer, Chief of Army Minister's Cabinet, Brasflia, Gen. Brasil will become either Director Petrobras or Chief SNI (this ~~will~~ corroborates previous reports). Commander ad interim 11th Military Region will be BGen. Antonio Bandeiro.

3. Serrano ~~parak~~ (para 1) stated today it will be a long time (demora muito) before Congress reopens. He would not commit himself to any time period.

4. Serrano is close to BGen. Carlos de Meira Mattos, Inspector, State Military Police.

LOW *SL*

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2:46 PM

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R 111250Z FEB 69

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TO RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
BT

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (U) BRIG GEN TACITO THEOPHILO GASPAR DE OLIVEIRA, CURRENTLY COMMANDING THE INFANTRY OF THE 3RD DIVISION AT PELOTAS, RIO GRANDE DO SUL, HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS SUPERINTENDENT OF SUDENE AND WILL ASSUME HIS NEW DUTIES AT RECIFE ON 14 FEBURARY.

2. (C) THE 55-YEAR OLD GEN. TACITO (NOM DE GUERRE) IS A CARREER INFANTRY OFFICER WHO SERVED IN ITALY AS A CAPTAIN DURING WW II WHERE HE COMMANDED THE BEF DIVISION HQS. CO. (REAR). HE WAS AWARDED THE US BRONZE STAR FOR HIS SERVICES DURING THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. AS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL HE SERVED AT FORT LEAVENWORTH FROM 1955 TO 1957 AS EDITOR OF THE BRAZILIAN EDITION OF "THE MILITARY REVIEW." FROM MID-1965 UNTIL EARLY 1966, THE THEN COL. TACITO WAS STATIONED IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON THE STAFF OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE. HE SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH.

3. (U). GEN. TACITO IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE BRAZILIAN NAVY. HE HAS A BROTHER WHO IS A NAVY CAPTAIN AND TACITO HIMSELF ATTENDED THE NAVAL WAR SCHOOL IN ADDITION TO SERVING THERE AS AN INSTRUCTOR. HE HOLDS THE ORDER OF NAVAL MERIT AND THE ADMIRAL TAMANDARE MEDAL.

4. (C) THE NEW HEAD OF SUDENE WAS BORN IN FORTALEZA, CEARA, AND GRADUATED FROM THE COLEGIO MILITAR OF THAT CITY. HE IS MARRIED TO YOLANDA METHON, A QUITET, PLEASANT WOMAN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY CHILDREN. AT THE TIME OF OF THE REVOLUTION, TACITO COMMANDED THE 23RD LIGHT INF. FN. IN FORTALEZA AND HE PLACED IT UNEQUIVOCALLY ON THE SIDE OF THE ANTI-GOULART FORCES. PERHAPS CARRIED AWAY BY THE EUPHORIA OF THE MOMENT, HE ASSUMED UNCHARACTERISTIC HARD-LINING ARBITRARY ACTIONS TOWARD SOME STATE DEPUTIES, BUT CAME DOWN OFF HIS HIGH HORSE AFTER BEING HARPOONED BY PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO.

5. (C) CUMULATIVE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON GEN. TACITO REVEALS THE FOLLOWING WITH RESPECT TO CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY; HE HAS A STRONG PERSONALITY AND IS FORCEFUL AND ENERGETIC, THOUGH CALM AND CONTROLLED. GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE IN HIS VIEWS, HE IS VERY
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ANTI- COMMUNIST. HIS REPUTATION IS EXCELLENT WITH RESPECT TO
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY. HE IS SOMEWHAT
OF AN INTELLECTUAL IN HIS TASTES AND VERY NEAT IN APPEARANCE.
LOGIC AND ADVANTAGES FOR BRAZIL ARE THE TACTICS MOST LIKELY TO
SUCCEED WITH TACITO, WHO IS NOT AN EXTREME NATIONALIST AND WHO
HAS CONSISTENTLY DISPLAYED A FAVORABLE DISPOSITION TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES. GP-3.
BT

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FM FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

READWD/OACSI

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE UNN

DA GRNC

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FEB 5, 1969

2:23 PM

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ACTION TAKEN SL

1. (C) EO50x1 CONTINUE TO EXPRESS SATISFIED SURPRISE OVER PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S APPARENT ABILITY TO REBOUND VIGOROUSLY FROM SEEMING INACTION OF PRE-13 DEC AND OBVIOUS CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY ON THAT DATE. INCREASING NUMBER OF OFFICERS NOW BELIEVES THAT BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY IN FIRM CONTROL AND OPERATING ON BASIS OF WELL OILED CHAIN OF COMMAND. WHILE COSTA E SILVA WILL NEVER BE CLASSIFIED AS THE AVERAGE ARMY OFFICER'S VISION OF AN "IDEAL" PRESIDENT (HE NEVER HAS ENJOYED THAT UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE), HIS RECENT ACTIONS HAVE RAISED HIS STOCK AND DAMPENED THE IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK FOR THE EVER-PRESENT APOSTLES OF ANARCHY AND AMBIGUITY.

2. (C) INDICATORS THAT COSTA E SILVA HAS MADE A STRONG COME-BACK IN THE EYES OF HIS COMRADES IN ARMY UNIFORM ALSO POINT TO THE CONCOMITANT CONSOLIDATION OF THE POSITION OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES. BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT PERSIST IN THEIR DETERMINED EFFORTS TO WEED OUT MALCONTENTED. TWO CHRONIC COLONEL CONSPIRATORS--BOAVENTURA CAVALCANTI AND SEBASTIAO CHAVES--WERE SUMMARILY AXED FROM THEIR BILLETTS AT THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL AND 2ND ARMY HEADQUARTERS, RESPECTIVELY, THIS PAST WEEKEND. LYRA TAVARES SEEMS TO HAVE REGAINED THE FULL SUPPORT OF GENERALS SYSENO SARMENTO AND DUTRA DE CASTILHO, AND RETAINS THAT OF SUCH IMPORTANT 4-STAR GENERALS AS MURICY, SOUZA AGUIAR, MAMEDE, BRAGA, MALAN, LISBOA, AND ORLANDO

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GEISEL.

3. (C) UPCOMING GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS AND REASSIGNMENTS WILL GENERATE A CONSIDERABLE TEST OF THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE ARMY MINISTER'S FULL ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN THE TRADITIONAL RITUAL OF UTILIZING THOSE DEVICES FOR POLITICAL AS WELL AS PROFESSIONAL PURPOSES. IN THE LIGHT OF THE IMPRESSIVE AUTHORITY AND DETERMINATION DISPLAYED BY THE PRESIDENT IN DEALING WITH THE RECENT UNPLEASANTNESS INVOLVING THE RESIGNATION OF INTERIOR MINISTER ALGUQUERQUE LIMA, ARMY OFFICER CONTACTS ARE GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC OVER THE CONFRONTATION ON PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS. MOREOVER, THERE IS A GROWING CONSENSUS IN THE ARMY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE DETERRED IN HIS OBJECTIVE OF PROVING THROUGH DEEDS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO EVERY FACET OF ITS PRESENT COURSE.

GP-3.

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Recd: JAN 31, 1969
8:23 AM

P 301950Z JAN 69

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TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHC/SECTSWATE WASHDC
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
READWD/DA OACSI
RUESAH/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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1. (C) FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA IS SCHEDULED TO TURN OVER HIS CABINET POST TO BRIG. GEN. (RET.) JOSE COSTA CAVALCANTI, FORMER MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY AT 1800 HOURS, 31 JANUARY. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION IN ARMY AREA THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE AMBITIOUS GEN. AFFONSO MAY PERSUADE HIM TO USE OCCASION TO LEVEL CRISIS-GENERATING BLAST AIMED AT GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, SOME MILITARY MEN BELIEVE THAT AFFONSO'S MORE AGGRESSIVE COLLEAGUES MAY EVEN SEEK TO UTILIZE TURN-OVER CEREMONY AND ATENDANT ORATORY AS TRIGGER FOR A COUP.

2. (C) [REDACTED] E050x1
[REDACTED] SOME HOTHEADS AT VILA MILITAR WERE PLANNING TO DISTRIBUTE PAMPHLETS TODAY FOR PURPOSE OF INCITING YOUNG OFFICERS TO PRESSURE COMMANDERS INTO PRO-AFFONSO POSTURE TOMORROW. DEFINITION OF "POSTURE" [REDACTED] E050x1 AS "UMA ATTITUDE FIRME") UNCLEAR, BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE CONNECTION WITH PARADE CONCENTRATION OF CRACK MAP-SUPPORTED 1ST INF. BRIGADE (FORMER SCHOOL TROOPS UNITS) TOMORROW FOR CHANGE-OF-COMMAND FROM GEN. CALDERARI TO GEN. ARGUS LIMA.

COMMENT: (C) [REDACTED] E050x1
[REDACTED] GENAFFONSO HAD BEEN FOOLISH TO RESIGN HIS CABINET OST PREMATURELY AND THAT HE NOW FACED UTTER OBSCURITY IN SOME UNIMPORTANT STAFF

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PAGE -2

JOB. ON BASIS OF PROBES WITH OFFICERS ON ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES' STAFF, A KEY INFANTRY COMMANDER AT THE VILA MILITAR, AND SEVERAL OTHER SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS, I AM CONFIDENT THAT TOMORROW'S PROSPECTIVE ORATORICAL FIREWORKS CARRY ONLY LIMITED POTENTIAL FOR A COUP. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CLEARLY INDICATIVE OF THE STILL UNCONSOLIDATED POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT THAT UNUSUAL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN. AMONG THESE, THE PRESENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO TODAY OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES WHO HAS BEEN LIVING IN PETROPOLIS IS SIGNIFICANT. MOREOVER, GEN. MURICY WAS REPORTED YESTERDAY AS BUSILY HUDDLING WITH KEY ARMY OFFICERS AND WITH OUTWARD APPEARANCES OF STRAIN AND WORRY. ANOTHER INDICATOR OF CONCERN IS THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TODAY TO CONSIDER FURTHER PURGES HAS BEEN POSTPONED, PROBABLY UNTIL AFTER CARNIVAL. BECAUSE THE NSC SECRETARIAT OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THE PURGE LISTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO WATCH OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO GARRISON. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, I BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT POTENTIAL MINI-CRISIS WILL BLOW OVER ON TWO COUNTS: (1) GEN AFFONSO'S SUPPORTERS LACK THE "HORSES" TO BRING ABOUT A COUP, AND (2) AFFONSO HIMSELF IS TOO MUCH OF A DISCIPLINED SOLDIER AND A FRIEND OF COSTA E SILVA TO DELIBERATELY THROW BRAZIL INTO THE "BANANA REPUBLIC" MOLD.

GP-3.

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RUEADWD/OACSI

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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1. (C) THERE ARE MANY STRONG INDICATORS THAT INTERIOR MINISTER ALBUQUERQUE LIMA WILL TENDER RESIGNATION FROM CABINET POST TO PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA DURING ROUTINE MEETING LATE THIS AFTERNOON.

EO50x1

[REDACTED], PARTICULARLY AS IT AFFECTS NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN STATES, BUT THAT REAL REASON WAS "AFFONSO'S LONG-RANGE AMBITIONS."

[REDACTED] HIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WAS A BLOW AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY UNITY AND THAT "IF I WERE BRIZOLA I WOULD BECOME EUPHORIC WHEN I HEAR OF YOUR RESIGNATION."

EO50x1

2. (C)

[REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT WOULDN'T ISSUE A SPECIAL DECREE ALLOWING AFFONSO TO STAY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY POST AFTER 15 MARCH. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA WAS DETERMINED NOT TO USE HIS EXCEPTIONAL POWERS UNDER INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5 FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY SINGLE INDIVIDUAL.

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Recd:

[REDACTED] NO OTHER OFFICER IN ANY OF THE THREE SERVICES WILL EVER BE AFFECTED BY THE LAW; YET, WHEN GEN PORTELLA OF THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD SUGGESTED THAT COSTA E SILVA ISSUE A DECREE CANCELLING THE DISCRIMINATORY LAW SO THAT LYRA COULD REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY, [REDACTED] HE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT SUCH A MEASURE. IN HIS VIEW, "IT IS SAD THAT SOME LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION CANNOT ACCEPT THIS SELFLESSNESS."

3. (C) SOME ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT GEN ALGUQUERQUE LIMA MAY BE INVOLVED IN A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO RALLY THE HOTHEADS OF THE NIGHT OF 12 DECEMBER FOR ONE FINAL ATTEMPT AT DEPOSING COSTA E SILVA. ALGUQUERQUE LIMA AND SOME OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS HAVE SEEN THE WRITING ON THE WALL IN THE FORM OF THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO NEUTRALIZE MOST OF THEM LARGELY THROUGH ROUTINE PROMOTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER, OR THROUGH EQUALLY ROUTINE CHANGES OF COMMAND ASSIGNMENTS FOR THOSE WHO HAVE LONG BEEN WITHOUT ADMINISTRATIVE DUTY (GENERALS SYSENO, CASTILHO, RAMIRO GONCALVES, ETC.). IF ALGUQUERQUE LIMA IN FACT ENTERTAINS COUP NOTIONS, HIS CHANCES APPEAR EXTREMELY SLIM.

4. (C) ALGUQUERQUE LIMA HAS GONE TO REIDICULOUS LENGTHS IN RECENT DAYS TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO RETAIN HIM IN HIS PRESENT JOB ON AN ACTIVE DUTY STATUS. HE HAS USED THE DEVICE OF REQUESTING THE SPECIAL STATUS FOR SUDENE SUPERINTENDENT GEN EULER, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HE TOO WOULD BENEFIT; HE HAS TRIED TO GET [REDACTED] TO ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RETENTION OF GEN CANDAL AS PRESIDENT OF PETROBRAS, AGAIN KNOWING THAT HE WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE PRECEDENT; AND HE HAS ALSO EMPLOYED THE MORE DIRECT APPROACH OF GOING TO GEN PORTELLA AND ASKING HIM TO PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, SUDENE, AND PETROBRAS WERE POSITIONS OF MILITARY INTEREST AND THAT, AS SUCH, AN EXCEPTION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE CURRENT LAW. COMMENT: (C) GEN AFFONSON UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CAUSE SOME

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8 - 65

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PAGE -3

EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE MOMENT HE
RESIGNS AND REVERTS TO HIS STATUS AS AN ACTIVE DUTY
MAJOR GENERAL--AND THE LIKELY OBSCURITY OF SUB-
DIRECTOR OF A TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT--HE MUST CEASE
HIS FREE-WHEELING POLITICKING AND BECOME THE
DISCIPLINED CANDIDATE FOR FOUR STARS.

EO50x1

GP-3.

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CHRON
RF

Recd: JAN 21, 1969
8:22 AM

R 202015Z JAN 69

FM [REDACTED]
TO RUEOJFA/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEADWD/OACSI
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONGEN SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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ACTION TAKEN Sc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

1. (G) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND IS RELIABLE, WELL INFORMED, INTELLIGENT,
AND FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE U.S.
DISCUSSED WITH ME THE MATTER OF FOREIGN
REACTIONS TO THE 13 DECEMBER TIGHTENING UP
UNDER INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5 (IA-5) [REDACTED]

EO50x1

IN SAO PAULO JUST AFTER CHRISTMAS TO ASSESS
THE IMPACT ABROAD OF IA-5. HE SAID THAT THE
ELEVEN OLONELS DECIDED OUT OF HAND THAT THEY
DID NOT CARE WHAT THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA
OR EUROPE THOUGHT. THEY DID CARE WHAT THE US
PRESS AND THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT, BUT THEY
BELIEVED THAT BRAZILIAN SOLUTIONS HAD TO BE
FOUND FOR BRAZILIAN PROBLEMS AND THAT IA-5
WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED DESPITE THE ESSENTIALLY
NEGATIVE IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. (G) SOURCE WAS ASKED WHETHER HE AND HIS
COLLEAGUES HAD CONSIDERED THE LIKELIHOOD OF
EXCESSES UNDER IA-5 PLACING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO DEPLORE
PUBLICLY THOSE ACTIONS AND PERHAPS EVEN
TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN THE ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE FIELD TO DEMONSTRATE ITS UNHAPPINESS.
HE REPLIED, WITH SOME EMOTION, THAT
THE CONTINGENCY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAD
BEEN DISCUSSED, AND THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED
THAT, IF SUCH WERE TO OCCUR, IMMEDIATE COUNTERACTION

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PAGE -2

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Recd:

WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST AMERICAN BUSINESS
INTERESTS IN BRAZIL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED
IN THE MEETING WITH HIM AS MODERATES WHO SINCERELY
HOPED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT
IMPOSE PENALTIES ON BRAZIL, BECAUSE THE CURRENT
MOOD OF THE BRAZILIAN OFFICER CORPS COULD
GENERATE IRREVERSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTIONS WHICH
COULD SEVERELY DAMAGE LONG-TERM BRAZILIAN-US
RELATIONS.

3. (G) [REDACTED]

EO50x1

[REDACTED] THAT OFFICERS WITH WHOM THAT SOURCE
MAINTAINS DAILY CONTACT HAVE REFLECTED ESSENTIALLY
SAME POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO ACTIONS
THEY WOULD RECOMMEND TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
IN THE EVENT OF US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
REPRISALS OVER IA-5.

COMMENT: (G) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OFTEN ARE ACCUSED OF OVER-
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE U.S. BUT HAVE INDIVIDUAL
RECORDS OF STEADFAST PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
GESTURES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. GP-3
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BRASILIA, D.F.

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Charge:

JAN 20

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Control: 24

Date: January 20, 1969

TO: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasília 24

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. Had dinner the other evening with a senior officer of the Presidência and his wife and another Brazilian couple. Both of the latter have responsible jobs with the Federal Government in Brasília. The couples are related by family. All are pro-Revolution and IA5 but it was obvious the civilian couple was ~~xxx~~ critical or at least dubious of what the military are doing. Several interesting comments are reported below. Of particular note was the mention by the officer of the Presidência of a new constitution.

2. Why, the civilians asked, were the political rights of the retired justices not lifted? Those who are professors will return to teaching and their ideas will be passed to future lawyers. The best the colonel could come up with was to state they will probably go to teach in US universities and further the bad image being created of Brazil; it is better they stay here, he said.

Draft FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Approving Officer:

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3. In 1964, the civilians said, cassations were for clear and obvious reason. Now much of what "you" are doing looks like ^{vengeance,} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ a dirty game of getting your enemy's friend. This is not a revolution, they said. The colonel offered little defense and weakly denied that any vengeance was involved.

4. Finally, the civilian pressed the colonel to tell him when Congress would open. He was reluctant to answer and replied he couldn't say. Brazil first must have ~~political~~ political education, he said. He was then asked how long this would take, 4 or 5 years? He strongly said no, it will open much sooner but first we will have to write a new constitution in order to give Brazil the kind of Congress acceptable to the Revolution. It must be the kind of constitution that will give Brazil democracy but not throw it open to the extended ^{chaos that it} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ is now too economically weak to withstand. As for the present, he said, the people are accepting what is going on as can be seen from their lack of reaction.

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-3-

Date:

5. COMMENT: This is the first mention I have heard
from a responsible source within the Government.
of a new constitution. He appeared to be talking of the

Government's plans and not of his personal ideas. Brasilia

3246 and 3271 reported talk among hard line officers of a new
form of Congress to replace the present one. This information
is reported as another possible indication of such plans.

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BRASILIA D.F.

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Control: 21

Date: 17 January 1969

TO: AMER.EMB. RIO DE JANEIRO

FOR: FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

FROM: BRASILIA 21

1. This morning I talked with a civilian Magistrate of the 4th Military Region (Auditor da Justica Militar) who has been working in Brasilia for many months. He had just returned from Rio where he had been involved in the cassations of 16 January.

2. He was jubilant over the cassation list and said progress was truely being made thanks to IA5. Now, he said, we must straighten out the University of Brasilia which has become a "Soviet".
"Soviet professors will be handled through IA5 and "new lists".

3. I asked if there will be more cassations of politicians and he replied of course, that there are still the state legislatures to be dealt with as well as more federal deputies. He talked with the easy assurance of a man describing his work.

Drafted by: WRO Approving Officer:

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RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONGEN SAO PAULO
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ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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1. (G) THE PRESSURES WHICH EXPLODED ON 13 DEC 68 IN THE FORM OF INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5 (IA-5) REFLECTED SOME ESTABLISHED HIGH-LEVEL ALIGNMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY. MOREOVER, NEW ALIGNMENTS WERE FORGED. SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE BEEN OF A TEMPORARY NATURE AND THE RESULT OF THE EMOTIONAL MOTIVATIONS OF THE MOMENT; OTHERS COULD BE MORE SUBSTANTIVE, BOTH IN DURATION AND PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THESE ALIGNMENTS AND IS THE RESULT OF INFORMATION GATHERED ON A CONTINUING BASIS FROM RELIABLE SOURCES WHO HAVE ACCESS TO OR ARE THEMSELVES PARTICIPANTS IN THE SHIFTING CURRENTS OF PERSONAL LOYALTIES.

2. (G) IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA "DECIDED" TO IMPOSE IA-5 OR HAD THE DECISION IMPOSED UPON HIM. WHATEVER THE TRUTH, THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT MOST ARMY OFFICERS APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S HAND WAS FORCED. SOME EVEN CLAIM THAT THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND DECIDED ON THE NIGHT OF 12 DECEMBER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE DEPOSED (NO SUCCESSOR INDICATED) UNLESS HE TOOK DRAMATIC MEASURES BY NOON ON THE 13TH. PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED ON 12-13 DECEMBER IS TO IDENTIFY THE POSITION OF THE KEY 4-STAR GENERALS DURING THOSE EVENTFUL HOURS:

A. ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES: HE REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF ARMY PRESSURES BETWEEN 1730 AND 1900 ON 12 DECEMBER AND CAME AWAY CONVINCED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD KEEP HIS PROMISE TO TAKE

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8 - 65

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PAGE -2

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APPROPRIATE ACTION THE FOLLOWING DAY. GENERAL LYRA SO INFORMED THE SCORES OF EXCITED OFFICERS WHO SOUGHT HIM IN HIS OFFICE BETWEEN 1900 ON THE 12TH AND 0230 ON THE 13TH. TO ALL TALK OF THE ARMED FORCES TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS--WITH OR WITHOUT COSTA E SILVA--GEN. LYRA TAVARES STEADFASTLY SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT AND OPENLY STATED THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD HAVE TO GET A NEW ARMY MINISTER AS WELL AS A NEW PRESIDENT, SINCE HE WAS A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT.

B. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ADALBERTO PEREIRA DOS SANTOS: WAS NOT CONSULTED BY ANYONE AND DID NOT TAKE ANY MEANINGFUL INITIATIVE. GENERALLY, IT WAS ASSUMED THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF THE PRESIDENT, BUT HE LACKED EITHER THE PRESTIGE OR THE FOLLOWING TO PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE.

C. GEN. ORLAND GEISEL, CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES STAFF: WHILE NOT OCCUPYING AN ARMY BILLET AND THUS NOT LEGALLY A MEMBER OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND, HE IS, NEVERTHELESS, THE SECOND SENIOR ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL WHOSE VIEWS ARE SOUGHT AND RESPECTED. HE GENERALLY FAVORED A HARDENING BY THE GOVERNMENT AND SOUGHT OUT THE PRESIDENT (THE FIRST TIME HE HAD GONE TO COSTA E SILVA WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SUMMONS) TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. GEISEL PLAYED HIS GAME WITH THE EXTREME PROPRIETY FOR WHICH HE IS NOTORIOUS, THUS, HE FAILED TO CALL ON THE JUNIOR GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO TO MORTGAGE HIS SUPPORT. MOREOVER, HE HARBORED RESERVATIONS OVER PLACING SO MUCH POWER IN COSTA E SILVA'S HANDS.

D. GEN. AUGUSTO FRAGOSO, COMDT. OF SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL: ANOTHER 4-STAR GENERAL WHO DOES NOT BELONG TO THE HIGH COMMAND BECAUSE HE OCCUPIES A TRI-SERVICE BILLET. MOREOVER, HE IS NOT TOO POPULAR OR INFLUENTIAL AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES. IN THIS SITUATION, HOWEVER, HE CAME FORTH TO LYRA TAVARES AND PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTER.

E. GEN. SOUZA AGUIAR, CHIEF OF SUPPLY: EXPRESSED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR "LEGALITY"--MEANING THE PRESIDENT AND LYRA TAVARES.

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PAGE -3

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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F. GEN. ALVARO ALVES DA SILVA BRAGA, 3RD ARMY CG: REPORTEDLY REMAINED FULLY RESPONSIVE TO ARMY MINISTER'S DIRECTIVES AND KEPT TIGHT CONTROL OVER HIS PERSONNEL TO AVOID EXCESSES.

G. GEN. JURANDYR DE BIZARRIA MAMEDE, CHIEF OF WORKS AND PRODUCTION: THE ONCE RESPECTED AND POLITICALLY INVOLVED MAMEDE IS TIRED AND SEEMINGLY DIVOCED FROM THE MAINSTREAM--THROUGH SOME CONTEND HE IS LAYING LOW WAITING FOR AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT. AT ANY RATE, ON THIS OCCASION, HE MERELY NODDED SLEEPILY.

H. GEN. ANTONIO CARLOS DA SILVA MURICY, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL: GEN. MURICY WAS ONE OF THE KEY BALANCE WHEELS IN THE CRISIS AND APPARENTLY THE MAN WHO DID THE MOST TO SUSTAIN LYRA TAVARES' AUTHORITY. THOSE CLOSE TO GEN. LYRA SAY THAT HE ASSIGNED MURICY THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF STAYING GLUED TO 1ST ARMY CG SYSENO SARMENTO TO RESTRAIN HIM IN THE EVENT HE SHOULD DECIDE UPON SOME RADICAL COURSE OF ACTION. MURICY WAS EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL IN DOING THAT AND IN ALLOWING HIMSELF TO SERVE AS AN ESCAPE VALVE FOR HOTHEADS WHO ESPOUSED RADICAL COURSES OF ACTION.

I. GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO, CG, 1ST ARMY: HE RETURNED TO RIO AT 2000 ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH FROM A WEEK-LONG INSPECTION TRIP IN BRASILIA AND GOIAS. HIS HARD-LINING AND AMBITIOUS STAFF STAGED AN IMPRESSIVE 100-OFFICER GREETING PARTY AT THE AIRPORT TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED WITH THE PRESENCE OF THIRTY GENERAL OFFICERS AT HIS ARMY MINISTRY HQS. AND A NON-STOP INSISTENCE ON ACTION. SYSENO RESPONDED BY GOING TO LYRA TAVARES WHO TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THE PRESIDENT WOULD DO THE RIGHT THING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. SYSENO INDICATED THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO GET SOMETHING DONE THAT NIGHT. LYRA AUTHORIZED HI TO GO TO THE PRESIDENT--WITH THE NEAR CERTAINTY THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RECEIVE SYSENO, THEREBY DEFLATING HIS PRESTIGE WITHIN THE ARMY. THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT HAPPENED. THE MAJOR COMPOSER OF SYSENO'S SUDEEN PROMINENCE WAS HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, BG HENRIQUE CARLOS

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8 - 65

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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PAGE -4

DE ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO. IT IS PROBABLY FAIR TO SAY THAT SYSENO WAS THE PRINCIPAL 4-STAR INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE UPON THE PRESIDENT.

J. GEN. ALFREDO SOUTO MALAN, CG IV ARMY: AN INTELLIGENT AND LOYAL MAN WHO RESPONDS TO THE HIERARCHICAL PROCESS AND THUS KEPT A FIRM LID ON HIS AREA WHILE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE ARMY MINISTER.

K. GEN. MANOEL RODRIGUES DE CARVALHO LISBOA, CG, 2ND ARMY: LISBOA IS BLINDLY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT AND GEN. PORTELLA, BUT HE PROVED AN INEFFECTIVE COMMANDER SINCE HE COULD NOT EVEN BE LOCATED ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH. SOME OFFICERS IN OUTLYING AREAS--SANTOS, FOR INSTANCE--TOOK MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF CENTRAL GUIDANCE FROM 2ND ARMY HQS. DESPITE THE CONFUSION AT LISBOA'S HEADQUARTERS, MAJOR UNIT COMMANDERS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND REMAINED LOYAL ON THE ASSUMPTION A REAL CRACKDOWN WAS FORTHCOMING.

3. (C) IN THE IMPORANT 4-STAR AREA, THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF ALL OF THE ARMY'S TOP GENERALS EXCEPT GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO. THE LATTER IS BELIEVED FUNDAMENTALLY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT BUT APPARENTLY SUCCUMBED--AT LEAST TEMPORARILY--TO THE HEADY VAPORS FED HIM BY THE FOLLOWING GENERALS--EACH FOR HIS OWN REASONS:

A. MG AUGUSTO CEZAR DE CASTRO MONIZ DE ARAGAO, CHIEF OF REMOUNT AND VETERINARY: THIS FINE OLD SOLDIER WITH A STERLING PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION APPARENTLY IS IN THE THROES OF ADVANCED ARTERIOSCLEROSIS AND HIS ALREADY NOTORIOUSLY SHORT POLITICAL FUZE IS EVEN SHORTER. HE WAS ONE OF THE MOST EXCITED AROUND SYSENO AND URGED VIGOROUS AND IMMEDIATE ACTION--TO INCLUDE DEPOSING THE PRESIDENT.

B. MG AFFONSO AUGUSTO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOS: THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT GEN. ALBUQUERQUE LIMA AND SYSENO HAVE BEEN CARRYING ON A CONSPIRATORIAL ROMANCE FOR QUITE SOME TIME, WITH

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8 - 65

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Recd:

PAGE -5

SAO PAULO AS THE FOCAL POINT. ALBUQUERQUE LIMA WAS IN THE FOREFRONT IN AGITATING YOUNG OFFICERS DURING THE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING IA-5 AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE FOR COSTA E SILVA IN THE EVENT THE NIGHT OF 12-13 DECEMBER HAD PRODUCED THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT. IN SUCH A SITUATION, SYSENO UNDOUBTLY WOULD HAVE EMERGED AS THE ARMY MINISTER.

C. MG JOAO DUTRA DE CASTILHO, CG OF THE 1ST AINF DIV AND VILA MILITAR: OUTSTANDING SOLDIER CASTILHO BECAME THE PRINCIPAL LIGHTNING ROD FOR THE TORRENT OF BOLTS GENERATED AT THE VILA MILITAR FOLLOWING THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON THE MARCIO MOREIRA ALVES CASE. CASTILHO IS LOYAL TO LYRA AND TO THE PRESIDENT SINCE HE WAS THEIR CHOICE FOR THE POWERFUL POSITION HE OCCUPIES; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT MANY THINGS WERE WRONG AND CHANGES WERE NEEDED URGENTLY IF THE ARMY WAS TO REMAIN COHESIVE AND STRONG. THUS, HE ASSUMED AN INTRASIGENT AND EXTREMELY HARD POSTURE, EVEN THREATENING TO MARCH WITH HIS MEN INTO DOWNTOWN RIO UNLESS A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT BY NOON ON THE 13TH. ONCE HIGHER AUTHORITY (LYRA, MURICY, AND PROBABLY OTHERS) HAD ASSURED CASTILHO THAT ACTION WAS FORTHCOMING, HE REVERTED TO HIS ROLE AS THE DISCIPLINED SOLDIER. DESPITE THE FOREGOING ASSESSMENT, THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT CASTILHO ACTED OUT OF PERSONAL AMBITION SINCE HE STANDS TO RETIRE FOR AGE IN JUNE, 1970 UNLESS PROMOTED TO 4 STARS, AND CHANCES ARE EXTREMELY SLIM THAT HE WILL BE PROMOTED UNDER ROUTINE CIRCUMSTANCES. THUS, HAD HE GENERATED COSTA E SILVA'S OVERTHROW, HIS DETRACTORS BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE SOLVED HIS OWN TENURE PROBLEM QUITE NICELY.

D. BG RAMIRO TAVARES CONCALVES, CG OF THE ARMORED DIVISION: THE INTELLIGENT BUT EXTREMELY VOOOAIN AND AMBITIOUS GEN. RAMIRO CHARGED AROUND ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH-13TH WITH FIRE IN HIS EYES. DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE SERVED ON COSTA E SILVA'S STAFF FOR MANY YEARS AND OWES HIS PROMOTIONS AND CURRENT KEY POWER ASSIGNMENT TO THE PRESIDENT, RAMIRO'S LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT IS OPEN TO SERIOUS DOUBT.

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PAGE -6

E. BG HENRIQUE CARLOS DE ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO, SYSENO'S CHIEF OF STAFF: GEN. HENRIQUE CARDOSO HAS BEEN MANIPULATING GEN. SYSENO FOR A GOOD MANY YEARS. HE IS BRIHT AND AMBITIOUS AND HE APPEARS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO PUSH SYSENO ALL THE WAY TO THE PRESIDENCY. NATURALLY, HENRIQUE CARDOSO WOULD DERIVE SOME BENEFITS FROM THAT UNLIKELY OCCURRENCE. HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S HOLD ON SYSENO IS SO NOTIRIOUS THAT PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA REPORTEDLY CALLED IN SYSENO ABOUT TEN DAYS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF IA-5 AND ASKED HIM: "DO YOU THINK YOU WILL EVER BE ABLE TO COMMAND ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S ORIENTATION?" THE IRONY OF HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S RECENT AGITATION IS THAT HIS CAREER WAS SAVED FROM THE JUNK PILE UNDER GOULART THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF THEN GENERAL COSTA E SILVA.

F. BG JOSE PINTO DE ARAUJO RABELLO, COMDT. OF OFFICERS' ADVANCED SCHOOL: GEN JOSE PINTO REVEALED HIS UNEASINESS IN OCTOBER WHEN HE SANCTIONED A "CAPTAINS MANIFESTO" BY STUDENT OFFICERS AT HIS SCHOOL. HE IS AN INTELLIGENT AND RESPECTED OFFICER, BUT HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE CARRIED AWAY BY THE REAL AND IMAGINED GRIEVANCES OF JUNIOR OFFICERS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT JOSE PINTO ACTED FROM CONVICTION RATHER THAN AMBITION.

G. BG CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBEIRO, CG 2ND INF BRIGADE, NITEROI: THE HARD-LINING GEN. CARLOS ALBERTO IS REGARDED AS A COSTA E SILVA MAN, BUT IN THE RECENT SITUATION HE SIDED WITH GEN. CASTILHO AND THROUGH HIM WITH GEN. SYSENO. HE WAS ONE OF THE "TIGERS" WHO HAD TO BE CONTAINED SINCE HE WANTED TO TAKE OVER THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO AND PURGE EVERY POLITICIAN SUSPECTED OF CORRUPTION OR SUBVERSION.

H. BG CESAR MONTAGNA DE SOUZA, ACTG. CG, 1ST MIL. REGLVION: THE VERY HARD-LINING MONTAGNA FOUND HIMSELF IN THE 1ST REGION BILLET AS THE HEAT GENERATED DURING SYSENO'S ABSENCE ON THE INSPECTION TRIP. HE WAS SWEEPED ALONG BY THE EUPHRIA OF THE MOMENT, EVEN THOUGH HE NORMALLY SUBORNIDANTES HIS NATURAL IMPETUOSITY TO THE MODERATE INFLUENCES OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES.

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FORM FS-412
8 - 65

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PAGE -7

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA
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I. BG ARNALDO JOSE LUIZ CALDERARI, CG 1ST INF. BRIGADE: GEN. CALDERARI'S EMERGENCE AT SYSENO'S SIDE WAS STARTLING IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE SERVED COSTA E SILVA AS CHIEF OF THE BRASILIA ADVANCED ECHELON WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS WAR MINISTER AND AS SUB-CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT ENTRUSTED HIM WITH THE KEY 1ST BRIGADE WHICH INCLUDES THE "CUTTING EDGE" MAP-SUPPORTED UNITS. IT COULD BE THAT CALDERARI LATCHED ON TO SYSENO IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE HIM FROM RASH ACTION AGAINST COSTA E SILVA, BUT MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH CALDERARI HAVE SHOWN HIM TO BE VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S "SOFTNESS."

4. (c) SINCE NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR LYRA TAVARES APPEAR IN ANY MOOD TO HAND OVER CONTROL OF BRAZIL'S DESTINEIES TO GEN SYSENO AND THOSE AROUND HIM, AND SINCE BOTH REALIZE THE NARROW MARGIN BY WHICH THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE PREVAILED ON 12-13 DECEMBER, IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY WILL TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS TO SHORE UP THE POSITION ON CENTRAL AUTHORITY. IN THE PROCESS, THEY WILL SAFEGUARD AGAINST LIKELY CONTINUED CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIITIES BY TOSE WHO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THEIR PERSONAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF IA-5. THE FIRST STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH THE RETENTION OF LYRA TAVARES AS ARMY MINISTER FOLLOWING HIS STATUTORY RETIREMENT FROM ACTIVE SERVICE ON 31 DECEMBER. OTHER MEASURES IN THE OFFING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. GEN SYSENO: AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY HE WILL PROBABLY BE REMOVED FROM COMMAND OF THE 1ST ARMY. SOME PREIBENTIAL ADVISERS WANT THE PRESIDENT TO ACT IMMEDIATELY--LARGELY TO SACK THE DANGEROUS HENRIQUE CARDOS IN THE BARGAIN--BUT OTHERS PREFER TO GIVE GEN SYSENO A BIT MORE "ROPE."

B. MINISTER ALBUQUERQUE LIMA: HE MUST EITHER RETIRE OR REVERT TO ACTIVE DUTY BY 15 MARCH AND THE FEELING IS THAT HE WILL REVERT. THUS, HE WILL COME UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT AND ARMY

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8 - 65

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PAGE 8

MINISTER WHO WILL EXERCISE GREAT CARE IN HIS ASSIGNMENTS AS WELL AS IN THE PERMISSIBLE LATITUDE HE CAN ENJOY IN POLITICAL STATEMENTS.

C. MG ARAGAO: HE WAS NE OF THE LEADING CONTENDERS FOR A FOURTH-STAR PRIOR TO HIS ACTIONS ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH. IT NOW APPEARS THAT HE WILL BE PASSED OVER AND ALLOWED TO FADE FROM THE SCENE.

D. MG CASTILHO: HIS RECENT ACTIONS ARE REGARDED WITH A CERTAIN TOLERANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE IS AN STEEMED PROFESSIONAL WHO IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE DISCIPLINARY FOLD. CASTILHO NOW KNOWS THAT HIS PROMOTION POTENTIAL IS DIRECTLY PEGGED TO FUTURE GOOD BEHAVIOR. HE PROBABLY WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM COMMAND OF THE VILA MILITAR AND FIRST INF. DIV.

E. BG RAMIRO: HE HAS JUST ABOUT COMPLETED A NORMAL TOUR AS CG OF THE ARMORED DIV. AND CAN EXPECT EARLY RELIEF. THERE IS EVEN TALK THAT HIS REPLACEMENT WILL BE GEN. TASSO VILLAR DE AQUINO, A RELIABLE LYRA TAVARES MAN.

F. GEN JOSE PINTO: HIS REASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND HE WILL GO TO THE STATE OF PARANA AS CG OF 5TH DIVISION ARTILLERY. HIS REPLACEMENT AT THE OFFICERS' ADVANCED SCHOOL IS SOLID LYRA TAVARES MAN, GEN OLAVO VIANNA MOOG.

G. BG CARLOS ALBERTO: HE COULD BE MOVED BUT MIGHT JUST AS EASILY STAY ON SINCE HE IS GENERALLY RESPONSIVE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND PARTICULARLY TO GEN PORTELLA, CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD.

H. GEN MONTAGNA: SAFELY BACK AS CG OF COAS ARTILLERY NOW THAT GEN FROTA--A LYRA TAVARES MAN-- HAS TAKEN OVER AS CG OF THE FIRST REGION.

I. GEN CALDERARI: HAS BEEN BROUGHT IN BY GEN. LYRA AS CHIEF OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF WHERE HE WILL BE UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY AND VERY BUSY. HIS SUCCESSOR AT THE FIRST BRIGADE IS EXPECTED TO BE LYRA TAVARES MAN GEN. ARGUS LIMA.

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8 - 65

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Recd:

PAGE -9

5. (C) STILL OTHER MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBJECT OF SPECULATION:

A. THE EXPECTED FORCED RETIREMENT LATER THIS WEEK BY EXECUTIVE ORDER OF CONTROVERSIAL GEN PERY CONSTANT BEVILAQUA OF THE SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL WILL OPEN UP JOB AND PROMOTION VACANCIES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT COLORLESS GEN. ADALBERTO MIGHT BE SHIFTED TO THE TRIBUNAL, THEREBY OPENING UP THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SLOT FOR THE ABLE GEN. MURICY. THE RESULTANT PROMOTION VACANCY (SINCE ADALBERTO WILL BE IN A NON-ARMY BILLET) WILL PROBABLY GO TO PRESENT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CHIEF, MG MEDICI, A SOLID COSTA E SILVA BOOSTER. HE COULD EITHER REMAIN IN SNI OR BE GIVEN COMMAND OF THE 1ST ARMY IN THE EVENT SYSENSO IS MOVED. THE OTHER 4-STAR VACANCY WHICH WILL BE FILLED ON 25 MARCH IS THAT RESULTING FROM LYRA TAVARES' RETIREMENT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT MG JOSE CANAVARRO PEREIRA, A SOLID PROFESSIONAL, WILL GET THAT PROMOTION AND PROBABLY COMMAND OF THE 2ND ARMY AS THE REPLACEMENT FOR GEN. LISBOA WHO RETIRED FOR AGE ON 31 DECEMBER.

B. PRESIDENTIAL FAVORITE MG CLOVIS BANDEIRA BRASIL, CG OF THE 11TH MILITARY REGION IN BRASILIA, REPORTEDLY WILL BE APPOINTED AS HEAD OF THE FINANCIALLY POWERFUL NATIONAL OIL MONOPOLY, PETROBRAS. CLOVIS BRASIL THUS WOULD REPLACE MG ARTHUR CANDAL, THE CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION WHO MUST REVERT TO ACTIVE SERVICE UPON COMPLETION OF TWO YEARS' NON-ARMY DUTY ON 15 MARCH. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT LESS THAN ENCHAINED WITH CANDAL'S INTRANSIGENT NATIONALISM IN PETROBRAS, AS WELL AS WITH CANDAL'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH FELLOW-ENGINEER. MG AFFONSO ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, THE AMBITIOUS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

6. (C) WHILE THE FOREGOING SEEMINGLY ADDS UP TO OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORITE ARITHMETIC FOR THE PRESIDENT, HE MAY NOT, IN FACT, BE IN SUCH A STRONG POSITION. HE MUST OVERCOME THE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED STIGMA OF HAVING BEEN "FORCED" INTO IA-5; HE MUST PROCEED WITH

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FORM FS-412
8 - 65

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Control:

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Recd:

PAGE 10

EXTREME CAUTION IN COMMAND SHIFTS; HE MUST MAKE FIRM BUT JUDICIOUS USE OF THE POWERS GIVEN TO HIM BFIA-5; HE MUST MOVE VIGOROUSLY AGAINST PROVEN CORRUPTION-- EVEN IF AMONG HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS; HE MUST WEIGH CAREFULLY THE FULL CONSEQUENCES IN MILITARY CIRCLES OF HIS CURRENT DESIRE TO RE-OPEN CONGRESS ON 1 MARCH; HE MUST CONTINUE TO GIVE UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE THAT HE IS PHYSICALLY AND METALLY EQUAL TO THE CHALLENGES OF HIS POSITION; HE MUST REMAIN ALERT TO PLOTS AIMED AT DEPOSING HIM, AND HE MUST PRODUCE MEANINGFUL SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESULTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IN ORDER TO REGAIN A POSITION OF FULL AUTHORITY, THE PRESIDENT MAY ALSO FIND IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE SOME OF THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET. ALL OF THESE

REQUIREMENTS CONSTITUTE A VERY LARGE ORDER FOR A MAN WHO SUFFERS FROM A HEART CONDITION; HAS LOST CONSIDERABLE MILITARY CONFIDENCE; IS FIERCELY LOYAL TO HIS FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES AND CONSIDERS IT A MATTER OF HONOR NOT TO REMOVE ANY OF THEM UNDER PRESSURE; HAS STRONG DEMOCRATIC CONVICTIONS AND DEPLORES AUTHORITARIAN MEASURES, AND IS NOTIRIOUSLY CHICKEN-HEARTED AND FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO SAY "NO" TO ANYONE WHO PLEADS ON THE BASIS OF SENTIMENTALITY OF HARDSHIP. WHETHER HE MAKES IT OR NOT WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON THE CONTINUING SUPPORT OF SUCH STALWARTS AS GENERALS LYRA TAVARES, MURICY, AND MEDICI, AND THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD OFF PRESSURES FROM BELOW THROUGH SUCCESSFUL PRESSURES UPON COSTA E SILVA. GP-3
BT

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8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

AMERICAN EMBASSY
BRASILIA, D.F.

DEF-6

Charge:

JAN 10 11 14 AM '69

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Classification

Control: 14

Date: January 10, 1969
1968

ACTION: AMEMBASSY ~~WASHINGTON~~ RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasília 14

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. I was told yesterday by the Minister Navy's representative in Brasília that BGEN Edmundo da Costa Neves, CG Frontier Elements Group, arrived vicinity Caramantarã (approx 57 degrees west, 2 degrees north) on Brazilian/Guyana border yesterday. Apparently there are small landing strips in that area, however, information given me in Manaus last September indicates there are no frontier elements stationed on the border between Boa Vista and ~~Clevelandia~~ ^{Clevelandia}. To the best of my knowledge, this location is well to the south of the recent trouble area in Guyana although source indicated Edmundo's presence was connected to that incident.

2. This information is reported only on speculation that it might contribute to something you are receiving there.

LOW

Drafted by:

69

Approving Officer: TBarrett

Concurrence:

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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

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Classification

CHRON
RF

R 131430Z OCT 69

FM

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
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OCT 13, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (C)

2. (C) IN SOURCE'S VIEW, GEN. MURICY, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, IS THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE TO BECOME MEDICI'S ARMY MINISTER. THE ONLY OTHER CANDIDATE HE THINKS IS IN THE RUNNING IS GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST ARMY. THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE MILITARY HOUSEHOLD WILL BE GIVEN TO BG CARLOS ALBERTO DA FONTOURA, CURRENTLY CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SNI). THE NEW SNI CHIEF REPORTEDLY WILL BE BG JOAO FIGURIRED, NOW GEN. MEDICI'S CHIEF OF STAFF AND A MAN WITH SUCCESSFUL PREVIOUS SNI EXPERIENCE AS THE DYNAMIC LEADER OF THE RIO DE JANEIRO AGENCY DURING THE CASTELLO BRANCO GOVERNMENT.

3. (C) SOURCE DID NOT HAVE CONFIRMED INFORMATION ON THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT HE HAD HEARD THAT DIPLOMAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

CAMARA CANTO, BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR TO CHILE, APPEARS TO BE RUNNING FIRST. HE ALSO AVOWED THAT MEDICI WILL RETAIN TRANSPORTATION MINISTER COL (RET) MARIO ANDREAZZA, DESPITE THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING ANDREAZZA OVER ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION.

COMMENT: (S)

[REDACTED] THERE ARE SOME IN THE ARMY WHO THINK THAT GEN. FIGUEIREDO HAS MORE TACK AND PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE THAN GEN. FONTOURA, AND SHOULD BE GIVEN THE KEY MILITARY HOUSEHOLD SLOT. IF ANDREAZZA IS RETAINED, GEN. MEDICI WILL BE TAKING A CALCULATED RISK, PROBABLY ON THE BASIS OF WISHING TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF BEING THE MASTER OF HIS OWN HOUSE. MOREOVER, MEDICI HAS LONG BEEN CLOSE TO ANDREAZZA AND REGARDS HIM AS ONE OF THE MOST COMPETENT COSTA E SILVA CABINET OFFICERS. GP-3.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
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P 061830Z OCT 69

OCT 6, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

ACTION TAKEN SL

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
RUECSDE/USMILGP BRAZIL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

1. (C/NF)

EO50x1

HE

EXPECTED UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE NAME OF GEN. EMILIO GARRASTAZU MEDICI, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ARMY, AS THE SELECTEE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO SUCCEED THE PHYSICALLY DISABLED PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA. GEN. MEDICI HAS BEEN SUMMONED TO RIO DE JANEIRO FROM HIS PORTO ALEGRE HEAD-QUARTERS AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT 1600 HOURS. LATER THIS EVENING, THE MEETING OF THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND WILL BE RESUMED AND GEN. MEDICI WILL RECEIVE FORMAL NOTIFICATION. AT THAT TIME, HE AND THE HIGH COMMAND WILL WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS, AND OTHER MAJOR ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED.

2. (C/NF) THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS ARE DETERMINED TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION ABROAD THAT PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA IS BEING DEPOSED. IN THAT CONNECTION, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION OVER DAMAGE DONE ABROAD BY A STATEMENT LAST WEEK BY PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY CHAGAS TO THE EFFECT THAT COSTA E SILVA HAD RESUMED NEARLY NORMAL WORK ROUTINE. BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES ARE GREATLY WORKED UP OVER FACT THAT VOICE OF AMERICA, AMONG OTHERS, GAVE PROMINENT PLAY TO THE STATEMENT. IT WAS DECIDED THAT ONLY WAY TO CLEAR UP THE SITUATION WOULD BE FOR MRS. COSTA E SILVA, HER SON ALCIO, OR THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO MAKE STATEMENT ANNOUNCING RESIGNATION. ON THAT BASIS,

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FORM FS-412
4-68

CONTINUED ON REVERSE CENTRAL

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

EO50x1

3. (~~C/NF~~) THE PROBLEM OF DISAPPOINTED WOULD-BE PRESIDENT MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, WILL BE DEALT WITH SEVERELY ON 7 OCTOBER, [REDACTED] WHEN I ASKED IF GEN. AFFONSO WOULD SUFFER A GEN. ARAGAO-TYPE OF PUNISHMENT (RELIEVED OF DUTIES), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ORIGINAL LETTER TO THE ARMY MINISTER (WHICH ALSO WAS DISSEMINATED BY ITS WRITER TO GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS ALL OVER BRAZIL) HAD BEEN ANSWERED BY GEN. LYRA TAVARES. GEN. AFFONSO HAD SINCE THEN WRITTEN A SECOND LETTER WHICH GEN. LYRA REFUSED TO ACCEPT AND RETURNED TO AFFONSO VIA ITS BEARER, COL. RENATO FONSECA, AFFONSO'S CHIEF OF CABINET.

COMMENT: (~~C/NF~~) THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCENARIO FOR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S SUCCESSION WILL TAKE ON EVEN GREATER FORMALITY THAN NORMALLY WOULD BE ATTENDANT UPON ANYTHING MANAGED BY ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, NOW THAT SOME FOREIGN MEDIA SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT COSTA E SILVA IS PRACTICALLY WELL AND BACK AT HIS DESK. EVERY ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO SHOOT DOWN THE OVERTHROW ANGLE AND NOTHING COULD BE MORE HELPFUL THAN THE COOPERATION OF MRS. COSTA E SILVA AND FAMILY. THE BITTERNESS WHICH SOURCE FEELS TOWARD GEN. AFFONSO IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENTIMENT SHARED BY MOST OF THOSE ON ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, STAFF AND BY MANY OTHERS IN AND OUT OF

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

THE ARMY. IF THE GEN. AFFONSO MENACE TO STABILITY IS
TO BE NEUTRALIZED, THESE INDIVIDUALS CONTEND, NOW IS THE
TIME TO APPLY POLITICALLY DISASTROUS SANCTIONS IN THE
FORM OF FORCE RETIREMENT. GP-3.

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

CHRON

RF

R 301945Z SEP 69

FM

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI DA

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. (C)

SEPTEMBER CIRCULAR FROM THE ARMY MINISTER TO ALL COMMANDS IN WHICH HE ABSOLUTELY FORBADE CONSIDERATION OF HIS NAME. MOREOVER, [REDACTED] GENERALS MEDICI AND MIRICY HAD SOUGHT TO PERSUADE LYRA TO ACCEPT AT THE 29 SEPTEMBER ARMY HIGH COMMAND MEETING, BUT THAT HE HAD DECLINED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEN. MEDICI WAS ASSURED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND AND ACCEPTED ONLY ON THAT BASIS. THE IDEA OF SENDING THREE NAMES TO THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND WAS SOLELY TO AVOID GIVING THE OTHER SERVICES THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE BEING HANDED A "TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT" SITUATION. GEN. GEISEL IS SAID TO HAVE AGREED TO THE INCLUSION OF HIS NAME ONLY ON THAT BASIS, SINCE HE REPORTEDLY DOES NOT WISH TO BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

2. (C)

EXPECTATION THAT HER HUSBAND WILL BE ABLE TO RESUME THE PRESIDENCY, AND URGED MEDICI TO ACCEPT ONLY AN INTERIM VICE- PRESIDENCY UNTIL COSTA E SILVA WAS WELL. SOURCE AVOWS THAT MEDICI NOW BELIEVES THAT BRAZIL'S HIGHER INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE AND THAT HE

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FORM FS-412
4-68

FILES WITHIN (5) DAYS.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

MUST ACCEPT THE NEW CHALLENGE WITH OR WITHOUT DONA YOLANDA'S BLESSING. THE FIRST LADY APPARENTLY IS DETERMINED TO RESIST TO THE BITTER END AND SOURCE SAYS THAT SHE HAS DEVISED SEVERAL DRAMATIC ACTIONS TO GAIN TIME. ONE OF THESE, HE SAID, WOULD SEE D. YOLANDA CALL FOR AN AMBULANCE AND WHISK THE PRESIDENT AWAY FROM LARANJEIRAS PALACE AND PRESUMABLY TO BRASILIA OR SOME OTHER PLACE WHERE HE WOULD SOMEHOW COMMUNICATE HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENCY. SOURCE SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS ARE AWARE OF THESE LIKELY TACTICS AND THAT THE THREE MILITARY MINISTERS ARE FULLY PREPARED TO COPE WITH ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT.

3. (C) A

OVER NOT RECEIVING THE BLANK CHECK HE HAD SOUGHT AND ALSO BECAUSE HE REPORTEDLY HEARD SEVERAL STRONG STATEMENTS AGAINST ANY FORM OF "CONTINUISMO".

ANY THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE ENTERTAINED OVER SEEKING HIGH OFFICE FOR HIMSELF. SOURCE IS OF THE OPINION THAT GEN. MEDICI IS IN A COMMANDING LEAD, BUT THAT HE WILL NOT ACCEPT AND THAT GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL WILL BE THE ULTIMATE CHOICE.

4. (C) ON THE VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SCENE, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATORS THAT LABOR MINISTER JARBAS PASSARINHO IS IN THE LEAD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68

EO50x1



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

PAGE 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

EO50x1

NAVY WAS PUTTING UP A STRONG BATTLE FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. MEIRA MATTOS SAID THAT NAVY FAVORITISM FOR THE PRESIDENCY HAD SETTLED ON NAVY MINISTER ADM. RADEMAKER (WITH GEN. MEDICI SECOND AND GEN. ALBUQUERQUE LIMA IN THIRD), BUT THAT THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF THAT FAVORITISM WAS TO GIVE THE NAVY A STRONG BAR-GAINING POSITION FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. MEIRA DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAVY WOULD GAIN THE NUMBER TWO SLOT BECAUSE "IT LACKS REAL LEADERSHIP AND RADEMAKER CANNOT STAY ON AFTER HAVING BEEN ON THE JUNTA".

COMMENT: (⊕) IT APPEARS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT MRS. COSTA E SILVA WILL ENGAGE IN DESPERATION MOVES TO SAFEGUARD HER PLACE IN THE SUN. HER CHANCES OF SUCCESS ARE SLIM, HOWEVER, EVEN THOUGH SHE COULD SUCCEED IN COMPLICATING THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM BY MAKING IT EXTREMELY AWKWARD FOR CLOSE COSTA E SILVA FRIEND AND ADVISER MEDICI TO ACCEPT THE SEEMINGLY OVERWHELMING BID OF HIS COLLEAGUES. GP-3.

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FORM 4-68 FS-412



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

CHRON
RF

P 181625Z SEP 69

FM [REDACTED]
TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEAOWD/OACSI DA
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSULATE PORTO ALEGRE
BT

SEPT 18, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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1. (C)

EO50x1

IN

CORDIAL ENVIRONMENT WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR UNITY AND RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY. INDIVIDUAL GENERAL OFFICERS COMMENTED ON THEIR SOUNDINGS IN RIO DE JANEIRO DURING PREVIOUS 48-HOURS AND CONSENSUS EMERGED THAT TIME HAD ARRIVED FOR CONSIDERATION OF NAMES OF LIKELY SUCCESSORS TO PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE HEARD IN THE SELECTION PROCESS AND THAT THE HIGH COMMAND WOULD AGAIN MEET IN A WEEK OR SO TO EVALUATE THE FINDINGS.

2. (C) ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, WITH THE REPORTED SOLID BACKING OF GENERALS MEDICI, MURICY, CANAVARRO, AND NAHON, PERSUADED THOSE PRESENT THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S DIGNITY BE RESPECTED. IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THAT NAMES AND PROCEDURES CONNECTED WITH THE SUCCESSION ISSUE WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S PHYSICIANS MAKE A DEFINITIVE ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE PROGNOSIS IN HIS CASE. THE HIGH COMMAND ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD WELCOME A MEDICAL VERDICT THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN RECOVER TO THE EXTENT OF RESUMING HIS DUTIES. HOWEVER, IT WAS GENERALLY CONCEDED THAT SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE WAS UNLIKELY AND THAT APPROPRIATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE SUCCESSION IS WARRANTED.

3. (C) UNDER THE SCENARIO WHICH SOURCES SAY THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND DEVISED, THE MEDICAL ANNOUNCEMENT (IN APPROXIMATELY 3-4 WEEKS) OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERMANENT DISABILITY WOULD

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FILES WITHIN (5) DAYS

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

BE FOLLOWED BY A STATEMENT OF THE THREE MILITARY MINISTERS THAT THE POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT ARE VACANT. THE JUNTA WOULD THEN STUDY AND ADJUST THE EXISTING DRAFT CONSTITUTION; CALL THE CONGRESS INTO SESSION, AND SUBMIT TO IT THE NAME OF A PRESIDENT AND OF THAT INDIVIDUAL'S CHOICE AS A VICE-PRESIDENT. BOTH NAMES WOULD HAVE THE BLESSING OF THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND. THE CONGRESS WOULD RATIFY THE CONSTITUTION AND "VOET" THE NOMINEES INTO OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM.

4. (C)

NOW BELIEVES THAT GEN. EMILIO GARRASTAZU MEDICI, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ARMY, IS ALMOST A "SURE THING" AS COSTA E SILVA'S REPLACEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT GEN. MEDICI IS A 4-STAR GENERAL; HE IS IN GOOD HEALTH DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WILL BE 64 ON 4 DECEMBER; HE IS WELL LIKED THROUGHOUT THE ARMY; HIS REPUTATION FOR INTEGRITY IS OF THE HIGHEST ORDER; HIS FAMILY LIFE IS A MODEL OF DEVOTION; HE IS PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S CLOSEST FRIEND OUTSIDE OF THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY; HIS WIFE, SILA IS VERY CLOSE TO MRS. COSTA E SILVA; AS CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF COSTA E SILVA'S ADMINISTRATION HE WAS A DAILY CONFIDANT OF THE PRESIDENT AND GAINED VALUABLE EXPERIENCE AND EXPOSURE AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL, AND HE IS NOT ACTIVELY SEEKING THE JOB. COMMENT: (C) THE SWING TOWARD MEDICI IS BOUND TO BE "LEAKED" BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE HIGH COMMAND MEETING WHO SIMPLY CANNOT KEEP SECRETS OF THAT NATURE. THE RESULT COULD BE AN IRREVERSIBLY SNOWBALLING ACCLAMATION OF MEDICI. THE DISAPPOINTED CONTENDERS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO UNLEASH FRANTIC ANTI-MEDICI GOSSIP AND PERHAPS EVEN ATTEMPT MORE EXTREME GESTURES OF DISSENT.

EO50x1

HEARD AS WILL RECENTLY-RELIEVED GEN. ARAGAO. THUS, THE ULTIMATE DECISION WILL BE TRULY REFLECTIVE OF A HIGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

COMMAND POSTURE. THE UNITY THEME WILL BE FURTHER RE-
INFORCED IF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE ([REDACTED])

EO50x1

[REDACTED] AGREE TO THE ARMY'S CHOICE. AT THIS STAGE, IT
WOULD APPEAR THAT ONLY LYRA TAVARES HAS A CHANCE AT THE
ARMY 4-STAR LEVEL IN THE EVENT SOME HITCH DEVELOPS IN
THE MEDICI TREND. HOWEVER, THE MOOD OF THOSE ON LYRA
TAVARES' STAFF IS THAT OF THE SOON-TO-BE-UNEMPLOYED.
GP-3.

BT

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

POL

INFO

USIS

CHRON

RF

R 171700Z SEP 69

FM

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUEAOWD/OACSI DA

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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SEPT 17, 1969

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ACTION TAKEN

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (S)

2. (S) DESPITE CONSIDERABLE SADNESS OVER THE APPARENT TREACHERY OF SOME COLLEAGUES OF MANY YEARS' STANDING, ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES IS QUITE CONFIDENT THAT HE HAS THE SITUATION GENERALLY UNDER CONTROL WITHIN THE ARMY AND THAT THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE REMAINS SOLIDLY INTACT. THE MINISTER IS DISAPPOINTED OVER THE POLITICKING OF MAJ. GEN. AFFONSO DE ALGUQUERQUE LIMA BUT IS GRATIFIED THAT THE DISAPPOINTMENT ALSO IS FELT BY THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE HIGH COMMAND. AS FAR AS ACTUAL TROOP COMMANDERS ARE CONCERNED, MAJ. GEN. CASTILHO, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST INF. DIVISION AND THE VILA MILITAR IS A SOURCE OF WORRY TO THE MINISTER AND MAY BE REPLACED SOON BY MAJ. GEN. FROTA, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST MILITARY REGION, WHO IS EFFECTIVE AND LOYAL.

3. (S) AS FAR AS THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION QUESTION IS CONCERNED, LYRA TAVARES AND THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND HAVE NO PRESENT INTENTION OF RUSHING INTO A SOLUTION.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

[REDACTED] THAT THE PRESIDENT IS PERMANENTLY DISABLED AS FAR AS THAT OFFICE IS CONCERNED, HE FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THE FOUR TO SIX-WEEK WAITING PERIOD SET BY THE DOCTORS MUST BE RESPECTED. SINCE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE ON THE LAST DAY OF AUGUST, THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND REPORTEDLY FEELS THAT THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER WOULD BE THE EARLIEST TIME THAT A DEFINITIVE OPINION MIGHT BE VOICED. GEN. LYRA TAVARES WOULD HOPE THAT EITHER THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF OR THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS INABILITY TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE. OTHERWISE, THE DOCTORS MIGHT MAKE SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT. OTHERWISE, THE DOCTORS MIGHT MAKE SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT. ONLY THEN, GEN. LYRA TAVARES AVOWS, WOULD THE SUCCESSION PROCESS BE TRIGGERED, TO INCLUDE THE SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE NAME.

4. (C) GEN. LYRA TAVARES IS HOLDING THE CURRENTLY HIGH COMMAND MEETINGS FOR SEVERAL REASONS -- NONE OF WHICH IS THE SELECTION OF A NAME. HE WISHES TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF UNITY AND TO INSURE THAT HIS TOP COMMANDERS ARE KEPT ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS SO THAT THEY CAN DISSEMINATE PRECISE INFORMATION TO THEIR SUBORDINATES. HE ALSO IS ANXIOUS TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THE 4-STAR GENERALS TO PRECLUDE IMPRESSIONS THAT HE IS EXCLUDING THEM OR THAT HE IS ACTING IN HIS OWN BEHALF. THE MEETINGS SERVE AS USEFUL SOUNDING BOARDS OF OPINIONS AND AS FORGES OF THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF SOLUTIONS. THE ARMY MINISTER ALSO SEES IN THE MEETINGS AN ESSENTIAL SOURCE OF THE AUTHORITY HE NEEDS TO HANDLE THE PROBLEMS OF DISCIPLINE AND COHESIVENESS.

EO50x1

5. (C) [REDACTED] MINISTER IS IN VERY GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED HIGHLY ENCOURAGING MEDICAL REPORTS FOLLOWING A COMPLETE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON 14 SEPTEMBER. GEN. LYRA TAVARES WAS DESCRIBED AS A MAN AT PEACE WITH HIMSELF AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM. MOREOVER, HIS MOOD IS OF SUPREME CONFIDENCE. THE MINISTER REFUSES TO DISCUSS ANY POLITICAL FUTURE FOR HIMSELF AND ECHOES A CONSTANT REFRAIN OF DETACHMENT FROM AMBITION. HE IS ALSO QUITE CANDID IN STATING THAT, NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, HE CANNOT POSSIBLY REMAIN AS ARMY MINISTER ONCE A SOLUTION IS FOUND.

COMMENT: (C) [REDACTED]

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - WHILE LOYAL - APPEAR NOT TO SHARE HIS CONVICTION THAT THE HIGH COMMAND CAN HOLD OFF FOR ANOTHER TWO OR THREE WEEKS. THE MINISTER'S RELAXED FRAME OF MIND PROBABLY REFLECTS THE COMFORT AND KNOWLEDGE HE GAINS FROM THE PHONE TAPS AND PENETRATIONS MAINTAINED BY THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER. MOREOVER, IN THE PAST, GEN. LYRA HAS EMERGED WITH UTTER BUOYANCY FROM HIGH COMMAND MEETINGS BECUASE OF THE MARKED ADVANTAGES HE HAS OVER HIS COLLEAGUES IN ARTICULATION OAND INTELLIGENCE. THE MINISTER APPEARS DETERMINED TO USE THE PRESIDENTIAL DIGNITY AS A SHIELD AGAINST THOSE WHO WOULD PUSH FOR A QUICK DECISION. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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P 162000Z SEP 69

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1. (C) MEETING OF ARMY HIGH COMMAND ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERATED HARMONY THEME AND GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY REQUIRES EARLY ACTION TO PROVIDE LONG-TERM SOLUTION. IT WAS AGREED THAT NAMES OF CONTENDERS MUST COME FROM 4-STAR ARMY BRACKET AND THAT HIGH COMMAND MEMBERS SHOULD CONDUCT SOUNDINGS IN RIO DE JANEIRO ON 16 SEPTEMBER IN ORDER TO REPORT FINDINGS AT NEXT MEETING CALLED FOR 17TH. AT THAT TIME, A SUBCOMMITTEE HEADED BY GEN. MAMEDE WILL REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCE TRENDS DISCERNED.

2. (C) THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND IS SAID TO HAVE CONSIDERED THE METHOD OF GIVING LEGITIMACY TO WHATEVER NAME IS AGREED UPON, AND TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THE CONGRESS MUST BE RECALLED TO LEND A MEASURE OF PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT TO THE ACTIONS OF THE HIGH COMMAND. MOREOVER, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE OTHER TWO SERVICES MUST BE HEARD AT THE 4-STAR LEVEL AND NAVY AND AIR FORCE APPROVAL OBTAINED FOR THE ULTIMATE CANDIDATE AND PROCEDURES. OPINIONS OF TWO OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH LYRA TAVARES COINCIDE IN FOLLOWING ASSESSMENTS:

A. GEN. AFFONSO ALGUEQUERQUE LIMA DOES NOT HAVE A SINGLE SUPPORTER WITHIN THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND.

B. GENERALS LYRA TAVARES AND GARRASTUZU MEDICI ARE THE TWO LIKELY NAMES TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT HIGH COMMAND.

C. THE SELECTION OF A NAME AND OF PROCEDURES FOR THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT WILL NOT OCCUR FOR "PERHAPS SEVERAL WEEKS".

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

3. (C)

4. (C)

5. (C)

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[REDACTED], THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE WITH A CONGRESS AND A CONSTITUTION AS HIS POWER BASES. COSTA CAVALCANTI BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION COULD BEST BE RESOLVED BY THE SELECTION OF A VICE-PRESIDENT TO CARRY ON DURING THE PRESIDENT'S DISABILITY, AND THAT CONGRESS SHOULD BE ANHANCED TO THE POINT WHERE IT COULD SELECT ITS OWN SUCCESSOR TO COSTA E SILVA AT THE SCHEDULED TIME.

[REDACTED] THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL CLASS WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF EXERCISING POWER.

6 (C) [REDACTED] THE PRESENT DILEMMA WILL PRODUCE NEGATIVE ECONOMIC RESULTS. HE SAID, FOR INSTANCE, THAT SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY HAD BEEN EMITTED UNDER THE JUNTA AND THAT THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE COMMENTED ON HIS OWN AUDIENCES WITH THE JUNTA AS NEEDLESSLY BOGGED DOWN IN THE ABUNDANT (AND OFTEN SUPERFLUOUS) RHETORIC [REDACTED]

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

[REDACTED]

PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HE WAS A BUNDLE OF HASTE WITH HEAPS OF DOCUMENTS TO CONSIDER OR A BULGING BRIEFCASE TRAILING AFTER HIM AS HE CHARGED OFF TO BOARD AN AIRPLANE FOR SOME DISTANT POINT.

COMMENT: (C) [REDACTED] IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE WHICH RESTS LARGELY ON THE PERPETUATION OF SOME FORM OF REAL OR TITULAR COSTA E SILVA INSPIRATION FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CABINET OFFICERS. CURRENT SPECULATION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

. HE WOULD HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO RESUME OFFICE JUST LONG ENOUGH TO RECALL THE CONGRESS, PROMULGATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND SUGGEST HIS OWN SUCCESSOR.

[REDACTED]

. IT IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT THAT RESPECTED SURGEON GENERAL OLIVIO IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND AS THE INTERIM SUCCESSOR TO GEN. MONIZ DE ARAGAO WHO WAS FIRED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. GEN. OLIVIO'S VIEWS WILL CARRY CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT AT TOMORROW'S HIGH COMMAND MEETING. GP-3

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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INFO

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R 111700Z SEP 69

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1 (G)

THE JUNTA IS COMPLETELY DEMORALIZED AND THAT SOME SORT OF DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION SHOULD EMERGE TODAY. HE DID NOT MEAN THAT THE JUNTA WOULD BE OVERTHROWN. HE POINTED OUT THAT EMISSARIES WERE OUT CANVASSING MAJOR MILITARY COMMANDS OUTSIDE OF RIO DE JANEIRO AND THAT THEY ARE EXPECTED BACK TODAY WITH THEIR FINDINGS. HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THOSE FINDINGS WILL REPRESENT A STIFF CONDEMNATION OF THE JUNTA AND A DEMAND FOR AN URGENT TRANSITION TO A MORE ACCEPTABLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

2. (G) THAT THE JUNTA WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO SEARCH IMMEDIATELY FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON HIERARCHY, AND THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONSENSUS CANDIDATE IS GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF. HE LOOKS UPON GEISEL AS HAVING ALL THE NECESSARY CREDENTIALS TO STEER BRAZIL THROUGH A TRANSITION PERIOD. UNDER THE SCENARIO HE ENVISIONS, GEISEL WOULD RECALL THE CONGRESS AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS WITHIN 60 DAYS, AT WHICH TIME GEISEL WOULD STEP ASIDE IN FAVOR OF A NEW VICE-PRESIDENT OR A NEW PRESIDENT.

3. (G) THE PRESENT JUNTA AS BEING RACKED BY DISSENSION AND UNDERMINED FROM WITHIN.

AS WEEK, STUPID, AND A LEADER

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

COMMENT: (C)

. IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, HOWEVER, HE MAY
BE ALLOWING HIS PERSONAL PREJUDICES AND HIS OWN AMBITIONS TO
COLOR HIS EVALUATIONS.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

TELEGRAM

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Control: 394

Date: September 11, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 394

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1.

Views are particularly useful because he
is not pro-Costa e Silva and has good ^{change} ~~change~~ to survive under any
of possible presidential contenders.

EO50x1

2. [redacted] a week ago looked like Costa e Silva
had thirty days for survival. Now he feels it is sharply less
because difficult decision to release political prisoners has weakened
junta "greatly." It will be long time, if ever, before President
able take over in complete sense. However, "o velho" is still
single most respected voice in Armed Forces. While minority groups
oppose him behind his back, in end majority of officers would
prefer his decision. If he can just reach point soon to speak
publically in convincingly lucid manner, he can indicate his choice
from among list three or four candidates submitted him by ministers.
This would ease present tension and relieve junta necessity make
unpopular final decision.

Drafted by: [redacted] 9/11/69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence: [redacted]

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Charge:

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Classification

Control:

-2-

Date: September 11, 1969

3. Three ministers are not capable of imposing their ^{choice} ~~advice~~.
However, burden rests on them and top generals to measure informal procedure now in process among senior officers, who are all old friends or at least acquaintances, and find right man most able to resolve present conflicts. Fundamental point is that choice will be man most acceptable within military hierarchy. Despite diversity of passions and opinions among lower ranking officers, whether for professional or personal reasons, the overwhelming majority in the end will accept selection made within hierarchy. This is a traditional Brazilian military reaction that foreigners should understand.

4. Because of foregoing, almost ^{certain} ~~choice~~ ^{will} ~~be~~ ~~four~~ ~~star~~ ~~general~~ ~~is~~ ~~System~~ ~~to~~ be four star general. Only a bad split among top generals could lead to selection lesser ranking officer. This would be MGEN Affonso's only likelihood of success and why impossible expect Generals will pick a highly popular colonel like Andreazza to command them. Most likely contenders are Gens. Geisel, Syseno, Medici and Moricy. Although Syseno's personal life would hurt him in more popular selection, it is not likely be important in such small group of "electors".

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Classification

Control:

-3-

Date: September 11, 1969

Gen. Lira will find it almost impossible offer himself in these circumstances. Navy Minister Adm. Rademaker has chance only if a hopelessly divided Army seeks an outsider. This is not expected. Beyond internal military politics, factors such as the officer's health ("They will not take a chance on some one who might have a heart attack soon"), how well he is reputed in the Armed Forces, and how well is is known to country as whole will weigh heavily. Army commanders like Gens. Canavarro and Malan know they are not in race.

5. There is distinct possibility Congress be opened, perhaps in October, not to "elect" but to "sanctify" candidate given them by junta. Individual could be selected as president for five years or vice president to complete C e S term. Advantage of VP solution is that it reduces pressure on junta from some quarters who will see new chance at presidency coming soon. Also will permit legal President Costa e Silva return should his health permit this at some time during remainder of term. Latter solution also will throw C e S supporters behind junta.

6. COMMENT: Above remarks suggest balanced perspective of

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

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Classification

Control:

-4-

Date: September 11, 1969

present situation as seen by experienced politico-military observer
who is removed from passions of Rio cockpit yet furnished with
best up-to-date information available to government in Brasilia. GP-3

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1. (e)

2. (e)

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-- INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF A
LARGE CONTINGENT OF AIRBORNE TROOPERS.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

3. (C) GEN. LYRA TAVARES IS DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER THE DOUBLE-DEALING HE HAS NOTED ON THE PART OF VILA MILITAR AND 1ST INF. DIV. COMMANDER, GEN DUTRA DE CASTILHO.

LAST FRIDAY AND SATURDAY

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, LYRA TAVARES PLANS TO REMOVE CASTILHO AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. HIS ONLY REASON FOR NOT DOING IT NOW IS THAT PASSIONS STILL ARE NOT COMPLETELY COOLED OFF AT RIO'S MAJOR GARRISON AND THAT SUCH AN ACTION AT THIS MOMENT MIGHT REIGNITE THEM.

4. (C) SOURCE IS NOT UNHAPPY WITH THE BEHAVIOR OF GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO, 1ST ARMY COMMANDER. THE MAJOR PROBLEM IN THAT RESPECT LIES WITH THE GENERAL'S ADVISERS WHO ARE DETERMINED TO INVOLVE HIM IN POLITICS, AND OFTEN DO SO WITHOUT HIS ACQUIESCENCE. ONE OF SYSENO'S MAIN POLITICAL CATALYSTS, GEN. RAMIRO TAVARES GONCALVES, COMMANDER OF THE 9TH MILITARY REGION IN MATO GROSSO, POPPED INTO RIO ON 9 SEPTEMBER AND WENT INTO A CONVENIENTLY LEADED AND SUGGESTIVELY CONSPIRATORIAL HUDDLE WITH SYSENO. AS SOON AS THE ARMY MINISTER HEARD OF RAMIRO'S PRESENCE IN RIO, HE CALLED HIM IN AN POINTED OUT THAT A COMMANDER SHOULD BE WITH HIS TROOPS - PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF TROUBLE. RAMIRO RETURNED TO MATO GROSSO TODAY.

EO50x1

5. (C) IN THE OPINION OF [REDACTED] LIMA REMAINS THE MOST PERSISTENT PLOTTER. [REDACTED] TO OUTLYING COMMANDS IN AN ATTEMPT TO WHIP UP SUPPORT, BUT THE LYRA TAVARES CAMP BELIEVES THAT THE MAJOR TEST HAS BEEN WON. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT DISCIPLINARY FLURRIES IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL AND RECIFE WERE VERY MINOR, [REDACTED] WHILE THE BRASILIA GARRISON, FOR INSTANCE, HAS NOT RESPONDED IN THE SLIGHTEST TO REPORTED PROBES BY AFFONSO ASSOCIATES. MOST OF [REDACTED] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS ARE [REDACTED] HE AND HIS ADVISERS ARE UNDER CONSTANT [REDACTED]. (EO50x1) REPORTS FROM BRASILIA THAT CLIMATE NOT TENSE IN MILITARY CIRCLES AND THAT MAJ. GEN DIOSCORO VALE, CG OF PLANALTO MILITARY COMMAND, HAS SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND SOLIDLY BEHIND MILITARY MINISTERS.)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

6. (S) THE ARMY MINISTER'S ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT FEELS THAT THE POSITION OF THE THREE MINISTERS AS INTERIM PRESIDENTS WOULD BE STRENGTHENED PERHAPS DECISIVELY IF PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA COULD POSE FOR STILL PICTURES AND MOVIES. GEN. PORTELLA REPORTEDLY IS WORKING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DOCTORS TO ARRANGE FOR SUCH COVERAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT THE PROJECT MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT TOWARD THE END OF THE PRESENT WEEK, THUS GAINING PRECIOUS MANEUVER SPACE FOR THE MINISTERS IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO WARD OFF CRUDE PRESSURES.

COMMENT: (S) THE SLIGHTEST SIGNS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE THAT SEVERAL FACTORS MAY BE BLENDING TO DEFUZE THE SITUATION, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. ONE OF THESE IS TIME ITSELF, ALWAYS A HEALER IN THESE PREDICAMENTS. ANOTHER IS THE APPARENT COHESIVENESS AND FIRMNESS OF THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS. STILL ANOTHER IS THE NATURAL DEMORALIZATION OF THE WOULD-BE SUCCESSORS WHO FAIL TO PRODUCE AS TARGET-DATE AFTER TARGET-DATE PASSES CALMLY. THE DETERMINED ACTIONS (NEW INSTITUTIONAL ACTS) OF THE ACTING PRESIDENTS ALSO SOOTHES THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE NOT COMMITTED TO SOMEONE'S CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY, AND CAREFUL RETROSPECTIVE REFLECTION IS PROVING TO MANY GOVERNMENT CRITICS THAT THE DECISIONS IN THE CASE OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK WERE CORRECT. MOREOVER, AS THE HOTHEADS SHOW THEIR HANDS, THEY BECOME VULNERABLE AND INEFFECTIVE, THUS ENHANCING THE POSITION OF THOSE SEEKING TO SUSTAIN MILITARY UNITY THROUGH THE ORDERLY EVOLUTION OF THE SUCCESSION PROCESS. THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL IS STILL A TINY SPECK, BUT IT SEEMINGLY HAS BUOYED THE HOPES OF THE LYRA TAVARES CAMP. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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SEPT 11, 1969

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1. (G) SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS AN ARMY LTC, CURRENTLY A MEMBER OF A MILITARY INQUIRY COMMISSION INVESTIGATING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN BRAZIL. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCEN, POLITICALLY IN GENERAL ORLANDO GEISEL'S CAMP. INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED DURING TWO HOUR VISIT WITH [REDACTED]. SOURCE HAS NUMEROUS

EO50x1

CONTACTS AMONG STAFF OFFICERS AND COMMANDERS OF KEY ARMY UNITS MENTIONED IN REPORT.

2. (G) OFFICER SAID HE WAS WILLING TO PREDICT THE MILITARY JUNTA WOULD FALL BEFORE NEXT MONDAY AND POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS THURSDAY, 11 SEP. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO SEE GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CHAIR BUT HE IS CONVINCED THAT GEN. AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA HAS NOW, OR WILL SOON HAVE, THE ARMY SUPPORT NECESSARY TO PROJECT HIMSELF INTO THE PRESIDENCY.

3. (G) EVENTS OF LAST TWO WEEKS, BEGINNING WITH COSTA E SILVA'S STROKE, FOLLOWED BY THE JUNTA ARRANGEMENT AND CAPPED BY AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S KIDNAPPING, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN STRONG HARD LINE REACTION OPPOSING THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPLY WITH THE KIDNAPPER'S DEMANDS, HAVE GIVEN AFFONSO THE OPPORTUNITIES HE NEEDS TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF KEY MILITARY COMMANDERS IN RIO'S VILA MILITAR AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. SOURCE STATED THAT AFFONSO CAN NOW COUNT ON KEY GENERAL JOAO DUTRA DE CASTILHO, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND VILA MILITAR GARRISON COMMANDER; GENERAL ADAUTO BEZERRA DE ARAUJO, AIRBORNE BRIGADE COMMANDER; AND GEN TASSO VILLAR DE AQUINO, ARMORED DIVISION COMMANDER WHO IS RESPONSIVE TO

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

WISHES OF GENERAL RAMIRO TAVARES GONCALVES, A FERVID AFFONSO SUPPORTER AND EX-ARMORED DIVISION CG NOW COMMANDING THE 9TH MILITARY REGION IN CAMPO GRANDE, MATO GROSSO. SOURCE SAID GEN RAMIRO WAS IN RIO SUNDAY, PRESUMABLY TO HELP AFFONSO LINE-UP VILA MILITAR SUPPORT AND TO PLEDGE SUPPORT OF 9TH MILITARY REGION. "FROM RIO DE JANEIRO TO THE NORTH, ALL ARMY UNITS ARE READY TO SUPPORT GEN. AFFONSO", SAID SOURCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT GENERAL ITIBERE GOUVEA DO AMARAL, MINAS GERAIS'S 4TH REGION AND 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION CG IS A STRONG AFFONSO MAN.

4. (C) TWO GARRISONS ARE STILL QUESTION MARKS, ACCORDING TO SOURCE. THE SAO PAULO GARRISON AND THE 3RD ARMY IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL. THE SAO PAULO GARRISON WOULD BECOME RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT, HE SAID, IF THE 3RD ARMY FELL INTO LINE. IN THIS CASE, THE SAO PAULO GARRISON WOULD BE ISOLATED AND WOULD EVENTUALLY FOLLOW THE REST OF THE ARMY. IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN 3RD ARMY SUPPORT, AFFONSO WAS SAID TO HAVE SENT HIM EMISSARIES TO RIO GRANDE DO SUL ON TUESDAY AND THEY WERE EXPECTED BACK IN RIO WITH THEIR REPORTS THURSDAY AFTERNOON. IF THEY RETURNED WITH 3RD ARMY BACKING, AFFONSO WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO PRESENT THE JUNTA WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI, WITH THE NECESSARY ARMY BACKING TO FORCE HIMSELF INTO THE PRESIDENCY.

5. (C) SOURCE HAD NO READY ANSWERS REGARDING THE MECHANICS AND LEGALITIES OF GRACEFULLY DISPOSING OF THE DISABLED PRESIDENT, THE JUNTA, AND THE MILITARY HIERARCHY. HE WAS CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT A BLOODLESS BRAZILIAN SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS COULD BE FOUND, AND THAT AFFONSO'S FAST GROWING MILITARY SUPPORT WOULD DECIDE THE ISSUE IN HIS FAVOR.

COMMENT: (C) EVALUATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOURCE'S AFFILIATION WITH GEN. ORLANDO GEISEL. GEN GEISEL'S CHANCES FOR THE PRESIDENCY APPEAR TO DEPEND ON THE JUNTA REMAINING IN CONTROL LONG ENOUGH FOR IT OR THE MILITARY HIERARCHY TO OPT TO REPLACE THE TRIUMVIRATE WITH ONE MAN. COMMITTING HIMSELF FULLY THIS POINT TO OBTAINING THE PRESIDENCY, MAY, IF HE FAILS IN THE ATTEMPT, CAUSE AFFONSO TO BURN HIMSELF OUT PREMATURELY AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, IN WHICH CASE, GEISEL COULD ONLY GAIN. IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THAT GEN. AFFONSO HAS THE STRONG VILA MILITAR BACKING SOURCE WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY. MOREOVER, SOURCE MIGHT BE ADVERTISING AFFONSO'S ALLEGED PROWESS FOR PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING GEISEL'S CREDENTIALS AS PURIST WITH NO POLITICAL AMBITION. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

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Classification

CHRON
RF

P 071810Z SEP 69

FM

TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEHC/DEP OF STATE

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUEAOWD/OACISI DA

RUECSDE/USMILGRP BRAZIL

RUESUZ/EMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

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SEPT 7, 1969

ACTION COPY

ACTION TAKEN *SL*

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. (G)

2. (G)

AN AGREEMENT
PRESUMABLY HAS BEEN REACHED AMONG CONSPIRATORS TO
ANNOUNCE 1 ST ARMY COMMANDER GEN. SYSENO AS THE
PRESIDENT AND MAJ. GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA
AS THE VICE- PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL

EO50x1

COMMENT: (G) I DO NOT ATTACHE ANY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE FOREGOING BECAUSE I CANNOT FIND ANY SYSENO-
FOR-PRESIDENT SENTIMENT AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS
WHOSE SUPPORT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR SUCH A FORMULA
TO PROSPER. MOREOVER, D DON'T BELIEVE GEN. AFFONSO
WANTS TO NO. 2 SLOT. FINALLY, INFORMANT HAD NO
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH COSTA E
SILVA, LYRA TAVARES, MURICY, AND OTHERS WOULD BE
DISPOSED OF. GP-3.

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FORM 4-68 FS-412

Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

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Classification

CHRON
RF
P 071530Z SEP 69

SEPT 7, 1969

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
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1. ~~(c)~~

CONVERSATION, THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS: "WE HAVE NOT HAD RECENT DIRECT CONTACT AND I THINK THIS IS APPROPRIATE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. [REDACTED] ENGAGED IN A RATHER UNUSUAL

GOVERNMENT IS FIRM IN ITS POSITION ON COOPERATING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE AMBASSADOR. THERE IS SOME UNHAPPINESS AND I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE OF THIS, BUT I WANTED TO TELL YOU MYSELF THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SUCCEEDING IN ITS EFFORTS."

2. (e)

24 187 PARATROOPERS HAD JUST READ A MANIFESTO OVER RADIO NACIONAL AND THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE AT THE VILA MILITAR WAS IN A STATE OF REBELLION. THE MANIFESTO VOICED OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN EXCHANGING PRISONERS FOR AMBASSADOR ELBRICK AND ASSERTED THAT COUNTER-INSURGENCY WOULD NOW BE INITIATED. THE STATEMENT WAS OF SHORT DURATION AND CAME IN THE MIDST OF THE PLAY-BY-PLAY DESCRIPTION OF A SOCCER GAME. THE GAME BROADCAST WAS QUICKLY RESUMED.

EO50x1

3. (e)

[] GREAT ANXIETY EXISTED AT THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE AND
 THAT A HANDFUL OF PARATROOPERS HAD GONE TO GALEAO
 AIRPORT EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON IN AN ATTEMPT TO BLOCK
 THE DEPARTURE OF THE C-130 CARRYING THE PRISONERS.

FORM FS-412
4-68

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THE PRISONERS.
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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THE AIRCRAFT HAD ALREADY LEFT AND AN OFFICER AT THE BASE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO THE EXCITED YOUNG MEN. APPARENTLY THE SMALL GROUP THEN HEADED FOR THE RADIO NACIONAL TRANSMITTER WHERE IT SUCCEEDED IN GETTING ON LINE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

4. (C) [REDACTED]

"THE 4 OR 5 WHO WENT TO GALEAO AND THE RADIO STATION WERE CONNECTED WITH SOME 30 TO 35 AT THE BRIGADE. THESE TRIED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE MANIFESTO WITH AN ATTEMPT TO TALK THE WHOLE BRIGADE INTO REBELLION. THEY ALSO TRIED TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE SCHOOL INFANTRY REGIMENT. GEN ADAUTO (THE BRIGADE COMMANDER) STOOD FIRM WITH HIS STAFF AND THE SCHOOL INFANTRY REGIMENT ALSO REMAINED LOYAL. ABOUT A DOZEN YOUNG OFFICERS OF THE BRIGADE ARE UNDER ARREST."

5. (C) GEN CASTILHO, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST DIVISION AND VILA MILITAR GARRISON WENT OUT TO HIS HEADQUARTERS AS SOON AS NOTIFIED AND REPORTEDLY ASSERTED A VOICE OF DECISIVE LEADERSHIP ON BEHALF OF DISCIPLINE AND FIDELITY TO THE MINISTER'S AUTHORITY. COMPETENT SOURCES BELIEVE THAT 1ST ARMY COMMANDER GEN. SYSENO ALSO REMAINED STEADFAST IN HIS LOYALTY.

EO50x1

6. . (C) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LARGE GROUP WAS PRESENT AND THAT THE VILA MILITAR ACTIVITIES WERE BEING CLOSELY MONITORED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEN. AFFONSO AND ASSOCIATES WERE MAINTAINING A "CONSPIRATORIAL VIGIL" IN THE HOPE THAT UPRISING WOULD TAKE HOLD AND "AFFONSO WOULD BE CALLED TO ASSUME POWER." COMMENT: (C) THE ACTIONS BY THE AIRBORNE HOTHEADS ARE INDICATIVE OF THE DEEPLY UNSETTLING IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS, THE ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY THE JUNTA, THE AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPPING, AND THE ALLEGED CAPITULATION TO TERRORIST DEMANDS. THE ATTEMPTED REBELLION IS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO ARMY

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3



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UNITY AND TO THE PRESTIGE OF THE ARMY MINISTER. IT ALSO REFLECTS THE EXTENT TO WHICH ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY EXCITED BY AMBITIOUS INDIVIDUALS IN AND OUT OF UNIFORM. THE INCIDENT ALMOST CERTAINLY HAS DONE MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO LYRA TAVARES AND I INTERPRET HIS CALL TO ME AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE THAT HE MIGHT GAIN A MEASURE OF STRENGTH FROM THE AFFAIR IF IT SERVES AS A CATALYST TO PROMOTE A REDEDICATION OF THE ARMY IN TERMS OF UNITY AND RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY. GP-3.
BT

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
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CHRON
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P 071600Z SEP 69

SEPT 7, 1969

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TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESVB/USCINCSO 'JAWL
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. (S)

THE ELBRICK KIDNAPPING IS
GOING TO PRODUCE SEVERE REPRESSIVE MEASURES AS SOON AS
THE AMBASSADOR IS SAFELY RETURNED.

EO50x1

2. (S) THE NEW RULES MIGHT NOT BE
CALLED A STATE OF SIEGE, BUT THAT THEY WILL PROVIDE
ALMOST EVERY WEAPON THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS AND WILL
REFLECT THE OFFICIAL CONCLUSION THAT URBAN REVOLUTIONARY
WARFARE IS NOW A FACT IN BRAZIL. WHEN I PROBED FOR THE
TYPES OF MEASURES LIKELY TO BE ADOPTED, HE SAID THAT ONE
STEP WOULD BE TO ROUNDUP (PREVENTIVE ARREST) KNOWN OR
SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES. HIS STRESS ON THE RULES OF
WARFARE ALSO IMPLIED THAT SUMMARY EXECUTIONS MIGHT BE
AUTHORIZED.

COMMENT: (S)

THIS NEW DETERMINATION ON THE PAT OF BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS

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4-68

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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DOES NOT OFFER MUCH BASIS FOR THE EXPECTATION OF NEGOTIATION LATITUDE IN THE EVENT ANOTHER DIPLOMAT OR KEY PERSON IS KIDNAPPED. IF THE HARDENED POSTURE MATERIALIZES (WHICH IF FULLY EXPECT), IT WILL BE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRODUCE OF GENUINE CONVICTION THAT A REAL THREAT OF SERIOUS PROPORTIONS EXISTS. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER LIKELY TRIGGERS FOR SUCH ACTION. ONE OF THEM MIGHT BE TO CREATE A SITUATION AND AN ATTENDANT SET OF RULES UNDER WHICH THE JUNTA CONCEPT AND THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NOW THREATENED COSTA E SILVA ADMINISTRATION MIGHT SURVIVE. IN THAT CONNECTION, ARBITRARY ACTIONS MIGHT ALSO BE AIMED AT NON-COMMUNIST INDIVIDUALS (ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, FOR EXAMPLE) WHO ARE DEEMED A MENACE TO THE STATUS QUO. AN ADDITIONAL NEARLY CERTAIN ELEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION IS THE URGENT NEED TO PLACATE THE APPARENTLY LARGE NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS WHO DEPLORED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO NEGOTIATE WITH AMBASSADOR ELBRICK'S ABDUCTORS. GP-3.
BT

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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SEPT 6, 1969

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FM [REDACTED]
TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
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RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA
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RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
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ZEN/AMCONSUL BELO HORIZONTE
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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1. (C) [REDACTED]

2. (C) [REDACTED], THE PRESENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT (THE 3-MAN AD HOC JUNTA) IS DOOMED TO COLLAPSE DURING THE COMING WEEK. HE FEELS THAT THE ACCUMULATION OF GRIEVANCES HAS NOW REACHED THE EXPLOSIVE STAGE AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPITULATION TO TERRORIST DEMANDS FOR THE RELEASE OF AMBASSADOR ELBRICK. THE ANTICIPATED CHANGE WILL BE FACILITATED, HE BELIEVES, BY THE REALIZATION ON THE PART OF COSTA E SILVA'S FAMILY AND CLOSEST ASSOCIATES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PHYSICAL CONDITION IS SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE ANY THOUGHT OF HAVING HIM RESUME OFFICE.

3. (C) [REDACTED] PRESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLD CHIEF GEN PORTELLA IS FRANTICALLY TRYING TO HAMMER OUT A SOLUTION BASED ON GEN. MEDICI, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ARMY. SHOULD MEDICI EMERGE AS THE NEXT PRESIDENT, MOST OF COSTA E SILVA'S "TEAM" WOULD STAND AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF CONTINUED TENURE. [REDACTED] PORTELLA IS EVEN LIKELY TO OBTAIN A GENUINE OR FABRICATED DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO INDICATE COSTA E SILVA'S PREFERENCE FOR MEDICI. PORTELLA REPORTEDLY FEELS THAT HE CAN COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES TO BACK THE MEDICI FORMULA.

4. (C) A SECOND SOLUTION WOULD PLACE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN MURICY IN THE PRESIDENCY. [REDACTED] MURICY AS THE INDIVIDUAL MOST LIKELY TO MUSTER A REAL MILITARY CONSENSUS. MOREOVER, HE BELIEVES THAT MURICY WOULD GOVERN WITH MODERATION BUT FIRMNESS.

FORM FS-412
4-68

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

IN AN ECONOMIC SENSE, MURICY REPORTEDLY WOULD RETAIN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC TEAM FOR AT LEAST THE SHORT TERM AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO MAKE SHARP CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTION.

5. (S) THE THIRD CANDIDATE IS MAJ GEN AFFONSO AUGUSTO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, THE ARMY CHIEF OF ORDNANCE. AFFONSO WOULD IMMEDIATELY FIRE DELFIM NETTO AND MOST OTHER COSTA E SILVA TEAM MEMBERS, AND HE WOULD SET BRAZIL ON A TIGHT ROPE COURSE BETWEEN "CONSTRUCTIVE NATIONALISM AND NASSERISM". [REDACTED] FINDS AFFONSO ATTRACTIVE, EVEN THOUGH HE RECOGNIZES THAT AFFONSO WILL BE RESISTED BY THE COSTA E SILVA PEOPLE AND SAO PAULO BUSINESS INTERESTS. AFFONSO IS SAID TO BE UTTERLY DETERMINED TO REOPEN THE CONGRESS.

6. (S) SOURCE BELIEVES THAT ONLY REAL LIKELY FLY IN THE OINTMENT TO A MILITARY CONSENSUS BEING REACHED LIES WITH NAVY MINISTER ADM RADEMACHER. HE REPORTEDLY IS FEELING HIS OATS AS A JUNTA MEMBER AND IS NOT IN A HURRY TO GIVE UP THAT STATUS. IN THE EVENT RADEMACHER TAKES A POSTURE OF INTRANSIGENCE, HE COULD PROVOKE A SERIOUS MILITARY SPLIT OR CAUSE THE PRESIDENCY TO BE GIVEN TO A CIVILIAN.

COMMENT: (S) MUCH OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS MESSAGE IS THE BASIS FOR SPECULATIVE TALK IN MOST MILITARY CIRCLES. THE ENVIRONMENT APPEARS TO BE GOING THROUGH A BUILD-UP LEADING TO AN ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE EARLY CHANGE AT THE SUMMIT OF THE BRAZILIAN EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IF SUCH A CHANGE OCCURS, THE TOP COMMAND OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT LIKELY WILL ALSO BE AFFECTED. GP-3

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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CHRON
RF
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SEPT 5, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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1. (~~C/NF~~) DURING VISIT TO MY OFFICE TODAY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ANALYZED CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION.
[REDACTED] IS WIRED IN TO MANY IMPORTANT MILITARY FIGURES
(MURICY, AFFONSO, MEIRA MATTOS) AND ENJOYS FREE-WHEELING
TRANSIT IN POLITICAL CIRCLES. HIS FREQUENT REPORTING HAS
BEEN ACCURATE AND HIS ALMOST DAILY SESSIONS
WITH MILITARY MEN (HE WAS OBSERVED IN GEN MURICY'S
OFFICE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON) RENDER HIM IN EXTREMELY
RELIABLE GAUGE OF THE POLITICAL ANXIETIES OF MEN IN
UNIFORM.

2. (~~C/NF~~) ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT
TRIUMVERATE ARRANGEMENT IS NEVITABLE. HE PREDICTS THAT
IT WILL OCCUR SHORTLY AFTER 7 SEPTEMBER -- A VIEW UTTERED
TO ME YESTERDAY BY ADM MURILLO, PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT
BRAZIL-US MILITARY COMMISSION. [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED THAT
COSTA E SILVA IS IN NO CONDITION TO EVER AGAIN BE
PRESIDENT. MOREOVER, [REDACTED] IS USING HIS BACKGROUND AS
[REDACTED] TO POINT OUT TO MILITARY MEN THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TO WHICH COSTA E SILVA NOW BECAME A PARTY WOULD
BE INVALIDATED ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL INCOMPETENCE.
[REDACTED] IS CONFIDENT THAT COSTA E SILVA'S SENSE OF PRO-
FOUND CONCERN FOR THE NATIONAL WELFARE WILL LEAD HIM TO

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4-68

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

RESIGN AS SOON AS SOMEONE HAS THE COURAGE TO POINT OUT TO HIM THE MEDICAL FACTS OF LIFE. [REDACTED] THAT FEW PEOPLE OF IMPORTANCE ENTERTAIN THE ILLUSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL RETURN. HE SAID THAT [REDACTED] IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE PRESIDENT RETURN BECAUSE THAT WOULD ENHANCE LYRA'S LONG-TERM POLITICAL PLANS; GEN PORTELLA IS ANXIOUS BECAUSE HE KNOWS THAT HE IS OUT OF A JOB OTHERWISE; TRANSPORTATION MINISTER ANDREAZZA WANTS COSTA E SILVA BACK BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS HIS ONLY CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL; HEALTH MINISTER MIRANDA WANTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT REVERT BECAUSE HE FACES DISMISSAL AND POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION FOR CORRUPTION UNDER ANYONE ELSE; THE MINISTERS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE PRESUMABLY ARE EQUALLY CERTAIN OF LOSS OF POWER UNDER ANYONE ELSE.

3. (C/NF) [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD SPENT AN HOUR WITH GEN AFFONSO YESTERDAY AND THAT HE FOUND HIM DEEPLY RESENTFUL BECAUSE [REDACTED] HAD NOT CONSULTED HIM ON THE TRIUMVIRATE CONCEPT. AFFONSO CONTENTS THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TAKE OFFICE. DURING THEIR CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] TOLD AFFONSO THAT HE SHOULD NOT PERMIT HIS PERSONAL AMBITIONS TO THREATEN MILITARY UNITY AND THAT HE SHOULD ESTABLISH CLOSE LIAISON WITH ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN MURICY. AFFONSO IS SAID TO HAVE REPLIED THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING WITH MURICY, AND THAT HE WOULD NEVER ALLOW ANY ACTION OF HIS TO JEOPARDIZE MILITARY UNITY. AFFONSO PRESUMABLY SAID THAT HE MIGHT, AT SOME FUTURE DATE BECOME PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT NOW PUSHING FOR THAT OFFICE.

4. (C/NF) IN DISCUSSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF VICE PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEIXO DURING LAST WEEKEND'S TURBULENCE, [REDACTED] INTRODUCED SOME NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE RATIONALE OF THOSE (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING HIMSELF) WHO OPPOSED THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT PEDRO ALEIXO HAD EARNED MILITARY WRATH BY URGING CONGRESSMEN TO VOTE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MARCIO MOREIRA ALVES CASE THAT TRIGGERED INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5. MOREOVER, PEDRO ALEIXO'S RECORD DURING NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SESSIONS TO CONSIDER CASSATION LISTS, ALLEGEDLY REVEALED A CONSISTENT TENDENCY TO SUPPORT CASSATIONS ON THE BASIS OF CORRUPTION, BUT TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THOSE PROPOSED ON THE BASIS OF SUBVERSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO IS

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

ACCUSED OF EXPOUNDING THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL ACTS BECAME TOTALLY VOID WITH THE PROMULGATION OF THE 1967 CONSTITUTION. FINALLY, IN HIS RECENT ROLE AS MANAGER OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, HE HAD SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE SUCH "ANTI-

REVOLUTION" CLAUSES AS DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENCY. [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT THE REVISED CONSTITUTION WHICH ALEIXO WAS DRAFTING WILL NEVER BE INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE VICE-PRESIDENT ATTACHED TO IT. INSTEAD, [REDACTED] ANTICIPATES THE USE OF COMPLEMENTARY ACTS TO CARRY OUT THE MOST NEEDED CHANGES IN THE 1967 CONSTITUTION -- ONE CHANGE HE CITED BEING A PROVISION FOR INDIRECT ELECTIONS FOR STATE GOVERNORS.

5. (C/NF) WHEN I PROBED FOR SPECIFICS WITH RESPECT TO THE SCENARIO HE SEES EMERGING IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, [REDACTED] WAS VAGUE ON JUST HOW THE PRESENT SERVICE MINISTERS WILL ABDICATE, BOTH FROM THE TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE ADDED DUTY AND FROM THE CABINET. HE SEEMED TO FEEL THAT COSTA E SILVA'S LIKELY ABDICATION WILL TRIGGER THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH HIM TO RESIGN ALSO. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ELECT TO ACT OUT A TWO-PART PLAY FOR HIS FINAL MOVES: (1) RE-CALL THE CONGRESS WITH THE ISSUANCE OF A MANDATE FOR IT TO HOLD ELECTIONS OF A SUCCESSOR WITHIN 60 DAYS, AND (2) RESIGN. THE CONGRESS MIGHT THEN ELECT A MILITARY APPROVED ACTING PRESIDENT WHO WOULD CARRY OUT THE ELECTION PLAN. [REDACTED] SAID THAT SOME CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO A MILITARY MAN BEING DESIGNATED AS INTERIM VICE-PRESIDENT, BUT THAT THIS IDEA HAS NOW BEEN DISCARDED. ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH IS BEGINNING TO MUSTER A CONSENSUS IS THAT THE SUCCESSOR TO COSTA E SILVA MUST BE CHOSEN FOR A FULL 4-YEAR TERM AND NOT MERELY TO FINISH OUT THE UNEXPIRED TERM. THE LATTER SITUATION WOULD MEAN REVIVING THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN 1970 AND BRAZIL CANNOT AFFORD TO MISS THE OPPORTUNITY IT NOW HAS TO AVOID THAT UNSETTLING CONTINGENCY.

EO50x1

[REDACTED] SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A CONVERSATION WITH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES PRESIDENT BONIFACIO WHO ASSURED HIM THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE CONGRESS, INCLUDING THOSE FROM THE OPPOSITION, ARE DETERMINED NOT "TO CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT THE SLIGHTEST DIFFICULTY" AS FAR AS ELECTING THE NEW PRESIDENT IS

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

CONCERNED. BONIFACIO AND [] AGREE THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MUST HAVE THE "LEGITIMACY" THAT A CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION WOULD GIVE HIM.

6. (C/!) ON THE MATTER OF LIKELY CANDIDATES TO SUCCEED COSTA E SILVA, [] IS OF HIS OPINION THAT GEN MURICY IS THE FRONT-RUNNER. HE POINTED OUT THAT MURICY'S PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL REPUTATIONS ARE IMPECCABLE, AND THAT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF IS INTELLIGENT AND PRAGMATIC. THE ONLY FAULT HE COULD FIND WITH MURICY IS THE TENDENCY HE HAS TO TALK TOO MUCH AND TO BE SOMEWHAT NAIVE. [] THOUGHT THAT GEN ORLANDO GEISEL HAD A SLIM CHANCE FOR THE FULL TERM, BUT THAT HE MIGHT QUALIFY AS THE "CHOICE" OF THE CONGRESS FOR THE 60-DAY MANAGER OF THE ELECTION.

[] ELIMINATED SYSENO ("DUMB AND UGLY FAMILY SITUATION"), MEDICI ("TOO CLOSE TO COSTA E SILVA"), AND ALL OTHER SENIOR GENERALS. IN THE EVENT THE ARMED FORCES DON'T REMAIN UNITED (AND HE IS SURE THAT THEY WILL) THE REQUIREMENT MIGHT ARISE FOR A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE. [] DIDN'T SAY SO, BUT IT SEEMED THAT HE WAS BURSTING TO HEAR ME SAY THAT HE WOULD BE AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE. HE MENTIONED JURIST CARLOS MEDEIROS (DRAFTER OF IA-12 AND OTHERS) AND ETELVINO LINS.

EO50x1

COMMENT: (C/NF) [] IS NOTED FOR HIS OPPORTUNISM AND IS DESPISED BY KUBITSCHKE FOLLOWERS FOR HAVING TURNED HIS BACK ON THE MAN WHO GAVE HIM POWER AND WEALTH. DESPITE THAT HANDICAP, HE HAS BECOME AN ARDENT REVOLUTIONARY WHO WON PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO'S CONFIDENCE. HIS VIEWS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION PROBABLY SUFFER FROM THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF A BALANCED LYRA TAVARES INPUT. THE ARMY MINISTER HAS NEVER GIVEN FALCAO THE TIME OF DAY, EVEN THOUGH THE GOOD CONGRESSMAN HAS MADE REPEATED OVERTURES. THUS, [] WRITING OFF OF LYRA MAY BE OVERLY REFLECTIVE OF HIS OWN ANTI-LYRA BIAS, AS WELL AS THAT OF ANOTHER LYRA HATER, BUT [] FAVORITE, GEN CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS, COMMANDANT OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY. GP-3

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Classification

FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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Classification

POL
INFO

SEPT 4, 1969

CHRON
RF

R 041530Z SEP 69

FM

TO RUCRJCS/DIA
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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1. (C)

WITH MAJ GEN AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, ARMY CHIEF OF ORDNANCE AND FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER, AVOWS THAT AFFONSO IS MANEUVERING FRANTICALLY TO GAIN PERSONAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM CURRENT SITUATION. ACCORDING TO SOURCE - AFFONSO AND AT WHOSE HOUSE I HAVE MET WITH AFFONSO - LATTER IS PUSHING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOWING SCENARIO:

A. KEEP COSTA E SILVA FROM RETURNING TO PRESIDENCY. AFFONSO HOPES TO ACHIEVE THIS LARGELY THROUGH RUMOR THAT PRESIDENT IS MENTALLY UNFIT TO RESUME OFFICE.

B. ONCE PRESIDENT'S PERMANENT INCAPACITY IS ESTABLISHED, PRESSURE THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS INTO NAMING A SINGLE ACTING PRESIDENT. AFFONSO DOES NOT HAVE ANYONE SPECIFIC IN MIND (AND DOESN'T WANT IT HIMSELF), BUT HE ENVISIONS THAT THE ACTING PRESIDENT WOULD BE DIRECTED TO RE-CALL THE CONGRESS WHICH WOULD ELECT COSTA E SILVA'S SUCCESSOR WITHIN 60 DAYS.

C. AFFONSO IS CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD THEN AIM AT THE CONGRESS DECISIVE MILITARY "PERSUASION" IN HIS FAVOR.

2. (C) IN ADDITION TO MEETING WITH HIS REGULAR ENTOURAGE, GEN AFFONSO HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN HUDDLES WITH SUCH PREVIOUSLY INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS AS AIR MARSHAL EDUARDO GOMES AND MARSHAL CORDEIRO DE FARIS. THESE CONTACTS ADD A CERTAIN RESPECTABILITY TO GEN AFFONSO, BUT THEY ARE NOT OF EARTHSHAKING IMPORTANCE BECAUSE NEITHER ELDER SOLDIER-STATESMAN IS LIKELY TO BE SYMPATHETIC

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FORM FS-412
4-68

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

TO AN ARBITRARY SETTING ASIDE OF COSTA E SILVA. MOREOVER, EDUARDO GOMES' MAIN CONCERN IS THAT AIR MINISTER MARCIO - WHOM HE DESPISES - IS NOW THE ACTING CO-PRESIDENT. MARSHAL CORDEIRO, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROBABLY WENT TO AFFONSO TO EXPRESS HIS DISPLEASURE OVER THE VICE PRESIDENT BEING BY-PASSED.

3. (C) A RETIRED ARMY MAJOR GENERAL WHO WAS A CLASSMATE OF TEN PORTELLA, CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD, AND WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE LIAISON WITH HIM, SAID YESTERDAY THAT PORTELLA WAS QUITE CAPABLE OF SIDING WITH AFFONSO. SOURCE DESCRIBED PORTELLA AS BEING THIRSTY FOR SURVIVAL AND AS A SHREWD JUDGE OF POWER TRENDS. IN MY VIEW, A PORTELLA-AFFONSO MARRIAGE IS UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS AFFONSO HAS CAUSED FOR THE PRESIDENT, WHO REMAINS THE OBJECT OF PORTELLA'S PROFOUND LOYALTY. ADDITIONALLY, PORTELLA APPEARS FULLY IN STEP WITH ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, WHO HARBORS A TOWERING CONTEMPT FOR GEN AFFONSO.

COMMENT: (C) GEN AFFONSO CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS A POSSIBLE FUTURE ALTERNATIVE AT THE PRESIDENT LEVEL, BUT HE FACES A TRYING UPHILL STRUGGLE. I SPENT 72-HOURS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIM DURING VISITS TO ARMY FACTORIES IN SAO PAULO AND MINAS GERAIS LAST WEEK, AND HE CAME THROUGH AS SINGULARLY UNIMPRESSIVE IN POLITICAL TERMS. HE IS NOT ATTRACTIVE IN A PHYSICAL SENSE; HE IS A POOR SPEAKER WHO GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF BEING ILL AT EASE IN ANY LARGE GROUP, AND HIS CONVERSATION CENTERS LARGELY ON PLATITUDES CONNECTED WITH NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT OF NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN BRAZIL. MOREOVER, HE THRIVES ON FLATTERY AND INVITES PRAISE THROUGH SELF-PRAISE. IN TERMS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, HE HAS THE FOLLOWING HANDICAPS: (1) AMBITION FOR HIGH POLITICAL OFFICE WHICH DULLS HIS PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS; (2) ALBEIT A SENIOR ONE, HE IS STILL A MAJOR GENERAL WHO MUST CONTEND WITH ALL THE 4-STAR GENERALS WHO HAVE THEIR OWN AMBITIONS; (3) HAVING BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE REGIME AS A REAL OR IMAGINED PLOTTER, HIS PHONES ARE TAPPED AND HIS MOVEMENTS WATCHED; (4) AS DIRECTOR OF ORDNANCE HE DOES NOT HAVE ANY TROOP COMMAND; AND (5) HE LACKS A CIVILIAN POLITICAL BASE OF ANY CURRENT CONSEQUENCE AND IS INTENSELY DISLIKED BY INTERIOR MINISTER COSTA CAVALCANTI, FINANCE MINISTER DELFIM NETTO, TRANSPORTATION MINISTER ANDREAZZA, AND PROBABLY OTHERS IN THE CABINET AS WELL.

GP-3

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

ANEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION
POL
INFO

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Classification

CHRON
RF

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FM

TO RUEHJCS/DIA

INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUEAOWD/OACSI/DA

RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/ANEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

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SEPT 3, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

EO50x1

1. (C) DETAILS ARE NOW FILTERING OUT ON

FOLLOWING PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S TURN FOR THE WORST EARLY SATURDAY MORNING. THE INFORMATION ON HOW THE INTERIM SUCCESSION PROBLEM WAS HANDLED TENDS TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO THE RASH OF RUMORS THAT MANY GENERAL OFFICERS AND OTHER OFFICERS ARE EXTREMELY UNHAPPY WITH THE TRIUMVIRATE ARRANGEMENT. MOREOVER, SOME OF THE MALCONTENTED APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO WHIP UP SOME SORT OF CHALLENGE TO THE SO-CALLED "JUNTA".

2. (C)

(1) THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE UNABLE TO HANDLE THE AFFAIRS OF HIS OFFICE FOR AT LEAST SIXTY DAYS AND AN INTERIM SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND; (2) VICE-PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEIXO WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE: (A) HE IS AN OLD-LINE POLITICIAN WITH A PEDIGREE OF DANGEROUS PSEUDO-LIBERALISM BUT WITH A RECORD OF SERVICE

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

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FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

ACCOMMODATION TO THE VARGAS PUTSCH OF 1937; (B) HE STRONGLY OPPOSED INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5; (C) IN HIS ORCHESTRATION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION HE HAS PERSISTED IN PROVISIONS WHICH HAVE PRODUCED SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE PAST; AND (C) HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE PROBABLY WOULD PRODUCE A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF POLITICAL APPREHENSION AMONG THE OFFICER CORPS; AND (3) EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD THE SECRECY OF THE SITUATION IN ORDER TO AVOID POLITICAL EXPLOITATION AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY.

3. (S) AFTER CONSIDERABLE DEBATE, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED LATE SATURDAY NIGHT ON THE ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS. SINCE MOST BRAZILIANS HAVE DIFFICULTY KEEPING A CONFIDENCE, WORD OF THE SITUATION BEGAN TO LEAK OUT EARLY SUNDAY AND THE HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPANTS DECIDED TO INFORM KEY INDIVIDUALS ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES ASKED THE ARMY CB! 91

5-!!1, GEN MURICY, TO CALL IN AVAILABLE MEMBERS OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND (GENS SYSENO, NAHON, BAMEDE, AND OLIVIO) AND TO ADVISE THEM OF THE HIGH-LEVEL DECISION. BY THEN, A RATHER LARGE CONCENTRATION OF GENERAL OFFICERS (ARAGAO, AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, FROTA, CANDAL, DUTRA DE CASTILHO, EULER BENTES MONTEIRO, AMONG THEM) WAS MEETING WITH GENERAL SYSENO IN HIS OFFICE AT 1ST ARMY HQS AT THE ARMY MINISTRY. WHEN MURICY LEARNED OF THIS, HE DECIDED TO JOIN THE GROUP AND TO HEAR INDIVIDUAL VIEWS. OFFICERS CLOSE TO LYRA TAVARES NOW SAY THAT MURICY ACTED UNWISELY BECAUSE LYRA DIDN'T WISH TO CONSULT SUBORDINATES, HE DESIRED MERELY TO COMMUNICATE HIS DECISION TO THEM. DURING THE REPORTEDLY TURBULENT SESSION IN SYSENO'S OFFICE, A GOOD MANY OF THOSE PRESENT (INCLUDING ARAGAO, AFFONSO, AND CASTILHO), ARGUED THAT THE SERVICE MINISTERS SHOULD NOT HAVE ACTED WITHOUT CONSULTING "THE GENERALS". MOREOVERS, SOME CONTENDED THAT THE MINISTERS WERE NOT SUITABLE INTERIM REPLACEMENTS FOR THE

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3

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FOIA(b)(3) + 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

PRESENT BECAUSE ALL THREE ARE ON THE RETIRED ROLLS AND THE SUBSTITUTE SHOULD BE AN ACTIVE DUTY MAN. FINALLY, ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD THAT THE MINISTERS SHOULD RESIGN AS CABINET OFFICERS BECAUSE OF THEIR NEW ROLES.

4. (⊕) GEN MURICY LEFT THE AGITATED GROUP TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 2200 HOURS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT THE ARMY MINISTRY'S 9TH FLOOR GRAND BALLROOM. AT THAT TIME HE INFORMED LYRA TAVARES OF THE UNHAPPINESS OF THOSE IN GEN SYSENO'S OFFICE. AT ABOUT 2230, GEN LYRA TAVARES ASKED MURICY TO INVITE THE AVAILABLE MEMBERS OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND TO HIS OFFICE SO THAT HE COULD FORMALLY INFORM THEM OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL. THE MINISTER WAS SURPRISED TO FIND GEN ARAGAO AMONG THOSE WHO CAME INTO HIS OFFICE AND IMMEDIATELY DECIDED THAT HE COULD NOT CONDUCT A FORMAL SESSION SINCE ARAGAO WAS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE HIGH COMMAND. INSTEAD, HE KEPT THOSE PRESENT STANDING WHILE HE INFORMALLY NOTIFIED THEM OF WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. ARAGAO REPORTEDLY HAD INVITED HIMSELF TO GO ALONG AS THE "REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE SULKING NON-PARTICIPANTS WHO REMAINED BEHIND IN SYSENO'S OFFICE AND WHO APPARENTLY RESENTED NOT BEING ASKED TO THE COUNCIL MEETING OR TO THE LATER MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF THE ARMY.

5. (⊕) THOSE GENERALS WHO WERE DISAPPOINTED HAVE SINCE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO TEST THE REAL STRENGTH OF LYRA TAVARES. GEN CASTILHO WENT BACK TO HIS VILA MILITAR COMMAND OF THE 1ST INF. DIV. AND CALLED HIS OFFICERS TOGETHER TO ANNOUNCE THAT HE WOULD NOT "TOLERATE THE AIR FORCE HAVING AN EQUAL VOICE WITH THE ARMY IN THE GOVERNMENT". OTHER GENERAL OFFICERS - PARTICULARLY ARAGAO AND AFFONSO - HAVE ALSO ENGAGED IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS AT WHICH THEY HAVE AILED THEIR UNHAPPINESS. ALL OF THIS HAS GENERATED AN AVALANCHE OF RUMORS OF IMPENDING REBELLION.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Classification

PAGE 4

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

ON 2 SEPTEMBER, FOR INSTANCE, MANY PEOPLE INSISTED THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED AT THE VILA MILITARY. A CLOSE CHECK FAILS TO LEND THE SLIGHTEST SUBSTANTIATION TO THAT REPORT. THE ARMY MINISTER'S OFFICE IS AWARE OF SOME UNHAPPINESS AMONG PERSONNEL IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO GARRISON, BUT IS FULLY CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO SUSTAIN THE MINISTER'S AUTHORITY. MOREOVER, GEN CASTILHO APPARENTLY HAS OVER-ESTIMATED HIS REAL CONTROL OVER SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS AND IS LIKELY TO BE RAPPED SEVERELY ON THE KNUCKLES BY LYRA TAVARES.

COMMENT: (G) LYRA TAVARES PLAYED WITH FIRE BY FAILING TO FOLLOW THE TIME-HONORED RITUAL OF AT LEAST GIVING THE GENERALS THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD CONSULTED THEM. THE MINISTER'S ASSOCIATES JUSTIFY HIS POSTURE ON THE BASIS OF THE GREATER RISKS INVOLVED IN HAVING NEWS LEAK OUT BEFORE THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MURICY - ALWAYS A BIT NAIVE AND ANXIOUS TO PLAY THE ROLL OF THE "GOOD GUY" - APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT LESS THAN ASTUTE IN COVERING HIS FRIEND LYRA TAVARES' EXPOSED FLANK. THOSE WHO ARE NOW UNHAPPY - SYSENQ, ARAGAO, CASTILHO, AFFONSO, ETC. - ARE THE VERY SAME MALCONTENTED OF LAST DECEMBER. IT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THEY HAVE MUSTERED ANY SIGNIFICANT FOLLOWING OR AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION. GP-3.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

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Classification

Control: 366

Date: September 2, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY

Brasilia 366

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

2. President's condition. Deputy was convinced President never return to office. Col. said, "knowing what I know and can't talk about, I cannot agree." However, latter continued talk in terms President not return. Better outlook for President's health supported by Military Aide who called wife in Brasilia evening 1 Sept. stating condition improved and doctors optimistic man in his good health recuperate possibly within thirty days with rest and treatment. Officer Army General Staff Brasilia called [redacted] morning 2 Sept. stating message just arrived with similar information and that C e S now able move right arm and continues alert and conscious.

EO50x1

Drafted by: [redacted]

md/9/2/69

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

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Control:

-2-

Date: September 2, 1969

3. Vice President Pedro Aleixo. Triumvirate Military Ministers (MM) realize extra-constitutional solution creates serious problems for them. However, I.A. 12 agreed upon and accepted by assembled VP and all govt ministers. Situation was dangerous. Major problem MM was not divide military where, especially among non-general officers, revolution committed remove control of old time political class, of whom VP outstanding example, in order replace with younger more progressive men. VP as President would have immediately fractionated military. VP stated at airport before leaving Brasilia that he not know what will happen but if return as President will have direct elections and open Congress at once. With this MM knew they had no choice if not to lose control of Revolution. They believe must prevent situation where military once again forced close Congress and remove President. This intolerable.

4. Problems of Triumvirate:

a. First and most important is to keep peace in military. Hawks want to eat doves therefore MM must lean toward hawks. Navy Minister Rademaker is hawk; Army Minister Lira Tavares is dove; Air Minister Marcio Souza Mello is a bird in

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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Control:

-3-

Date: September 2, 1969

between. Need for equipment and improved economic position of Armed Forces is at critical stage and threatening integrity. They have sacrificed since 1964.

b. Second is keep present high level national economy on course. Brazil can't lose her only opportunity to develop. Political situation could destroy economy overnight.

c. Third is find solution return to political legitimacy and solve problem presidential succession. There is no possibility new constitution will be promulgated on schedule. Entire constitutional situation must be restudied in light new developments. Can't risk return to time of deputy Marcio Alves. Insurgency will be stepped up with passing of "liberal" Costa e Silva and MM must retain means to combat.

5. Length of Triumvirate: Collegiate forum cannot endure. It is only temporary measure or serious clash is inevitable. To solve immediate problems (par. 3) will probably take 4-6 months. At end must come succession solution.

MM has only 30 days at most to announce a program or it will not last another 15 days beyond that. The entire political class has been awaiting opening Congress on 8 September.

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Control:

-4-

Date: September 2, 1969

They have suffered financial privation for nine months (great emphasis). If not something soon, "everyone" of Congressmen living in Brasilia will renounce his mandate. They can't stand another delay. Unless they want worse problems, Triumvirate must enter into contact with political representative, the only legitimate political element chosen by the people that still exists in Brazil today. [] he believed MM can survive longer, six months.

6. US Public Opinion: [] stated biggest hurdle now as in past is US public opinion. It is very important to Brazil but forces an un-Brazilian solution which leads to future troubles because Brazilian public has a different response. [] the Latin personality is different from the teutonic, it always will find an extra legal solution.

7. Succession issue. , Solution is very difficult and now of immediate concern. Task of MM is select candidate or list of two or three. Everyone wants be president but Triumvirate must select on basis (1) acceptance to military, (2) widest possible acceptance in all parts country and (3) competence in various determined fields. Both sources mentioned Ministers

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OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
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Control:

-5-

Date: September 2, 1969

Passarinho and Andreazza and Generals Portella, Medici and Afonso Albuquerque Lima as possibilities. Gen. Eira Tavares they rejected on age and that he does not want presidency. Said Brazil needs young man to give dynamic leadership and symbol of hope for future. Andreazza and Passarinho have this, they said.

8. COMMENT: Above comments reflect impressions of key officer in EO50x1 at end of first work day following President Costa e Silva's incapacitation.
GP-3

LOW *SL*

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

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ACTION
POL
INFO

CHRON

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TO RUEOJFA/DIA
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUCRJCS/OJCS
RULPAL/USCINCSO (J2)
RUEAOWD/OACSI
RULPAK/USARSO (G2)
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
BT

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AUG 31, 1969

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. (C) PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA APPARENTLY SUFFERED CORONARY THROMBOSIS ABOARD AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE FROM BRASILIA TO RIO DE JANEIRO ON FRIDAY. REPORTS INDICATE MEDICAL SITUATION BECAME AGGRAVATED EARLY SATURDAY BUT THAT ACUTE CRISIS PHASE NOW PASSED AND DOCTORS MORE OPTIMISTIC FOR OUTLOOK. INDIVIDUAL'S CLOSE TO SCENE AT RIO'S LARANJEIRAS PALACE SAY ONLY THAT PRESIDENT NEEDS A LONG REST.

2. (C) SOURCE CLOSE TO MILITARY HOUSEHOLD CHIEF, GENERAL PORTELLA, SAYS THAT CABINET NOW MEETING TO EVALUATE SITUATION AND PLOT COURSE OF ACTION. INDICATIONS ARE THAT INSTITUTIONAL ACT OF SIXTY TO NINETY DAYS DURATION WILL BE PROMULGATED ANNOUNCING THAT EITHER A TRIUMVIRATE OF SERVICE MINISTERS WILL TAKE CHARGE OR THAT A SINGLE LEADER, PROBABLY ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, WILL TAKE UP THE REINS OF LEADERSHIP. SOURCE SAYS VICE PRESIDENT PEDRO ALEIXO HAS DECLINED TO TAKE OVER. SOURCE CLOSE TO MINISTER OF INTERIOR COSTA CAVALCANTI SAYS THAT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CABINET'S DECISION CAN BE EXPECTED SOON AFTER MEETING CLOSES. COSTA CAVALCANTI BELIEVES THAT EARLY ELECTION OF NEW PRESIDENT LIKELY.

3. (C) OFFICER'S OF SO-CALLED "CASTELLISTA" PERSUASION, INCLUDING EX-MINISTER OF WAR ADEMAR DE QUEIROZ AND LATE PRESIDENT'S NAVY CAPTAIN SON, PUSHING HARD FOR LEGAL SUCCESSION OF VICE PRESIDENT. CAPTAIN CASTELLO BRANCO THINKS, HOWEVER, THAT TRIUMVIRATE OF SERVICE MINISTER'S ALMOST CERTAIN.

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FORM FS-412
4-68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

PAGE 2

4. (C) COL. COVAS OF GEN PORTELLA'S STAFF PLAYING DOWN GRAVITY OF PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS AND EVERYONE AROUND PRESIDENT ENGAGED IN SAME EFFORT. THIS INTERPRETED BY BRAZILIAN SOURCE'S AS REFLECTING ONE OF TWO MOTIVATIONS: (1) A DESIRE TO HOLD ON TO POWER OR (2) A DESIRE TO HOLD LID ON TO AVOID UNDUE POPULAR APPREHENSION.

COMMENT: (C) ALL SOURCES CONFIDENT THAT A TYPICAL BRAZILIAN "JEITO" (SOLUTION) WILL BE FOUND. VICE PRESIDENT ALEIXO'S ALLEGED DECLINATION OF LEADERSHIP PROBABLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEELING THAT TIME NOT YET RIPE FOR CIVILIAN HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OVER-IDENTIFICATION WITH LYRA TAVARES.

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FORM FS-412
4-68

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY
BRASILIA AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

DEF-6

Charge:

FEB 26 4 08 PM '69
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control: 94

Date: Feb. 26, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY
BRASILIA 94

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. Recommend consideration be given and planning begin now for DOD sponsored visit of MGEN Clovis Bandeira Brasil to the United States soon after confirmation of his next appointment. You may want to discuss this in Washington.

2. Brasil has never been to the US and has said how disappointed he is that he knows it only from books. Twice he sought a US assignment, once to Leavenworth and once as military attache (the selection Gen. Medici received). He said to me with deep sincerity once, "I am a great admirer of the Americans and always have been. I have great confidence in your leadership and am grateful that it is you who share our Western Hemisphere." If this man becomes the next chief of SNI, a well conducted VIP tour of the US is clearly in our interests.

3. Gen. Brasil is saying nothing of a new assignment. However, at a gathering I had at Embassy last night, the officers from the Presidencia stuck to him like flies,

Drafted by: [redacted] /md/2/26/69

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Concurrence:

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING

Foreign Service of the
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Charge:

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Control:

-2-

Date: Feb. 26, 1969

offering further evidence that appointment to high position is in offing.

4. He will retire by 14 March in order to offer an additional vacancy for March promotions. Last night he said he will go to Curitiba on 13 March where he will be made an Honorary Citizen of Parana the next day. He will then return to Brasilia and stay through April settling his affairs. The vagueness of plans beyond that point are further indication that he expects a new job.

LOW *SC*

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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ACTION
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Control:

Recd:

MAR 26, 1969

CHRON
RF

P 251910Z MAR 69

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TO RUEOJFA/DIA
INFO RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)
RUEOAWD/OACSI DA(FLO)
RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUESUP/AMCONGEN SAO PAULO
RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE
BT

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC, 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. (U) ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TODAY OF FOLLOWING
PROMOTIONS IN BRAZILIAN ARMY:

A. TO FULL GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL AUGUSTO CEZAR DE CASTRO MONIZ DE ARAGAO
MAJOR GENERAL JOSE CANAVARRO PEREIRA
MAJOR GENERAL EMILIO GARRASTAZU MEDICI

B. TO MAJOR GENERAL

BG SYLVIO COUTO COELHO DA FROTA
BG RAMIRO TAVARES CONCALVES
BG REYNALDO MELLO DE ALMEIDA
BG EDNARDO D'AVILA MELLO
BG HENRIQUE CARLOS DE ASSUMPÇÃO CARDOSO
BG LAURO ALVES PINTO
BG FRANCISCO ESTELLIANO BASTOS DE AGUIAR

C. TO BRIGADIER GENERAL

COL MANEOEL JOSE CARREA DE LACERDA
COL AUGUSTO CID DE CAMARGO OSORIO
COL ANTONIO CARLOS DE ANDRADA SERPA
COL HUGO DE ANDRADE ABREU
COL WALTER PIRES DE CARVALHO E ALBUQUERQUE

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FORM FS-412
8 - 65

TELEGRAM

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PAGE-2

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Control:

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COL ERNANI AYROSA DA SILVA
COL JOAO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO

2. (G) PROMOTIONS TO GENERAL OFFICER ON 25 MARCH ARE TRADITIONAL AND THE SELECTIONS GENERALLY FOLLOW STRICT SENIORITY. IN THE CASE OF THE NEW FOUR-STAR GENERALS, THEY RANKED ONE-TWO-THREE AFTER PREVIOUSLY PASSED-OVER MAJOR GENERALS CARLOS GUEDES AND MOACIR ARAUJO LOPES WHO WERE NOT EXPECTED TO BE PICKED UP THIS TIME EITHER. THE NEW MAJOR GENERALS FOLLOW IN SEQUENCE AFTER OFT-PASSED OVER BRIGADIER GENERALS ENIO GARCIA, LINDOLPHO FERRAZ, AND ALBARO SANTOS. THE ONE EXCEPTION IS RECENT SUDENE CHIEF, BG EULER BENTES MONTEIRO, WHO RANKS AFTER GEN. REYNALDO AND BEFORE GEN. D'AVILA, BUT WAS PASSED OVER ON THE STATUTORY BASIS THAT HE DID NOT REVERT TO ACTIVE DUTY 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE 25 MARCH PROMOTION DATE. HE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE NUMBER ONE FOR MAJOR GENERAL ON THE NEXT LIST ON 25 JULY. THERE WERE ONLY TWO SURPRISES AMONG THE NEW BRIGADIER GENERALS: COLONEL LACERDA, THE CURRENT ARMY G-4, AND COLONEL CID, RECENTLY OF THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL STAFF AND NOW AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ON A GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION. LACERDA HAD BEEN PASSED OVER SEVERAL TIMES AND IS NOT A PARTICULARLY BRIGHT OFFICER, EVEN THOUGH WELL LIKED. AS FOR CID, HE IS A GEN. PORTELLA HACK WHO ALSO HAS VERY CLOSE TIES WITH JUSTICE MINISTER GAMA E SILVA. OF ALL TODAY'S PROMOTIONS, CID'S WILL CAUSE THE MOST UNFAVORABLE REACTION, BUT THE SLIPPING IN OF SUCH A RINGER HAS BECOME STANDARD PRACTICE FOR COSTA E SILVA AND GEN. PORTELLA. THE OTHER FIVE NEW BRIGADIER GENERAL MAKES ARE SINGULARLY OUTSTANDING. BG-DESIGNATE JOAO FIGUEIREDO IS ONE OF THE MOST SUPERIOR OFFICERS IN THE BRAZILIAN ARMY AND ENJOYS A SPARKLING PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION. HE IS ESSENTIALLY A PROFESSION, BUT POSSESS KEEN POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF MODERATE INCLINATIONS. BG-DESIGNATE AYROSA IS PERHAPS THE MOST POPULAR OFFICER IN THE BRAZILIAN ARMY. IN THIS COUNTRY WHERE EVERYONE KNOCKS EVERYONE ELSE, AYROSA'S NAME CAN BE MENTIONED IN ANY GROUP WITH THE NEAR CERTAINTY THAT NOT A SINGLE RESERVATION WILL BE UTTERED. HE IS A US SILVER

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PAGE-3

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Control:

Recd:

STAR MAN FROM THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN WHERE HE DEMONSTRATED
REAL HEROISM. THE CURRENT

EO50x1

EO50x1

IS ANOTHER HIGHLY RESPECTED PROFESSIONAL.
AS WITH AYROSA, HE IS REGARDED AS EXCLUSIVELY PROFESSIONAL
WITH NO POLITICAL AMBITIONS OR AFFILIATIONS. COL. WALTER
PIRES IS ANOTHER OUTSTANDING OFFICER WHO WILL GREATLY
REINFORCE THE QUALITY OF THE BRAZILIAN ARMY GENERAL
OFFICER CORPS. THE SAME CAN BE SAID FOR BG-DESIGNATE
SERPA, EVEN THOUGH THIS SECOND ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL OF
THREE SERPA BROTHERS, TENDS TO BE HARD-LINING.

3. (U) FOR OACSI, FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE: REQUEST
APPROPRIATE MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM ARMY FOR
GENERAL EDNARDO D'AVILA MELLO AND HUGO DE ANDRADE ABREAU.
COMMENT: (e) NOW THAT THE EXCITEMENT OF PROMOTIONS IS
OVER, THE NEXT STEP, EXPECTED TO DEVELOP IN THE NEXT
FEW DAYS, IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF THOSE PROMOTED AND THE
REASSIGNMENT OF THOSE TO BE DISLOGED BY THE NEW MAKES.
THIS PROCESS WILL BE OF A WHOLESAL NATURE AND WILL HAVE
DEEP POLITICAL MEANING. AS FOR THE TWO GEERALS IN
WASHINGTON, HUGO ABREAU IS ALREADY ON ORDERS TO RETURN,
AND D'AVILA MELLO WILL ALSO RETURN WITHIN 90 DAYS OR SO.
BOTH THE PROMOTIONS AND THE PENDING REASSIGNMENTS
TRANSLATE INTO A POWERFUL REINFORCEMENT OF PRESIDENT
COSTA E SILVA'S POSITION

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

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Classification

Control:

I44

Date: March 27, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasilia I44



FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

also


1. There is talk here/that newly promoted GenDiv Ednardo D'Avila Mello, presently Military Attache in Washington, will be next CG, 11th Military Region. Sources ~~XXXX~~ includes his daughter, wife of Presidential Naval Aide CT Peixoto.

2. When new CG is announced, request bio data available your office be sent me.

~~XXXXX Mark political significance to you attach~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

LOW SC

Drafted by:



/md/3/27/69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

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TELEGRAM

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Charge:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Control: 159

Date: April 8, 1969

ACTION: AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO

Brasilia 159

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

1. With the arrival of General Orlando Geisel today the move of EMFA is complete. It will officially commence functioning from Brasilia effective 9 April.

LOW *sc*

Drafted by: md/4/8/69

Approving Officer:

Concurrence:

UNCLASSIFIED

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

ACTION

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INFO

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Control:

Recd:

JULY 25, 1969

CHRON

RF

R 251745Z JUL 69

FM

TO RUEOJFA/DIA

INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESUP/AMCONGEN SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONGEN PORTO ALEGRE

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

BT

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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

1. (U) FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS ANNOUNCED BY
BRAZILIAN ARMY:

A. TO FULL GENERAL

MAJOR BENERAL ISAAC NAHON

B. TO MAJOR GENERAL

BG EULER BENTES MONTEIRO

BG OLDEMAR FERREIRA GARCIA

BG GASTAO GUIMARAES DE ALEMIDA

BF ALVARO CARDOSO

BF ADOLPHO JOAO DE PAULA COUTO

BG FRITZ AZEVEDO MANSO

BG JAIME PORTELLA DE MELLO

BF VENITIUS NAZARETH NOTARE

BF OSCAR JANNSEN BARROSO

BG ELYSIO CARLOS DALE COUTINHO

C. TO BRIGADIER GENERAL

COL GENTIL MARCONDES FILHO

COL AMADEU MARTIRE

COL RAUL LOPES MUNHOZ

COL JOSE FERRAZ DA ROCHA

COL RUY DE PAULO COUTO

COL FLORIMAR CAMPELLO

COL LEANDRO MONTE ALEGRE

COL AYRTON RIBEIRO DA SILVA

2. (U) IN ADDITION PROMOTIONS, RANKING AND OFTEN PASSED OVER
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS LUIZ GUEDES MANDATORILY RETIRED FOR AGE.

3. (C) 25 JULY TRADITIONAL DATE GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS

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★ GPO : 1967 O - 305-214 (81)

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Foreign Service of the
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FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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Recd:

BRZILIAN ARMY. AS EXPECTED, PROMOTIONS FOLLOWED SENIORITY.
WITH RETIREMENT MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS LUIZ GUEDES,
GEN ISAAC NAHON WAS JUNIOR ONLY TO MOACIR ARAUJO LOPES,
OFTEN PASSED OVER AND FACING MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE IN
OCTOBER. PROMOTIONS TO MAJOR GENERAL FOLLOW SENIORITY.
PROMOTIONS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL APPEAR TO BE FOR SENIORITY AND
PROFESSIONAL ABILITY WITH EXCEPTION FLORIMAR CAMPELLO. AARMA
CALLERO REPORTS CAMPELLO LAST ON LIST OF 12 NAMES RECOMMENDED TO
PRESIDENT FOR PROMOTION TO BRIG GEN. PRESIDENT BELIEVED TO HAVE
APPROVED PROMOTION BECAUSE CAMPELLO DYING OF CANCER.
COMMENT: (c) POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROMOTIONS THEMSELVES
NEGLECTIBLE. RESULTING REASSIGNMENTS TO BE ANNOUNCED NEXT FEW
DAYS WILL PROBABLY SEE PRESIDENT AND ARMY MINISTER TRYING TO
RECOVER SOME OF GROUND LOST DURING ARAGAO CONTROVERSY BY SHIFT-
ING TRUSTED SUPPORTERS TO KEY POSITIONS.

GP-3

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8 - 65

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TELEGRAM

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INCOMING AMEMBASSY BRASILIA DEF-6

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R 261400Z NOV 69

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TO RUCRJCS/DIA

INFO RUEAOWD/OACSI, DA

RUESVB/USCINCSO (J-2)

RULPAK/USARSO (G-2)

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUESEI/AMCONSUL RECIFE

RUESUP/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

ZEN/AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

BT

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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1. (U) ON TRADITIONAL 25 NOVEMBER PROMOTION DATE FOR GENERAL OFFICERS (OTHERS ARE 25 MARCH AND 25 JULY), PRESIDENT MEDICI SELECTED FOLLOWING FOR PROMOTION FROM LISTS SUBMITTED BY ARMY HIGH COMMAND:

(A) TO FOUR-STAR RANK:

MG ARTUR DUARTE CANDAL DA FONSECA

MG IDALIO SARDENBERG

MG RODRIGO OCTAVIO JORDAO RAMOS

MG BRENO BORGES FORTES

(B) TO MAJOR GENERAL:

BG AUGUSTO JOSE PRESGRAVE

BG MOACYR BARCELLOS POTYGUARA

(C) TO BRIGADIER GENERAL:

COL MILTON TAVARES DE SOUZA

COL BENEDICTO MAIA PINTO DE ALMEIDA

COL DELIO BARBOSA LEITE

COL GERALDO ALVARENGA NAVARRO

COL ENEAS MARTINS NOGUEIRA

2. (S) PROMOTIONS TO MAJOR GENERAL AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NOT CHARACTERIZED BY ANY GLARING SURPRISE, EVEN THOUGH THE RECOVERY, AFTER PREVIOUS PASSOVERS, OF COL ENEAS CLEARLY A REFLECTION OF HIS LONGTIME CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ARMY MINISTER GEISEL. IN THE FOUR-STAR AREA, THERE WERE THREE VERY IMPORTANT ACTIONS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INVOLVED CONTROVERSIAL MG AFFONSO AUGUSTO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER AND RECENTLY ACTIVE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. IN A MOVE DESIGNED AS A FRONTAL CHALLENGE TO WHATEVER POWER AFFONSO AND HIS SUPPORTERS IMAGINE THEY HAVE WITHIN THE ARMY, THE HIGH COMMAND TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF EXCLUDING AFFONSO'S NAME FROM THE LIST OF SIX MAJOR GENERALS SENT TO THE

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PRESIDENT FOR CONSIDERATION. AS IF TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, THE HIGH COMMAND DIPPED THREE FILES BELOW GENERAL AFFONSO TO PICK THE NAME OF GEN BINA MACHADO. THE SELECTED GEN BRENO IS ALSO JUNIOR TO AFFONSO. IN THIS MANNER, THE HIGH COMMAND PRACTICALLY TOLD AFFONSO THAT HE WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED IN FORTHCOMING SELECTIONS AS WELL. IN ADDITION TO BINA MACHADO AND THE FOUR SELECTED, THE LIST SENT TO THE PRESIDENT ALSO INCLUDED MG JOAO COSTA WHO, AS EXPECTED, WAS PASSED OVER.

3. (C) THE SECOND POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PROMOTIONS INVOLVES GEN IDALIO SARDENBERG, PREVIOUSLY DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL AND NOW NAMED AS PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT BRAZIL-US MILITARY COMMISSION. SARDENBERG IS A CAPABLE AND POPULAR OFFICER, BUT HE WAS NOT AN ACTIVE REVOLUTIONARY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE HAS A TAINT IN SOME MILITARY CIRCLES BECAUSE OF HIS ROLES AS HEAD OF CONTROVERSIAL FORMER WAR MINISTER LOTT'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND AS PRESIDENT KUBITSCHKE'S HEAD OF PETROBRAS (1958-1961). MOREOVER, SOME OFFICERS ARE OF THE OPINION THAT IT IS A DOUBLE AFFRONT TO GENERAL AFFONSO, A MAN WITH SOLID REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS, TO BE PASSED OVER WHILE FENCE STRADDLER SARDENBERG--WHO WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROMOTED BY COSTA E SILVA AND LYRA TAVARES--GAINS A NEW STAR. BEHIND THE CHANGE IN SARDENBERG'S FORTUNES IS ONE MAN--ARMY MINISTER ORLANDO GEISEL. GEN GEISEL IS KNOWN TO HAVE DEEP PROFESSIONAL RESPECT FOR SARDENBERG AND HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT SARDENBERG IS A MAN OF UTTER INTEGRITY AND LACKING IN POLITICAL AMBITION. THUS, GEN GEISEL IS SAID TO HAVE EXERCISED GREAT PERSUASION OVER THE RELUCTANT PRESIDENT MEDICI (WHO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SARDENBERG'S PROMOTION CONSTITUTED A "DOSE FOR A HORSE" AS FAR AS THE ARMY WAS CONCERNED). SOME OFFICERS EVEN INSIST THAT GEN GEISEL WOULD HAVE RESIGNED HAD SARDENBERG BEEN PASSED OVER.

4. (C) THE LEAST SIGNIFICANT OF THE THREE ATTENTION-CATCHING ASPECTS OF THE PROMOTION LIST WAS THE EXCLUSION OF MG JOSE NOGUEIRA PAES (GEN BINA MACHADO IS ONE FILE JUNIOR) FROM THE SELECTIONS BY THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND. NOGUEIRA PAES WAS CLOSE TO PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO AND WAS PROMINENT IN THE 1964 REVOLUTION. DESPITE A REPUTATION AS A HARD WORKER, HE IS ALSO SAID TO BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET ALONG WITH AND A NOTORIOUS NITPICKER. NOGUEIRA PAES IS FURIOUS OVER HIS EXCLUSION FROM THE LIST AND CHARGED INTO MINISTER GEISEL'S OFFICE WITH A PLEA FOR SOME SORT OF AN EXPLANATION. THE MINISTER REPORTEDLY TOLD HIM THAT HIS SITUATION IS FAR FROM DESPERATE AND THAT HE IS A YOUNG MAN (58) WITH AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FUTURE PROMOTION. NOGUEIRA PAES (A FORMER ENGINEER, AS ARE CANDAL, RODRIGO OCTAVIO, AND AFFONSO) HAS NOW BEEN ASSIGNED TO

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THE AMAZON MILITARY COMMAND IN MANAUS, WHERE HE WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO MAKE HIS MARK. THE ABSENCE OF ENGINEERS FROM THE NEXT GROUP OF MAJOR GENERALS CONSIDERED FOR PROMOTION SHOULD ALSO ENHANCE HIS CHANCES.

5. (U) THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO AUTHORIZED THE FOLLOWING CHANGES OF ASSIGNMENT: A. GEN CANDAL-FROM ACTING TO EFFECTIVE COMMANDER OF THE 4TH ARMY.

B. GEN RODRIGO OCTAVIO-FROM THE AMAZON MILITARY COMMAND TO DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WORKS AND PRODUCTION, VICE GEN MAMEDE WHO HAS GONE TO THE SUPERIOR MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

C. GEN BRENO-FROM ARMY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF TO COMMANDER OF THE 3RD ARMY.

D. GEN BINA MACHADO-FROM CHIEF OF MILITARY SERVICE TO VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY.

E. GEN POTYGUARA-FROM ARMY DEPUTY OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF, TO CHIEF OF MILITARY SERVICE.

G. GEN NEWTON FARIA FERREIRA, FROM ARMY MEMBER ON THE JOINT BRAZIL-US MILITARY COMMISSION, TO ARMY DEPUTY OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF IN BRASILIA.

G. GEN MILTON TAVARES DE SOUZE-FROM THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF TO CHIEF OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER.

ADDITIONAL CHANGES OF STATION FOR GENERAL OFFICERS ARE EXPECTED IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

6. (U) GEN AUGUSTO CEZAR DE CASTRO MONIZ DE ARAGAO TOOK OVER ON 25 NOVEMBER AS CHIEF OF THE NEWLY-CREATED DEPARTMENT OF TRAINING IN A CEREMONY ATTENDED BY ARMY MINISTER GEISEL AND ALMOST EVERY GENERAL OFFICER IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO GARRISON, AS WELL AS MANY OTHER DISTINGUISHED GUESTS. IN HIS SPEECH, GEN ARAGAO STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT THROUGH SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY DESIGNED TO IMPROVE SOCIAL CONDITIONS. HE ALSO URGED THE ARMY TO PURSUE POLICIES AIMED AT TRAINING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE LIAISON BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES AND SERVICE SCHOOLS. GP-3.

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Geo Clee

Country: Brazil

IR No.

Subject: (U) EMFA in Brasilia

Date of report

Date of Information: Feb-Apr 1969

No. of pages

Place & Date of Acq: Brasilia
Feb-Apr 1969

References:

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

Eval: B 2

Prepared by:

Source: Various Officers of EMFA

EO50x1

Summary: (e) This IR reports the move of the Armed Forces General Staff to Brasilia, a move which was formally completed by the arrival of its Chief on 8 April 1969, although individuals continue to straggle in. It constitutes a major addition to the Military presence in Brasilia and places its Chief in closer potential daily contact with the President and his key advisors than the peripatetic military ministers who are still based in Rio.

1. (U) During the period 3 March-8 April 1969, the Armed Forces General Staff (Estado Maior das Forças Armadas or EMFA) moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia. The move is part of the programmed consolidation of the federal government in the new capital. It all it will involve 196 EMFA personnel, including 84 officers and 112 non-commissioned officers and civilians. These constitute 192 families or approximately 1,000 people, of which 256 are school age children. Approximately one third of the people have not yet arrived but will do so within the next thirty days or so.

EO50x1

EO50x1

The move represents a major addition to the city of Brasilia and the military presence here. EMFA officially commenced to operate from its new location with the arrival of its Chief, Gen. Orlando Geisel, on 8 April.

2. (U) Preparations for the move have been in process for the past year and a half under an agency known as COEMFA whose chief is Col. Roberto de Almeida SERRA. SERRA, a hard working Infantry officer with an engineering degree, programmed the move in five

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-2-

weekly echelons beginning 3 March. EMFA now occupies the first large ministerial building on the Esplanada dos Ministerios closest to the Palacio do Planalto, which houses the Presidencia. It is using all floors except the top two, the 7th and 8th which are occupied by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Service (SNI), respectively. The proper title of the building, to include mail address, is now: Edificio de EMFA.

3. (U) For living purposes EMFA has constructed two apartment house blocks for officers in Superquadra South (SQS) 112 and one block for non-commissioned officers and civilians in SQS 212, and also purchased 36 two family units for lower ranking personnel in Quadra 703 of the Setor Habitacional Economico Sul, a lower class residential area known as Cruzeiro located between the Setor Urbano Militar and the Setor Industrial. In addition, one 12 apartment wing in SQS 205 was bought and 12 more apartments are being sought. To date 180 housing units were either constructed or acquired. Serra also had to coordinate with the Federal District government for 250 school spaces ranging from kindergarten through high school to permit newly arriving children to continue their education without interruption. Future construction plans also call for additional apartments in SQS 112 and SQS 113 for the future staff of the Armed Forces Hospital, both military and civilian. (SQS 113 is where the bulk of the foreign diplomatic community is consolidated today, to include the Americans.) Gen Geisel is presently living in SQS 112, Building D, Apt 604, although long range plans call for eventual construction of a house for him across the lake in the Ministers area.

4. (FOUO) The move brings to Brasilia the Chief, his cabinet, the J Staff, and the Army, Navy and Air Force Sections (sub chefias). Remaining in Rio de Janeiro are the following subordinate EMFA activities:

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-3-

Superior War College
Mixed Brazil/United States Military Commission
Defense Nucleus Atlantic (under an Admiral)
Defense Nucleus South (under an Army General)
Defense Nucleus North (under an AF Brigdeiro)
Administrative Subsection of the Chiefs Cabinet
to coordinate final close out (under an Army major).

Except for the clean-up detachment, all of the above report directly to the Chief of EMFA.

5. (C) The general officers presently in Brasilia, in addition to Gen. Geisel, are BGEN Moacyr Barcellos POTYGUARA, Chief of the Army Section; Brigadeiro Raimundo PIRES, Chief of the Air Force Section, and BGEN Fernando BELCHIOR de Oliveira Filho. A new Chief of the Navy Section is to be nominated shortly.

EO50x1

an EMFA reorganization plan that has been awaiting the President's approval for several months. While all the details are not known to RO, under this plan a 4 star Vice Chief of Staff position will be created as well as the Sub chiefia Technica. Also, the J Staff will be increased from the present poor conventional sections to twelve, "along the lines of your Department of Defense", a source told me. The chiefs of the Service Sections apparently will continue to wear two hats: as representatives of their respective service general staffs and as assistants to the Chief, EMFA.

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-4-

The Technological Section will occupy a position on a level with that of the three service sections and will have combined under it the Mixed Mapping Commission, the Armed Forces Research Institute (?) and any other EMFA commissions and activities dealing with technical or scientific matters. ARMA 360 reported that MGEN NEWTON REIS, presently Deputy Chief, Army General Staff, is expected to be the first Vice Chief of EMFA.

6. (e) The reason and the wisdom of the move of EMFA exactly at this time are not clear. Gen Belchoir told me it was done entirely too fast that nothing really was ready and that it would have been better to wait a month or two until preparations were more advanced. Last September I was told in Gen. Geisel's presence that EMFA would be moving about next May. The J-2 told me last week they really had hoped to move in February but that some of the arrangements fell behind schedule. It is obvious from walking through the building that a high state of disorder exists. The director of the Army Garrison Hospital recently told me funds were taken from the Armed Forces Hospital (an EMFA activity) to complete the personnel quarters. Also, such a heavy family move was made in the middle of a school year. In sum, there is strong suggestion that EMFA was in a hurry to get here. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMENT (e): One reason for the hurry to move to Brasilia could be an effort to give economic support to a city feeling the pinch of the absence of the relatively well to do congressmen.

INCOMING

DEF-6-

ACTION:

INFO

CHARGE

AIDE

MINECON

POL-2

POL/R

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BRAS-2

FILE

R 302120Z JAN 69
FM COMUSMILGP BRAZIL
TO RUENAAA/CNO
INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RULPNA/COMUSNAVS
RUESUA/AMEMB RIO
RULGAGA/COMSOLANT
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Control:

944

Recd:

31 Jan 69
1115

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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BRAZNAV MIDSHIPMEN TRAINING CRUISE (U)
JKM COMUSMILGP BRAZIL 071223Z JAN 69 (NOTAL)
B. CINCLANTFLT 102328Z JAN 69 (NOHXL)

1. (C) REF A FORWARDED SCHEDULE OF BRAZNAV TRAINING CRUISE TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL PERIOD JAN-MAR 1969 AND INDICATED BRAZILIAN INTEREST IN JOINT TRAINING WITH U.S. FORCES IF SCHEDULED TRANSITS TO AND FROM MEDITERRANEAN MADE SUCH RENDEZVOUS FEASIBLE. REF B ADVISED THAT LANTFLT TRANSIT SKEDS OFFER NO OPPORTUNITY FOR JOINT OPS DURING TIME FRAME OF CRUISE. BRAZNAV UNDERSTANDS FULLY THAT JOINT TRAINING WITH TRANSITING US FORCES NOT FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME.

2. (C) AS MATTER OF INTEREST BRAZNAV ADVISES THAT THEY HAVE INVITED FRENCH NAVY TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT EXERCISES WHILE IN VICINITY OF PORTUGAL. APPARENTLY FRENCH REPLY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO PARTICIPATE BUT NOT IN VICINITY OF NATO COUNTRIES DUE TO DELICATE POLITICAL ISSUE. FRENCH INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT EXERCISES FURTHER TO THE SOUTH. AS A RESULT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR JOINT FRENCH/BRAZILIAN OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF CANARY ISLANDS DURING BRAZNAV RETURN TRANSIT IN LATE FEB. BELIEVE FRENCH FORCES WILL INCLUDE CLEMENCEAU AND SUPPORTING DESTROYERS.

EMSOFFICE
Brasilia GP-4

P.O.	1
Pol/Econ	2
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Adm.	
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SEC	
Cons	
Use	
NO	
IR	
SEC	4

GSY

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Classification

Country: Brazil

IR No.

Subject: (U) Navy Move to Brasilia

Date of report

Date of Information: 12 June 1969

No. of pages

Place & Date of Acq: Brasilia,
12 June 1969

References:

Eval: B 2

Prepared by:

Source:

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Summary: (FOUO) The Brazilian Navy Minister plans to move his ministry to Brasilia in July or August of this year. It is planned to do this in one large move rather than a phasing in by echelons over a period of time. For living purposes Navy personnel will be spread throughout the city rather than concentrated in one place. There is planning to increase the Marine force upwards to 2,000 men.

1. (FOUO)

Rather than a series of shifts by echelon, the Navy plans to make one big move in order to comply with the presidential directive to have the key parts of each ministry functioning in Brasilia by May 1970. This is not to say, he added, that there won't be parts left in Rio still programmed to move. Nonetheless, the bulk will come at one time, taking advantage of the July-August school vacation period. It is the Minister's desire not to have his key elements split between Rio and Brasilia,

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2. (U) Among the elements taking part in the move he mentioned the Minister's Cabinet, the Navy General Staff, and the Department of Personnel. The Minister himself will have offices on the third floor of the Navy Ministry building in Brasilia, following a third-floor tradition established in the building used prior to the present one in Rio (the later was occupied in 1936). The ninth floor, where the headquarters of the ENC now is located, will be used for communications, storage, and archive purposes. Admiral COUTINHO expects to move to his new Command Headquarters next to the Brasilia Yacht Club before the Ministerial transfer, depending on the resolution of a sewage disposal problem which they have encountered.

3. (E) Among other changes to take place is the creation of a 2,000 man Marine (Fuzileiro Naval) force for the ENC, he said. The Army, Navy, and Air Force -- who have identical territorial responsibility in this area -- have divided security tasks among themselves. These men are needed, said the Commandant, in order for him to fulfill his responsibilities under these agreements. The basic organization will be a battalion and any other Marine security elements located throughout the area will be subordinated to it. However, this is a plan still under study and a final decision has not yet been reached, he said.

4. (U) Housing for Navy personnel will be spread throughout Brasilia. This will be done for two reasons, said the Admiral. First, is security; personnel will not be concentrated and vulnerable at one location. Second, is the Navy belief that it is not desirable to live with the same people with whom you work all day; it is better to get away for a fresh outlook and to become a part of the local community. He acknowledged that the Army and Navy attitude on this subject is basically opposite, owing to the nature of their service experience over the years. Troop concentrations forced Army families to live together whereas Navy personnel in large cities had to spread out to find housing where ever it was available. However, the Army is beginning to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

tend toward the Navy point of view, he said.

COMMENT (c): The local naval command is maintaining a high degree of consistency to its _____. The last three commandants have made almost identical statements to me concerning the Navy housing policy. However, there is no indication here in Brasilia that the Army plans to abandon its policy living together. Army housing and construction consists of large clusters.

Admiral HENNING, the recently departed commandant, made similar remarks to me about a plan which he said was yet to be completed for augmenting the BNC Marine force from its present size of about 150 to 1000/2000 men. A National Security Council source once mentioned to me that there was talk of placing a Marine Company in Anapolis. In all, there is good indication of serious planning to greatly increase the Navy land combat capability in the national capital area. This increase likely has political as well as strategic implications.

Although not an aspect of their history of which the non-violence prone Brazilian military are proud, the fact is that in Rio the Navy possessed the demonstrated capability to head to sea, train its guns on the city and threaten to bombard the capital if due consideration was not given to the political demands of the dissidents. In Brasilia, since Gen. Meira Mattos' dash from Mato Grosso to secure the capital for the revolutionists of 1964, the Army has been the military master of the Planalto. At most, the Air Force could secure the airbase with its large police battalion and challenge the Army with an air attack from its counter guerilla squadron. In fact, it is precaution against the latter which offers one of the most plausible reason that the only artillery unit in the Planalto Command is an anti-aircraft group. The Navy at present has nothing to add muscle to its voice in the federal district. While there is a great deal of service unity today, any thinking Brazilian military man knows there is no guarantee this will always be true in the future.

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-4-

A thousand or so marines would be a force to be counted.

Finally, it should be noted that a large Navy migration will have a favorable economic impact on Brasilia. The city has suffered economically since the closing of Congress and the rapid move of EMFA was rumored to have been an effort of its chief to curry the President's favor by bringing an economic lift to the city. Should the Congress not be reopened this year, a Navy move in July-August and the Foreign Ministry move in September would be of special significance in helping maintain economic stability.

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